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THE PHANTASY OF THE NAKED TRUTH

A NOTE ON *COSÌ È* (PIRANDELLO)

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Despite the Censor, and under the inner promptings of the Wish, what Dramatization does for the dream, the drama does for Life. It fulfills it. . . . Now it is a rare thing for a sane consciously-guided individual to express in the manufactured ravings of a madman, the very thoughts the latter, by an unconscious mechanism, expresses in delusion. To us it is almost reminiscent of the detailed and successful fabrication of a dream, by some neurotic in the course of analysis; which again and again proves as valuable as the genuine dream itself. But when Thought is thus spontaneously expressed by a psychologically-minded dramatist (seemingly ignorant of the technicalities of the newer psychology, but by intuition, possessed of a knowledge of some of its independent findings as to the rôle of the Unconscious) and certainly by a man of superior intellect, it becomes especially valuable to us in our specialization. For it is nothing short of a stroke of genius for the author of a tragedy thus to deceive himself, the Censor and the world, and produce what has been universally acclaimed, a masterpiece of drama. Pirandello's *Così È* ("And that's the truth") contains in three short acts, the germ of the commonest and crudest phantasy of the insane mind. He states the problem through the mouths of the apparent insane, yet by this very method disarms all criticism and analysis, and allays all suspicion with the ingenuity of the devices he adopts.

Probably most of us who have had dealings with the insane, are at once wary of the individual who is beginning to have difficulty as to the realness of Reality; when things only "seem to be," actions are "as if"; and "perhaps there is no such thing as truth"; "how can we be sure life is not a dream"? "What after all is phantasy?"

"Is there for certain no objective basis for hallucination?" "Are not my delusions perhaps as real as other people's reflections?" and so on, and so on; and of the man "who is sure it is the physician who is mad, and whose reason is deflected, and he at least is sane, conscious, truthful, real." The mechanism that goes to the making of this attitude of mind is too well known to be repeated here; but when it is adopted as an elaborate pose, innocently in the person of a brilliant playwright (who thus for the first time produces a new symbol for the European stage), our attention is instantly arrested; and we may naturally pause to analyze this artifice and see what significant by-play lurks beneath.

This brief note on the essentials of the play in question, a play which has found sufficient notoriety to justify a recent performance in London, will dwell on the drama (1) as the public sees it (its manifest content), (2) as the author intended it to be appreciated (the statement of a social problem and the propounding of a philosophy—which we would nominate Rationalization), (3) from the psychologist's viewpoint (in terms of mechanisms, conduct, behavior); and from a slightly different angle—the possibility of the play's symbolic interpretation; and finally (4) from the viewpoint of the Unconscious; wherein its motives, implications and ultimate solution are alone to be found. . . . Special interest attaches to this drama, and some widespread attention will have been focused on our author and his philosophy, by some recent events of medico-legal interest, and by some events peculiar to himself. Common to them all is the effective lesson "How difficult it seems to distinguish Phantasy from Reality in the clash of Delusion and Truth."

We may take it as a commonplace that the Drama as a rule reflects Life, rarely foreshadows it. Yet recently with all the genuine hall-mark of reality—and a Pirandellesque reality at that—there has been staged on the stage of Life, two tragic-comedies that must have delighted the heart of that dramatic-philosopher. One—a recent occurrence in the author's native land, surrounds the personality of the inmate of a certain asylum. He claims to be the person and living reality of, a professor, believed by the world to be, dead. The latter's family swear to the truth of his claim; the authorities are convinced of his delusion, the real professor's old friends are divided in their opinions; indeed striking proofs are offered us from both parties, until the mere outsider (the world audience) is left baffled as to the meaning of it all; baffled as to the significance of honest human testimony and the value of evidence at all; and even the exist-

ence of absolute truth. It is not yet settled if this is a case of "possession" (identification); double personality (of the professor), delusion or merely hoax. The other, a homelier example, that has a good deal that runs parallel to our play both in the statement of the problem and the unconscious motives at work, was recently prominently before the public eye in England. It concerned the apparent delusion of an insane character who loved his wife but more so his mother; and who wove the phantasy that his wife was attempting to get rid of him and placing a whole network of organizations against him, commencing with his medical advisers. Her unfaithfulness to him and her seduction by *them*, justified he said, all his anxiety. She for her part stated on oath that he was trying to get rid of her, that he attempted to attack his mother-in-law; and that there was no basis for this suspicion of a "conspiracy," or of her misconduct with the medical men in question. She claimed that he indeed sent her on the streets to prostitute herself. On her statement he was certified insane. He, for his part, swore further that these delusions of unfaithfulness were not imaginary but the truth, and could be verified; and indeed some of her stated actions lent support to his sane husbandly anxiety; and he coolly stated that she had had him certified thus to be free for *their* attentions. It subsequently transpired that he was only kept in a state of tolerable, apparent sanity by the artifices of both his own mother and his wife, who played up to his delusion, by writing angry letters to one another meant for his eye; and by the wife writing letters to his dictation and fitting in with his delusion. The whole trend of the story was so confusing that, thus living in a world of delusion and phantasy, or a world of reality seen through his eyes or her's, many of *us* may have been pardonably hard put to say where delusion ended and Life began; which was the unreal, which the Truth. Fortunately sufficient expert psychological opinion was at hand to decide the point before further baffling complications (say by the justification of delusion) arose.

From Pirandello's own life we have a subsequent contribution to his philosophy in his newer novels and plays, further elaborating the Unreality-motif he has been working at for thirty years; and in a recent production of his play "Naked," which carries our play about the uncertainty of "veiled truth" to its logical conclusion. We see truth "laid bare," stripped of its trappings, and make-believe, and at last as naked truth, revealed; with the discovery 'Truth absolute is non-existent, it too is illusionary. . . . There is no certainty; all seems; Life is but a problematic reality.' The motives and mecha-

nisms for the emergence of such healthy philosophic doubt may perhaps be investigated, at least so far as a study of the present play permits. An analysis of the ultimate determinants in the author's mind and life is not attempted; but we may be pardoned some deduction on this score from the written message—his story's confession, or the plea that authors in thus publishing their thought-creations to the world, throw themselves open to self-revelation in so far as the trained eye has power to observe.

We as psychologists find a special significance in, and may perhaps sense a vein of morbidity in, the conceptual psyche when an author repeatedly and significantly, makes a symbol of Unreality in attempting to conceive for his own mind and that of his audience, all external phenomena and beings of his environment, in terms of subjective processes and ideas; at length fusing (or confusing) them into phantoms of an hallucinatory looking-glass world, where substance and shadow meet, and Thought alone is truth. The denial of Reality serves as a rule to cloak a purpose in the mind of the perpetrator; for it is an artifice quite apart from a philosophic attempt to make life tolerable by rectifying (if not wrecking), absolute values in the world in consonance with a preconceived desideratum of the relativity of its standards. This desire to discover the bare truth (by a whole community in this case), sparing themselves no pains to get "to the bottom of things" and expose all that is hidden, in fact to be left face to face with "naked reality," very often savors of the psychopath, if (in the individual) it is pushed to an extreme; and we all know cases of asylum patients who harp on this very problem of the "bare facts"—and the "naked truth." This signifies, in their case, the sexual knowledge, sex secrets, and sex parts they fondly would "lay bare" and "expose."

But let us first of all acquaint ourselves with the Manifest Story as the audience understands it, and then examine the viewpoints of the chief participants in the story, analyzing the implications of their subterfuge and craft.

The plot can be very briefly sketched. . . .¹ It is an incident of our times. A new secretary arrives in a north Italian town to take up his duties at the district registry. He brings with him his wife and her mother; but he maintains two separate establishments—one for his mother-in-law and another for his wife. This soon sets

¹ It is assumed, however, that the reader is familiar with the play, or has it before him, as our essay cannot for lack of space be cumbered with a mass of quotations in support.

every tongue wagging, and the more the new arrivals shun society the more eager grows its curiosity about them. At length a courtesy call on the part of one of the local ladies forces some explanation from the new secretary. Briefly it is that his mother-in-law is mad but her delusions must be humored. This would have cleared up everything had not the lady in question followed close upon his heels with the reluctant avowal, that her poor son-in-law is mad, and must be sympathetically nursed in his delusions. The rest of the play is taken up with the efforts of local society to rediscover where the Truth lies.

MANIFEST STORY

The manifest story through his eyes as gathered from various hints throughout the play runs as follows:

"My childless wife whom I had married seven years ago, was killed with her (childless) cousin three years later in an earthquake, and her devoted mother as a result lost her reason. I remarried (? the younger sister) two years after this (*i.e.*, two years ago) and when with her nurse in a private home, the mother saw this girl (who is also childless) she conceived the delusion that this was the dead daughter; in reality, never dead, but just shut away by myself till then, entirely for my own pleasure. We do not disturb the happy delusion, as her present degree of sanity and well-being depends on it; rather by our actions, words and subterfuges do we aid her in the delusion. I indeed shout her the truth that this is my second wife, but I have to do so in frenzy and maniacal histrionic outbursts, so that she will discount it, thinking me mad. In quieter moments, I comfort her that this is my first wife, a 'truth' that she prefers. . . ."

Through *her* eyes the story is:

"My daughter soon after marriage seven years ago acquired a certain contagious disease and was isolated in hospital; and the devoted husband, as a result, lost his reason and (as he believed) his wife. He knew her again only as another woman. So he remarried (or went through a process of marriage) a few weeks later with the aid of his nurse and the doctor of the hospital to which he had been transferred. He is certain we have taken the other woman away against her will, and they (of the hospital) have killed her, and this woman (his wife who consents to play the part) is some other whom he loved. We do not disturb the happy delusion as his present degree of sanity and well-being depend upon it. Rather by action, word and deed do we aid the delusion."

Thus each in his own quiet way lives his life and reveals (unwittingly) the secret story of the other. Neither gives evidence of the

insane conduct claimed of him, except in the presence of the other, to keep up (as each tells us) the delusion the other harbors. . . . Though we as audience may anxiously demand a way out of this conflict of evidence to side with one or the other, no solution is possible, seeing that all written evidence and human testimony is destroyed. Recall, the whole environment was wiped out by the subsequent earthquake. Each gives us a plausible story, but one surely must be discounted. The further protestations and manner of each does little to settle the point for us. *He* continues:

"To satisfy my mother-in-law's delusion, I have in effect to act at times the maniacal excitement of insanity, though assuming an immediate calm (as we observe) when out of her presence. Again, I have to pretend, the new woman is Lena her daughter, with whom she is allowed to correspond, and (from the undistinguishing distance) see. The whole world must needs be shut out of *her* life too, to keep up the deception (for our part), and the delusion (for hers)." (Thus he keeps no servant, he does his own shopping, she does not visit or receive visits, and is virtually locked up; and if appearing at all, is ever veiled. She may not play the piano, and her whole interest is a love and obedience to him.) Unfortunately these elaborate efforts to preserve the mother's hesitant sanity, by allowing her to persist in quiet delusion, seem liable to awkward jars, by his well-meaning efforts to help it on, with his own pretended maniacal outbursts; when at the top of his voice he forces from her words of comfort for his apparent insanity and extorts from her beliefs opposed to his delusion, *e.g.*, that this is Julia, when her deluded fancy has it that it is Lena. (It is such weak points in the technique that indeed lend support to the conjecture that the man is insane; other points will be discussed later.)

Meanwhile *her* further story states:

"I, to keep up his delusion and to help him pull himself together, must needs pretend to have no more interest in my daughter (as she is some other's) can never see her except by chance at a distance, and rarely write her. In truth he is a passionate lover, and the zeal which he had for her seven years ago (when newly engaged) has only been exaggerated since, in the fear that he may lose her again (or, as he thinks, lose her supplanter in his affections again). I am content to leave them so, realizing that it is wrong for a mother to interfere with the relations of her daughter, or have her remain so closely as before."

The conclusion for both sides is reached, when a number of episodes that threaten to betray the success of the artifice of one or other party (or the futility of their individual delusions) reach a climax. It occurs through the curiosity and unfeeling inquisition into

the facts, by the entire town. This is too much for both parties to the conspiracy—this prying into their private life; and he, resigning his position and she her flat, betake themselves to another town; out of which they will doubtless be hounded as ever before, by the force of public opinion, compound of curiosity, distrust, rumor, and that crude sense of justice in keeping with conventional morality.

CRYSTAL AND FLAW

So much for the manifest content of the story through their individual eyes; though multi-faceted it seems crystal-clear. The author purposely narrows down the issues, in permitting two, and only two "interpretations" of the life they lead (or their manner of living), his and hers; and only two histories of the cause and onset of the present insanity, his and hers. . . . This is secured by a fire and an earthquake (for both) blotting out the landscape and its inhabitants, and all documents that might tend to throw light on the "claims" of each party in this conspiracy of silence. What a brain-storm from shock (separation) does for the one, a brain-storm from shock (earthquake) does for the other (the mother-in-law); and the silent disease does its work. We have no desire to comment here on the technical structure or possible imperfections of the play; but the basic fallacy is of course obvious. The mother-in-law and her family is available to give evidence, for he remarried (according to his statement) long after the earthquake, so *they* were not lost. The date will be fixed in his mind, either as of two years ago or (according to her story) as of seven years ago. (In either case it must be well remembered; for the earthquake does not affect *his* mind, and he could have been questioned thereon.) The nurse in charge of the mother-in-law in the nursing home, could have proved her presence there (this, too, was after the earthquake, and so further evidence not destroyed). While he, in his (supposed) sane moments and when admittedly not acting, gives evidence (probably unintentional on the author's part) of his evident insanity which would discredit his evidence, *e.g.*,

(1) Witness how he once "broke up a piano and destroyed it," so that neither mother nor wife should "ever dream of trying to play . . . must not. . . ." It was an attack of mania.

(2) The nature of Ponza's love. "He wants her whole heart, her every thought for himself" and insists that the natural affection the mother might have for her child "should reach her through me." ("That is going pretty strong" is the calm retort.) It is nevertheless his "nature" so to act; "perhaps a sort of disease, a fullness of love, a love

shut off from the world" . . . The wife indeed is "passionately adored," and with a "completion of devotion" that only the maniacally ecstatic is capable of. It is a "jealous" passion in this "closed world of theirs" and "so completely is he in love with her that he will not allow anyone to approach her." Much of this is from the mother's biased story, but it is independently borne out by his own behavior; and the manifest fact that his wife lives boxed up in the fifth story flat, no servant to help her, no piano to amuse her, and forbidden to see anyone, lest as he says, "she receives caresses intended for another woman . . . a torment beyond conception."

(3) On his own admission he has to lock his mother up too. . . . She lives in confinement and "knows only his love" for "they are always together." His great love for her in pretending to play the frenzied madman we have already seen.

Apart from these imperfections (inherent in the play's psychology, and the effect of the author's unconscious stress on apparent wife-devotion, which analytically we recognize as hatred; and to detract attention thereby from the figure his love is really centered upon), the stated problem might well hold; but we think it would have been more natural to synchronize rather the isolation and the earthquake, and make the second wife (if so she be) the younger daughter of Frola; whereby the poignancy of the situation would be more acutely intensified. There is some reason to believe that this was unconsciously the author's conception and that he is playing with this thought, too. We shall subsequently comment on the psychological problems involved in all this, when we review the mother's love and no less the son's to her and to his wife.

HINTS OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST AT WORK

That Pirandello is a psychologist and shrewd observer of men cannot be doubted, and probably of intent he introduces many of the common mechanisms of the psyche and the Unconscious, and the significant character-traits so characteristic of the psychopathic mind. We see for example, the *jealousy* motif; jealousy towards the daughter in the loving attitude of the mother; how she is "resigned to" the girl being locked up in the son-in-law's love, and how she "does not break in on their privacy." Her exaggerated description of his passionate fondness for his wife betokens this, and her minimization of his fondness for her. True to life is her anxiety for this daughter's safety which goes to the point of allowing him to keep her locked up if necessary, lest she (the wife) should be taken from him again. An

explanation of her conduct is forthcoming . . . *"her trying to find a reason to explain why her son-in-law should be keeping her away from her daughter. This effort of hers to justify it and then to adapt herself to excuses of her own invention."* Rationalization in essence is here betrayed. Many other subtle points observable from the working of the Unconscious in sane and insane alike are emphasized in this play, and not the least characteristic observation of our author is . . . *"To feel the need of maintaining the pretense. . . . He feels sure of himself that way."*

We insist on this soft world of make-believe in regard to ourselves, but demand something of more solid basis in regard to our environment; if only to bring home to us that not all the world is so, and outside us Reality *does* exist. ". . . They all want the truth—a truth, something specific, something concrete. . . . They don't care what it is . . . something categorical." This is the essence of the craving of the healthy mind to be reassured of the realness of things, as against the insane who want to forget it for themselves and for the world.

THE AIR OF RATIONALIZATION

Constantly seeking to lead us away from the sober truth underlying the artificialities his genius has created, the author at every turn draws distracting motifs across our path, and side-tracks the real issue by sudden transitions in thought or fresh and novel incidents in the story's unfolding. With the ultimate nature of this "truth" and this "reality" that the superimposed artifice hides, we are not as yet acquainted; we shall dwell upon it in our solution of the play (p. 136). But it may be stated here, that the quintessence is from the realms of the Unconscious; it is unacceptable, is against conventions; and as such, endeavor is made to put it out of mind, and shelve the problems by side-issues. This (with its identical problem) is well and interestingly stressed in his "Six Characters" that their father-creator *"no longer wishes to put into a world of art."* Yet once "born a character" they "cannot die." The immoral story woven around them proves too revolting for the stage, they are shelved . . . *"we are really side-tracked,"* yet they strive for expression, and for the reality the author cannot bring himself to provide. He puts them "out of his mind" and they wander thus free onto the stage of Life; though the ultimate nature of the "truth" they reveal in *their* play is identical with the truth behind our own; and only the constant chorus of derision and the piercing "Ha!" that in its high-pitched mockery

breaks through the confusing mists of the dual phantasy, tells of the hidden certain Truth beneath. . . . It is no explanation of the collective delusion of all three in "That's the Truth" to say, as Pirandello does, "It is a living world of phantasy," of phantasy for all three; nor yet that "it has all the semblance of reality." We must ask why do some people find it necessary to harbor the delusion, and why can their sanity only be secured by the preservation of its voluntary artificiality. He rationalizes, in other words, that 'each of the two parties is, of intent, living consciously in the delusion of the other, whilst unwitting thrall of his own. . . .' And such is Life; the whole picture is of ourselves! He lays great stress also on the futility of evidences of reality; manuscripts, certificates, witnesses, and the opinions of the world jury; bringing in the inadmissibly faulty argument, that an external object capable of approach from many viewpoints and productive of a multiplicity of conceptions, from a variety of onlookers, cannot have an absolute reality of its own; rather must that object, compound of a multiplicity of realities (so-called) and being "all things to all men," be only a relative truth to itself. . . . The *conception* of the object is to him as real as the object, and has as much right to be so considered, in view of the uncertainty of objective proof for its real and ultimate existence.

" . . . She has created for him, and he for her a world of fancy which has all the ear-marks of Reality itself.² And in this fictitious reality they get along perfectly well³ . . . and the world of fancy, this reality of theirs, no document can possibly destroy, because the air they breathe is of that world. You are in the extraordinary fix of having before you, on the one hand a world of fancy and on the other a world of reality, and you for the life of you are not able to distinguish one from the other."

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEME

Pirandello seems to sum this up as follows: Tolerable life is built on an elaborate illusion that must be kept up for the sake of our sanity. Destroy that illusion, *i.e.*, unmask the deception, and the world's (man's) whole happiness is annihilated. It is the Truth that kills. Destroy the standard of comparison (evidence—human evidence) for the two sides of reality, and you cannot get at the truth;

² Quotations throughout are from the English version. We should render " . . . a world of fancy which has the same coherence and texture as Reality itself" (*la stessa consistenza della realtà*).

³ "They live in perfect accord, complete serenity" (*in perfetto accordo . . . pacificate*).

for all is relative. And are not those two sides but mirror images of one another? The searchings of science and philosophy after the Truth can only succeed in undermining the grounds of that complex illusion which certain folk ("the family")—already "fled" from the "unbearable" reality of the past into a present happy world of make-believe—have succeeded in creating. The father and his family well realize that they will be hounded down again, driven away into madness and "another world" (village), if this Truth they believe in is subjected to the cold light of Reason. "Only leave us alone," they beg, "don't come prying into our affairs, don't cross-question us, or the remedy our love has found must fail." They fear the light of day, the lamp of reason. For that artifice, that Truth is at its best but a standard, different for each individual; at most but a relative scale of reckonings; and they ask themselves are not the conditions of existence identical if (as we suppose) all are suffering from the self-same delusion, or all are sane? But the chances of doubt, uncertainty, improbability, etc., are so great that it is best not to make the search for truth, or unfeelingly to upset that elaborate superstructure of make-believe which is Civilized Life. But if this is truth, says the wandering author and Ponza, let me live on lies.

This articulate cry in the mind of the world and of our author for the wilds of phantasy and a phantasy of lies, may bring us to a discussion of the psychological causation. For the moment, however, we will dwell on the clever stage artifices that the author uses to bring out the images of the great mind conceiving his play. . . . Looking into his brain he sees the wings of a stage, the footlights and the curtain rising on his vivid imagination. The characters that are to follow break loose their bonds, and escaping from the wings and stage of phantasy, dash into the cockpit of the world to become "characters"; that is his formula. It is the essence of what we may term his Symbolism in drama.

SYMBOLISM

It is the inevitable outcome of the Pirandellesque approach to Nature, namely, his tendency to hold up the mirror to her, and confound mankind with the reality glancing back—for the author to manufacture and multiply similes to justify his theme, and conveniently to propound a philosophy in consonance with his symbols and in challenge of that held by the world. Nowhere is this better seen than in his ingenious employment of symbolism and much of the magnificence and grandeur of the play is secured by the staggering

significance behind this all-unassuming usage. The figure of Truth in the play is the prime exemplar of this artifice; Truth is symbolic. Truth is here the emblem of Reality, an absolute amid the clash of uncertainties, and wavering delusions that confuse the mind and confound the intellect; a woman-figure whom in their baffling bewilderment both sides must needs create, for the reassurance of their dubious minds. She is to be an indubitable substantiality, and she is called Truth. The crafty cynic in the playwright half-knowingly betrays us even in this symbol, when he makes emblematic of truth, a wish-fulfillment figure, an hallucinatory reality for both; unsubstantial figmentary nonexistent and all unreal, to remind us that there is no absolute Truth, no certainty in Life, and veiled Truth with its gaze on the world, can only be tolerated through the impenetrable darkness of a mourning veil, a veil of shame. Life has to be founded on make-believe, a lie from the first; for her to exist. When we tear the veil away and seek to gaze on naked truth, she is gone ". . . as for myself I am nothing," and only a ghost of verisimilitudes. While not offering this as a philosophy or statement of dogmatism, our author uses this subtlety and symbol to provoke to self-questionings the smug intellectuality of the world, its too-ready credence of accepted "facts," its weak logic, its loss of critical faculty. He only demands reasonable Doubt of us; and by provoking thought hopes to stimulate thought.

We might say of this symbol—by way of mild rationalization of the theme—that it is Veiled Truth locked away from the eyes of the world, and merely explained to it, revealed to it, by two rival schools of philosophy; each seeing it in a different light and from the standpoint of its own preconceptions. Absolute Truth can never be known by the world, only the unsatisfying *relative* truths. As such, as we have said, it is nonexistent, delusive, and an abstraction; a picture conceived by a thinking world, of whom the remainder can only report—"I have no use for philosophy, give me *facts*." It is an abstraction, a figment to enable mankind to lead this little life in peace, by a series of well-concocted artifices, habits, views, conventions, all firmly adhered to, and in which environmental make-believe, all the mentally-stable live. Explode the delusion, says the author, unbare the voluntary fairy-tale, shatter the dream, and "the labor of untold sacrifice" crumbles into nothingness; and we are plunged into insanity. We who have been "living on the edge of a volcano" are forced to flee, are hounded down by those who still cling to sanity, and must wander, like Ponza, from the light of day, restless from place to place, and sacrifice our happiness in life—as reward for this attempt to understand it. We cannot, we must not, we were not meant to,

"grasp" it. By harboring our delusions we live, without them we die (psychic death), till we learn to realize "it is the Truth that kills."⁴

Now, through the eyes of the characters of the play, this symbol of Truth is the creation of desire; at once the wish-fulfillment of a mother for a daughter in her own image (the only daughter, who died—the phantasy of the rejuvenated self), and the wish-fulfillment of an impotent lover for a wife, to replace her that was taken away (the image of the mother—his own mother-image). She is product of a power of thought peculiar to both; "all may become a reality if only we *wish* it," or as our author himself says in another play, "a family come into being through my *will*." Both mother and son keep up the collective hallucination (in their case a *folie à deux* as it might be called), to enable *him* in embracing the mother (in-law) to feel her as the maiden-daughter she once was, and *her* in embracing the son-in-law to see him, as her boy. The full significance of this phantasy to the understanding of the architecture of the play will be appraised subsequently; suffice it that the theme of possession of the daughter by her father and the recognition in her, ultimately of his mother (maiden mother), is the stock-in-trade of the Pirandello drama; undisguised, passionate and seemingly natural. It is only the prevailing air of unreality, delusion or "acting a part" that secures its passage through the censor of the Unconscious and the Life. The naked mother-wife, the bare phantom we vainly pursue after, and see her in every loved object that we feel with our fingers, see with our eyes; that veiled woman we must needs expose and lay bare, that woman most loved and most lovely in all the world, the one whom we would have knowledge (carnal knowledge) of, is Truth, Sophia and the mother; she is the much-desired . . . but Truth is unattainable. It is only the insane, he says, who thus cling to her image throughout life, lock her up in their spacious "upper stories," allow no one to approach her or speak with her, love her as their very own. "Truth crying from the house-tops"; an unreality that cannot be, a woman that cannot be—either's.

THE ACTOR AND THE SYMBOLIC STAGE

Realizing the nature of the one living phantom on the stage (always in the background, always spoken of, but who at the end

⁴ This, it will be recalled, was Ibsen's haunting idea: "Dare we reveal the truth to the world?" Its tragic outcome is seen best in "Rosmersholm," until as Master Builder he realized the finest edifice is built on phantasy, and the happiest in this world is a Castle in the air!"

confronts us amid the living images of life), we shall better be able to understand the symbolic nature of the Stage itself in this play; the stage across which she stalks and moves; also the symbolism of the actors male and female (and more especially the place of Laudisi in their midst). We shall view them as the author intends them to be understood; though this aspect—the symbolic—is simply another attempt by his mind to cast the shadow of unreality over the realistic chronicle of events, and across the forbidden theme with which he toys. In fine, the expanse of stage, and the two rooms encircling this drama symbolize the human Mind in action, conscious and unconscious, male and female viewpoints, with the interpreter, the rationalist and the censor ever present. We shall discuss this under the next heading.

The inquisitive folk of the "place," determined to hound down the truth, to discover the mode of life of these two and squeeze out the facts, to sift the evidence and peruse all manuscripts, are symbolic of the well-meaning inquirers of the world, "the seekers after Truth." They are the scientists—evidently, grown out of a sublimated "stupid Curiosity" and inquisitiveness in regard to the workings of Nature—the intimacy of the family life (the sexual relationship) being the ultimate aim of their peepings. Further, the life of the world is here symbolic of the mental life, admittedly repressed from the sight of the world, "locked up," veiled from the light of consciousness and ourselves.

MIND IN ACTION—DRAMATIZATION AND THE OFFICE OF THE CENSOR

Over-emphasized as this symbol of the Mind is, we can ultimately trace two situations that most prominently symbolize its existence and its workings; and we soon realize how ingeniously the simile has been followed through. Man's thoughts are made so many male characters; his counter-thoughts so many female. The conscious plane is the stage, this room before us; and the Unconscious is the room beyond the partition; then the resounding corridor and the (water-tight) compartments leading off, one at least is locked. Whatever happens then, within the realms of Mind in the full focus of attention, is treated as a (mental) scene in the limelight of the stage. Realities are "acting parts"; thoughts are puppets, and working from the promptings of the Will, but ever scrutinized, criticized, queried and skeptically viewed by the supermind on this stage—the Censor of plays and thoughts. It will be seen that Laudisi from the first "plays" this part of censor critic, impartial judge, as he stands between unconscious and conscious. True, this character hides the

person of the author himself ("the open mind" on the subject) which merely signifies that the expressed philosophy of the dramatist is the result of his mental deliberations, his weighing of both sides of the question and the coming and going through his mind (stage) of just those unconnected, discordant thoughts (characters) he has permitted us to gaze on, when he raises the curtain and focuses the lime-lights on their existence; an existence which perhaps was unsuspected; for Laudisi all along is of another world. He can "dissociate" from these wishes, these silent wishes clothed in Thought, these characters that dominate the mind. It is no mere accident that the scene takes place in the "upper story" that colloquially the mind is named.

Thus it will be noted that it pleases the author to view reality as a play, and our serious thoughts as enacted on a stage. "*It's all planned in advance. It will be a most interesting scene. The curtain rises at eleven*" ("A scene it really was I suppose . . . I pretended") and the clash of volition and cognition, unconscious and conscious, is staged accordingly.⁵ On the *Left* we have the Unconscious symbolized. It is the drawing room; it is the mother's aspect of the (life) problem, Frola's and Amalia's; it is the Woman's attitude, Woman who is all for theory, rumor, hearsay phantasy—the affective side; of those who for the most part believe *her* story. It is no less the daughter's (the daughter buried in the mother) Dina Lena, (?) Nina's side.

Balanced against this is the Conscious viewpoint; hard facts, reality, evidence, certainty, symbolized in the room on the Right, and the son's aspect of the problem; the masculine protest. It is no less the father's standpoint; the commissioner's, the Prefect with a bias for his subordinate, Ponza's "final superior." A thin partition separates the right from the left; ever and anon the old-time music *she* used to play floats through, with its haunting memories, the "Door" they are all frightened to close, remaining imperceptibly open the while ("*the matter is closed . . . close the door*"). This symbolic curtain is there to remind us of the veil and the censor on the threshold, whence our inspiration and desperation comes. Laudisi pauses between the two aspects of mind. . . . "*It is all planned in advance. The curtain rises at eleven . . . the ladies in one room,*

⁵ This technical approach has been seized upon and elaborated by the modern Russian drama, of which Eyreinov's "Theatre of the Soul" is an interesting exemplar. But it is too obviously analytically inspired and consciously pieced together. Pirandello writes as if oblivious of his deeper subtleties and unconscious implications.

the men in the other, afterwards all of them here." We see them face to face and from their conflict, apparent Truth appears. For "Truth will out."

In view of the unsubstantiality of this pageantry of thoughts manifestly moving in the *mind* of the author (who at any rate concedes his *own* reality), it is not surprising that other similes in the course of the play should likewise emphasize the two imposing themes of Shadow and Substance, Delusion and Life; in fact the Phantasy-Reality principle is much overdetermined in this play, but with evident motivation. But for us the phantasy-reality in the two rooms, his and her's, is merely the realism of Truth from consciousness as against the mirror-image of Delusion (phantasy) from the Unconscious.

Viewed from another angle, this conflict of stark reality and latent dream is well seen in the symbol of the two locked Rooms, his and hers. It will be remembered that the man harbors a veiled image of his wife (mother) at the top story of a dismal high tenement flat (mind), whilst to (and in) that image his mother (in-law) speaks. A voice from the depths, a faint sound as if "*from the bottom of a well*" communicates between them, or in a message in a traveling basket, filled at either destination. The significant remark of the "room and its balcony" being "five stories *deep*" shows from which end the conscious mind is viewing the scene. It is the sound of the voice that is still, the song "*she used to play*" that rises into consciousness, into the room where Ponza lives. And at the other end of the scale is the luxurious Unconscious, locked and barred to approach.

In the combined symbol then we have the mother-image *welling up* from the depths of unconscious, and masquerading on the conscious level ⁶ as she emerges past the censor from the left-hand room, only to be confronted with the reality principle, the ego, the conscious self come down from the heights onto the plane of Truth (the scene of the drawing room on the stage); both *pretending*, for this dramatization of their desires. When *they* can see eye to eye, truth is born.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TOUCHES AND THE UNCONSCIOUS IMPLICATION

The ultimate implication of the phantasy at the level of the unconscious, and precisely what the problem arises from, and what it is driving at, may be expressed somewhat as follows:

⁶ That all this is enacted on the mental stage is hinted at in the remark . . . "They all carry just such a shadow inside themselves, and here they are racking their brains about the phantom in other people."

A family of husband, wife and her mother are thrown onto the world out of chaos (*i.e.*, thrown onto the scene out of the darkness of the author's imagination); but you may see the three puppets at work. They are representative of a typical situation such as you meet every day. Now it is no business of conventional morality in the world (townsfolk) to pass judgment on the inner (unconscious) desires of such a man. . . . His real desire is for the love (by Unconscious fixation) of his mother-in-law (the mother imago). . . . "*I love her as my own mother*" even though this means losing the love and person of his own wife; indeed she is only an unreal figure (it transpires), to embody that desire. She for her part, by a process of conversion-projection is made the conscious antithesis, *i.e.*, mother rival; a protection against any such realization of her true import. She tries, to her fullest extent, to keep these two lovers apart, shutting herself up on high to prevent the mother climbing up to see her; trying to rouse by artful means her husband's jealousy and desire for her, and draw his love back to herself. It is of course the mother of old, the young mother-maid as he conceives her, who is there all along in the imago shut away in the top stories of his mind, that draws him to herself; and indeed is successful.

But her desperate and useless stratagem can only be achieved by renunciation of life's pleasures; a recession into an insane delusion that "each is devotedly attached to a third (mental) party, *i.e.*, herself. But (each being blinded to the other's desires), Frola in reality is sacrificing her whole life and that of the other in a kind endeavor to do justice to this party—who is nonexistent, simply Truth. She is the mirror of something in ourselves, the image of the mother, the reflection of that Conscience which stands threateningly over us; imploring and even defiant, between us and our desires. And their desire it is true is but for an image; an unreal phantasy that cannot be, a woman that cannot be, either's. In the one it is the past-and-done image of her youth; to the other the vision of the mother as a young virgin; "*and as for myself I am nothing.*"

The strange desire, it is evident, is by the mother for her son but even in his case the complementary position holds; it is a maternal fixation that we—in borrowing a term from bacteriology—might call his "complement fixation." Viewing the problem from a slightly different angle we can discern in the play . . . "A man confronted with a woman he loves as his own mother and whom he will not see tortured, spoken to, or cross-questioned by any other. With her at the close he walks away arm in arm, blessed by his mind's creation (the wife) for the expedient he has adopted (justification). He leaves her for the world to gaze on—a phantom-creation that morality,

convention and civilized society has invented—a living being, and so-called wife wrapped in the delusions (the veil) of his weaving to produce *something apart from his mother* (note his endeavor to keep her away from his mother); and with whom at every turn the mother wishes to be joined to, identified with and (what the conscious mind is at never-ceasing pains to prevent) one with. For the daughter's presence—this hallucinatory being—represents both aspects of the desire, of mother and son; and in the cold light of reason she fades, and we—we are left in the dark as to the meaning of it all.

DISCUSSION OF MECHANISMS

Now we can understand this jealous guarding by the hero of the secrets of Truth; that Truth, that guarded Truth, that veiled Truth, which the wife represents. Tear off the veil (mask) that each (of us) supplies and both stare in utter horror at the disillusion of their fancies. They are driven to insane despair when the image each one really embraces is manifest. . . . We are indeed mad and blind ourselves to the truth which we shut off, and dare not look upon, or allow others to penetrate. We voluntarily blind ourselves by acting, appearing to others and thinking in a false (pseudo-truthful) way, to make civilized life bearable. Destroy this, we are indeed sane but reduced to the level of beasts (for "it is only in a madhouse where one says all one thinks"). 'Tis then the stark horror of *that* truth of Ponza's first dawns on man's mind. . . .

Such a great passion as Ponza manifests towards his wife has a deeper psychological import, though we must bear in mind that certain features in the story are of necessity exaggerated, seeing that they are only made manifest to us through the mother's eyes. It will be recalled that so great was the depth of this passion of Ponza's for his wife that he was killing her with his love, and it is in consequence of this that she has a breakdown directly after marriage, and must be separated from him. That love is so consuming as to turn him mad. That love is so insistent as to well forth in the Wish (fulfilled in the subsequent delusion) that she were dead, and that another was put in her place. He does not, he dare not, recognize her on becoming sane. It is this Wish which makes him marry a second time, marry the new image of the old creation. That love is so profound as to keep her actually locked up—away from everyone, to enjoy her by himself. Such great passion it will readily be realized covers a deeper dislike and hatred of the girl. It covers a projection of jealousy on to his wife, which is the expression of his own love for another. The

degree of this love and its implications we have discussed elsewhere. That love in fine is pathological, and tells of the fixation from which Ponza has never freed himself. This other mate is, like he, dressed in black. That is why (through *his* eyes) *her* daughter is all make-believe, she is dead, nonexistent, and he is married to a make-believe other wife, that, we observe, the mother clings so pathetically to, *as if* her own. For, plain for all the world to see, this phantom is the mother-imago, and she cannot be separated from her, yet only by remaining distant and distinct from her, can this new marriage succeed. Of course she is but illusory ("*living with a ghost*," "*might as well be in another world*") and only in thought is he wedded to her, his mother; but for a brief moment she materializes on the stage of life right at the close, that we may see her; and there for a spell before our eyes is a phantom dressed in black, and with a black veil even as his mother. Now we can realize the ambivalence of Ponza's attitude; how he worships not only the mother but the daughter within the mother (*i.e.*, the picture of the young, ever youthful mother he discerns within her breast. Recall how she continues to play the very melody her daughter played, and for him is living her life). It is this latter which he secures for himself by locking her up in a fashionable flat, forbidding visitors to her and (as rumor rightly insists) treating her more as a lover than a dam. She for her part rightly professes a fondness and anxiety for him; for she knows, she bears within herself a Reality preferable by far to the phantom image of herself. He lives with her as his wife in that upper story elsewhere; in truth living with her in the heights of imagination, and in the depths of despair.

To appreciate the psychological import of this fanatical fixation and fantastic delusional system, we have perforce to conceive in terms of the mental imagery of the patients (in this case each of the characters of the play), and step into his mind and no less the mind of the Author, before we can gauge the import of his phantasy. We do so even at the risk of appearing to be carried away by the lunatic's own arguments and basing our logic on his tottery premises. We do so in order to state the problem in the light of his deeper reasoning, his unconscious motives. The mechanisms at work have thus become simplified. The theme of hate runs its great undercurrent beneath this pathological passion for a phantom of unreality nominated Truth; the vision of the forbidden, and forbidding; the beloved and the bereaved, ultimately the incestuous love for the unattainable, the image of the mother-maiden-wife.

THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM: ANALYTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The insistence of these thought-characters *playing* a part—the artifice of DRAMATIZATION, brings us finally to this widely recognized unconscious mechanism so well-instanced in the normal dream. There is wish-fulfillment on the stage, too. And thus is the light of our discussion, the solving of the problem of the play by us on the *other* side of the footlights—beyond the delusional conspiracy, and uninfluenced by the basic complex, can at last be attempted. For there is an answer to the conflicting story of *Così E*. It sums up the whole of our previous arguments and restated it might run somewhat as follows:

"A son-in-law finds himself in love with his own mother-in-law whom he loves as his mother; indeed they are Mother and Son without the Law. They have become deeply attracted to one another and agree to live together (cohabit), under the very eyes of an unsympathetic scandal-making, gossiping, superficially-minded, convention-bound world, by means of an ingenious ruse; "a work of love" as they admit "of untold sacrifice." To allay suspicion they concoct an external truth (*i.e.*, an imaginary belief that each attempts to live up to) that each considers the other mad. Each boldly points to an evident trait of insanity in the other, since each for the purpose is acting a lunatic's part. They purposely repress "in their souls" the truth of this, so as to foster a world of phantasy for their prying neighbors; impenetrable because unsuspected, unassailed because of such seeming innocence, and from out whose shadows Truth (till the last page) never dawns on their simple minds. The type chosen is manic-depressive insanity with delusions, and the content of the supposed delusions is such as to focus attention on a (neutral) third party who is admittedly but a fiction (though for the purposes of the drama is a real being), that both intensely hate, but to all appearance, equally love. The conspiracy gives us to understand that the mother preserves a deep love for a stranger not her daughter (his version of her delusion) and that the man conceives a real love for a woman not his (believed) wife—her version of his delusion; and thus while either can tell himself he is only acting the part (pretense) and tell the loved one so, and tell the public so, and even in the same breath deny it for himself and the loved one, the real state of affairs, the real truth, never strikes them whom it is intended to deceive; for they cannot themselves relinquish the viewpoint of phantasy (a visualization of the "plain facts"), and *must* view the domestic problem (which is Life) from one attitude or the other, his or hers. . . . And so it comes about that the conspirators can bamboozle the world, and when all the "Town" is reflecting, expostulating and gossiping and rumoring on the truth and the *reality* of this phantom-image, together the two stalk quietly away arm in arm, he

and she, the writer and his mother-imago; and go to another world where gossip, censure and misunderstanding no longer prevail.

And so we have the seeming paradox of Pirandello expose the whole truth of life to the world and still for them nothing (is hid) but the Truth, "nothing but the truth."

And the reason for just this smothering up of the facts? It is buried in the secret of human nature. For the guilty secret of these two cannot be denied and comes out in a parallel play by Pirandello wherein the mother-character emphasizes "*. . . the truth we cannot tell; it is too ugly, too horrible, we two have been able to speak honestly to each other because we are both smirched with a common shame.*" ("EACH IN HIS OWN WAY.")⁷

It is obvious that in this argument the author is considering the relationship of a typical family to illustrate his theme, the successful realization of the Œdipus situation. The hero most probably is the unconscious image of himself, but the story, he realizes, is applicable to all mankind, and is a parable of Life. Perhaps for this reason the classical example he attempts to impart is the model of the holy family—a Mother-maid possessed in this case not by the Holy Ghost but by the Son, of whom indeed Truth shall at last be born. "And after the earthquake a fire, and the Lord was not in the fire and after the fire . . . a still small voice. . . ."

"In (all) our lives there is something which must remain concealed otherwise the remedy which our love for each other has found cannot avail."

which being translated means, "in the mental life of mother and son, etc. (of some of us), we must purposely suppress reality and moral censorship, if we seek to retain between us the infantile bonds of life and affection. Betray our nuclear phantasy, and our happiness, well-being, smugness and even mental health (sanity) is no more; the remedy fails. It is the truth (reality) which kills, and the dawn of this truth which drives us mad.

More psychological cunning is utilized in the construction of this play around the Œdipus complex than in others of Pirandello, where almost blatantly and distastefully he toys with the incest-theme (*i.e.*,

⁷ Perhaps a further sidelight on the "guilty" relationship is seen in the hint of another character . . . "My case to a T. . . . The Mother-in-law goes mad on the death of her own daughter and insists that her son-in-law will not allow her to see her." . . . But he significantly adds, "Not to a T. . . . The man did not marry *again*," *i.e.*, he enjoyed the mother-in-law unmolested even as Ponza did, to a T.

of the possession by the Son of the Mother buried in the daughter), cf. "Six Characters" and "Henry IV," and personally we consider the psychological insight shown in the play under discussion as of a high order. The elaborate air of confusion and mystery wrought by the slowly revealed pseudo-delusions of the two conspirators is ingenious and satisfying; even though it savors of the helpful Johnsonian definition of "Network" ("anything reticulated or decussated, at equal distances, with interstices between the intersections"!). But is not the Unconscious such a network? Pirandello himself elsewhere employs this very metaphor; further there is interwoven a welcome vein of philosophy, doubt and healthy cynicism (witness the conversation in the mirror), all of which sufficiently side-track the attention from the somber Truth, that none of the town for a moment detects. The whole symbolic setting, the dramatization of phantasy, the expression of truth through the mouth of Insanity (*"I have to shout the truth to her in that way"*) so typical of Pirandello's originality of approach, is worthy of his genius; even though the elaborated drama takes us scarce a step further than those brilliant, all unwritten, all-forgotten dramas of our individual phantasies and dreams. And with the night they have flown.

THE FRUSTRATION THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

MIND AS ENERGY

BY WILLIAM A. WHITE

During the past quarter century there has grown up a literally stupendous literature which has had as its major objective the interpretation and the defining of mental mechanisms in health and in disease with implications that were explanatory of the whole range of mental functions. A great deal of this literature has been written around specific, concrete situations. Some of it has been more general in its scope, and much of it has been highly speculative and philosophical.

I have always felt that it would be a worth while endeavor to attempt the coördination of this great mass of facts and speculations, and to attempt to cast it in a mold of formulations that would relate it to the general body of science. To do this successfully would require, naturally, that the material should be expressed in terms common to all science and inasmuch as the concept "energy" is the most generic of all scientific concepts it would seem as if the formulations should be expressed in terms of energy.

To do this would seem to be an adventure in the field of philosophy and therefore to some, at least, a departure from scientific method. With this, however, I cannot agree. Of course I shall have to start with the acknowledgment that I do not know what energy is. In this respect I am not alone for I surmise that if we should turn to the physicist we would find him equally impotent to offer a satisfactory definition. All we know is that energy is a term which we give to a certain hypothetical something that lies back of "change," in other words that it is something that does "work," brings things to pass. We know energy only by what it does.

Such an approach is of course philosophical but it is the sort of philosophy to which we are all of necessity committed. We cannot, in its ultimate meaning, define anything. The best we can do is to accept certain postulates and reason from them "as if" they were true. To the acceptance of certain postulates we are committed from the moment of our birth. We have to accept the postulate that we are alive, although we cannot define life, and that we are sur-

rounded by persons and things to which we must in some way relate ourselves although again what constitutes a "person" or a "thing" escapes us. Many if not most of these fundamental postulates are accepted quite unconsciously, but it is the very function of philosophy upon which progress is based to examine and reëxamine these postulates from time to time in the light of advancing knowledge and to rerelease them to our cosmos. Whether we will or no we are forced, if we think at all, to think in terms of and in accordance with the methods of philosophy especially and always when we are trying by our thinking to penetrate the unknown, to progress beyond the places in which we feel sure and at home, and to venture into the regions that as yet are all mystery. The fuller significance of this we shall see later on.

To begin with, therefore, I shall state that my real purpose, in attempting to formulate certain of the phenomena of mind action in terms of energy is a purely pragmatic one. For me this way of thinking has proved useful. It has not disturbed me at all that certain persons see no justification for this way of thinking and even think it foolish to speak of the psyche as a force or of the mind in terms of energy. Whether the concept mind is fully encompassed when expressed in terms of energy in the physical sense I do not know. That mental action is accompanied by energy manifestations I feel sure. Whatever the facts may turn out to be in the last analysis does not so much matter for present purposes. The only vital question now is whether by using the analogy to energy we thereby are able more clearly to visualize what is taking place and further whether by the use of this analogy, for we may call it such in deference to the opposition, we are not able to think about mind functions in a way that will be helpful to their better understanding and suggestive for further enlightenment. In other words, Is the analogy I suggest a useful tool at this time? Can we use it to advantage in attacking the problems that mental functioning presents? If thinking of mental functioning in terms "as if" there were such a thing as psychic energy results in an affirmative answer to these questions then it is as fully justified as any scientific formulation.

To begin with, the query might very naturally arise, and in days gone by it did and was controlling, How could anyone possibly come to think of the intangible, imponderable, and elusive phenomena of consciousness in terms of energy? We are accustomed, in the physical world, to think of energy manifestations in terms of work done that can be measured in terms of foot-pounds, calories, kilo-

watts or whatnot. In the psychic sphere we have no means of reducing to any such units the work done in arriving at an idea. The whole field of conscious phenomena escape from any device calculated to effect any such ends. If, however, we realize that physiological phenomena generally, including the passage of nerve currents, have long been thought of in this way and that the concept organism-as-a-whole no longer leaves any place for mind as a separate entity distinct from the other functions of the individual, we might equally wonder why it had escaped so long consideration as at least a manifestation of, if not an actual form of, energy. It must be that we are here again confronted by a manifestation of that general principle that man instinctively opposes any attempt to invade these secret springs of his being, the most intimate parts of his personality, to examine them and reduce them to the formulations of scientific laws. In his final stand, however, in the parallelistic theory of the relation of mind and body, which compares the mind to a shadow which changes with every change in the body but is still not of it, he concedes the issue while still reserving a certain subjective experience as unique. If the mind is responsive to every bodily change it is a mere quibble with words to still insist that they are not related but only different aspects of a larger inclusive whole.

It has been consistently held that we with propriety talk of energy when considering physiological functions but that when we get to the level of consciousness, where we can no longer apply the methods of measurement of physics, we must no longer think in such terms. Why this distinction has been held to I have already indicated but I may add a few considerations in the words of Tansley¹ which set forth many likenesses which would seem to speak for more than a mere analogy. He says:

“Meanwhile we recognize many of the characteristics of physical energy in the ebb and flow, the storage and expenditure, of the energy of the mind. The outrush of energy passing into motor action when a simple instinct is excited and there are no barriers to its response; the locking up and gradual increase of energy in a complex actuated by a great instinct, but denied outlet in action; the tendency of energy to follow the line of least resistance; its possible diversion into other channels by the building up of mechanism represented by an elaborate complex, closely parallel with the ‘harnessing’ of physical energy to do prescribed work through a machine constructed for that definite end; the wasteful

¹ A. G. Tansley. *The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life*. London and New York, 1920.

use of psychic energy when the mind is 'working against the grain,' so that a sense of strain is developed and a large amount of energy is dissipated in 'friction,' often showing itself in irritable outbursts, comparable with its similarly wasteful use in an unskilfully constructed machine where a large part of the source of energy is used up in friction and the production of useless heat—all these are characteristic alike of the psychic energy of the mind and of the behavior of physical energy in any mechanical system."

I similarly expressed this same view² as follows:

"Consciousness arises only under conditions of conflict, conditions of great complexity, of increased resistance as compared with the facile reaction along the definite lines of a reflex arc. When in the path of an electric current, a complex network of wiring is introduced that raises the resistance to the passage of the current, we find that accompanying its passage there goes along a marked rise of temperature. As heat goes along with increase in resistance in an electric circuit so consciousness goes along with increase in resistance in a mental circuit. Herrick has said,³ 'the various degrees or grades of consciousness are expressions of successively higher forms of the coördination of forces.'"

The way in which the concept of energy has been utilized to account for the structure and integrated functions of the organism is best illustrated by the work of Child.⁴ He set out to discover what constituted a living or organic individual, what was the basis of its unity and the orderliness of its responses. While the structure of an individual is a matter of anatomy he was interested in the orderly integration of the functions of these structural parts, in other words the individual in action. Contrary to the assumption of biologists who believed that physiological individuality was inherent in protoplasm and dependent upon a self-determined organization, he saw physiological individuality as a function of the relation between protoplasm and its environment.

The nature of the integrating factor of relationship he arrived at by assuming first a bit of undifferentiated protoplasm. Now let a difference at some point in the environment act as a stimulus at a given point at the surface of the protoplasm. The immediate result is an increase in activity at this point, which dynamic effect is not

² *Mental Mechanisms*, 1911.

³ *The Mestaphysics of a Naturalist*.

⁴ *The Basis of Physiological Individuality in Organisms. Individuality in Organisms. Senescence and Rejuvenescence. The Beginnings of Unity and Order in Living Things.*

limited to the point of contact but tends to spread in ever widening waves of decreased energy much like the waves that result when a stone is thrown into a quiet pond.

As the wave of activity spreads it successively acts as stimulus so that the wave represents the spread of the increased activity originally set in operation by the stimulus from the environment. As it spreads, too, there is a constant decrement in its effectiveness, so that a dynamic gradient is established, the point of greatest intensity or highest rate of activity being the point of incidence of the original stimulus. A passing stimulus produces only a passing gradient, while a long continued, or often repeated, or very strong stimulus, or all combined, tends in proportion to these several qualities, to establish permanent changes in the protoplasm along the path of the increased activity. The dynamic gradient tends to become persistent and consists fundamentally in a change in reactivity, irritability of the protoplasm. Finally this dynamic, or irritability or metabolic gradient, as it really is because here tissue changes go on most rapidly, becomes the starting point of a permanent quantitative order in the protoplasm or a physiological axis of the simplest form of individual.

If the transmission of energy from the point of stimulation repeatedly follows the same path; if the same character of stimulus is repeatedly applied to the same portion of the animal; if, for example, the animal keeps thrusting the same part of its body forward into the environment, then the protoplasm along the lines of the transmission of energy from the stimulus will tend to organize into a chemico-physical equilibrium with the rate of energy change. In other words substances will tend to accumulate at the different levels of the gradient which are in dynamic equilibrium with the energy transmission at those levels—the gradient becomes organized.

Not only is the principle of the organization of the gradient visible in these processes, but another principle of as great importance comes out with equal clearness; namely, that structure is organized function, or, as Bergson would perhaps put it, structure is the organization of the past, or, organization is the structuralization of function or of the past. From this point of view the nervous system, as well too the other organ systems, as a structuralized organic gradient or as an organized system of relations between the parts of the organism, is given a new meaning.

Now, of course, as Child has very well shown in the simpler organisms, an individual has many gradients. Among the simpler

individuals these are expressed in the various axes of symmetry. Among the higher animals each organ would have a dominant gradient of its own and probably many subordinate ones, while the total interplay of forces in the individual can be visualized as playing along the axes of these multitudinous gradients, now reinforcing, now inhibiting, according as their energy rate is mutually assimilable or not, all of this great number of gradients held in an orderly organization because of mutual relations of dominance and dependence and all in the last analysis under the final domination of the gradient of highest metabolic rate, which in turn is dominated by its region of highest metabolic rate—the head end.

From this point of view of the origin of structure as the result of the interplay of forces between the organism and the environment or the pressing of the organism into certain patterns as the result of the necessities of an environment to which it must adjust itself with a certain degree of efficiency in order to live, we see at once that the outstanding and most important gradient in the higher animals is the gradient laid down in the structure of that master tissue that makes up the nervous system.

The nervous system effects those correlations and integrations of the various parts of the organism that make possible those total responses that make up behavior and which are accompanied by consciousness. Human behavior as we know it is, however, a result of millions of years of experience only fragments of which, because of their survival value, have been laid down in structure and passed on by means of the mechanisms of heredity. Let us try to visualize the way in which such results are brought about.

For the purposes of this illustration I will take as an example the person who is learning to play the piano but with the assumption first that playing the piano is a form of activity that is absolutely essential for the species to learn in order to survive, and second I will assume that the activities I am about to describe, instead of being limited to a single individual are spread out over many thousands of generations.

On the sheet of music there are a mass of signs that stand for notes of different pitch and duration, combinations of such signs indicating chords, other signs indicating pauses, and various directions as to rapidity or slowness, expression, loudness, repetition of certain portions, etc. The piano keyboard is comprised of black and white keys arranged in certain definite relations to each other. The notes on the sheet of music each refer to a certain one of these keys and no other and in order to know exactly to which it refers the player must

be able to read the music, that is, relate the position of the note on the clef to the position of the key on the piano. This, roughly speaking, constitutes the environment to which the learner must make some sort of efficient adaptation.

All this mass of impressions presented to the learner are just so many separate perceptions, jumbled together, without arrangement and without meaning. As the days pass, however, there begins to emerge from this mass a perception of relationship among its several parts, it begins to become comprehensible, takes on meaning. The relation between the printed notes and the piano keys becomes definite, the keys are struck and sounds that are pleasant are produced if the correct relationship has been maintained in the striking, sounds of an unpleasant quality if a mistake has been made. The masses of perceptions are beginning to arrange themselves in an orderly fashion. Constellations are being formed.

Now this process continues and the orderly arrangement of mental states as related to these outside conditions becomes more and more extensive and more and more perfect. There is taking place an adjustment of the individual to the environment, a building up of a certain relationship between the outside conditions—the sheet of music and the piano keyboard—and the individual, and this relationship becomes progressively more and more exact and more and more efficient. As the adjustment becomes more perfect disharmonies with their resulting painful mental states are less frequent—the harmony and efficiency of the adjustment is improved with practice.

It will be helpful at this point to point out briefly some of the differences in the state of consciousness of the beginner on the piano and of the finished product, the accomplished performer.

At first while learning, each movement is painfully conscious, the fingers have to be watched, each note separately observed, and the required movements are slowly and awkwardly executed. When proficiency has been acquired the same results are accomplished far better, with much less effort, and with so little attention that an occasional glance over the shoulder or even entering into the conversation of those about does not seem to interfere.

At first a note has to be carefully looked at in order to recognize it, then the signature, the tempo, the various directions, and its relation to other notes in the other clef have all to be separately observed before it can be finally sought out on the piano and struck in its proper time and place. Later all these things are appreciated at a glance and the reproduction is instantaneous. In this way hundreds

of notes in all sorts of relations and combinations may be struck in a single minute as the eye skims rapidly across the page of music, and the transition from the printed signs to the appropriate sounds is relatively immediate.

It will be seen that a relationship has been established with outside conditions that is very definite, the adaptation of the individual to the environment is highly efficient and takes place in a way so nearly absolutely fixed that it is practically predictable. There has been established by a slow process of growth a complex of mechanisms, mechanisms that are automatic or quasi-automatic in character so that whenever the appropriate stimulus is applied the whole machinery goes off in a perfectly well defined way in all its various parts.

In this description it will be recognized that we are describing a sort of activity that reminds us of the reflex. The reflex, however, is still more rigidly defined in its possibilities, its response is, to all intents and purposes, absolutely the same always, whenever a stimulus is applied. Then too it is no longer under the control of the individual but occurs whether or no. The piano playing activities on the other hand are always under the control of the subject. He may play or not, as he sees fit, and he may vary the production from the written directions to suit his own whim. The various activities of his fingers in seeking the notes are, however, not changed in either instance. They go on in their accustomed way in both cases.

This type of activity is called automatic, though it will be seen from the description that it is really a complex product containing, it is true, many automatic components, but containing also many that have not reached that degree of definiteness of response—activities that are still in the proving ground of automatisms.

One of the changes that has been undergone in the process of learning is a change toward an automatic character of the reaction. With continuous practice the activities become more and more automatic.

Another change, which is important for us to note, is a change in the degree of awareness that accompanies these activities. The change toward greater automatism implies this change. From a condition of very acute awareness of every minute adjustment in the beginning there is reached a condition of almost absent awareness when a high grade of efficiency has been reached. At least those portions of the adjustment that have become truly automatisms have become activities of the **unaware region of consciousness**.

To put the matter a little differently, when the same or similar

conditions in the environment are repeatedly presented to the organism so that it is called upon to react in a similar or almost identical way each time, there tends to be organized a mechanism of reaction which becomes more and more automatic and is accompanied by a state of mind of less and less awareness. Or to put the observe: Consciousness, or at least clear conscious awareness, appears only upon attempts at adjustment to conditions that are unusual, at moments of conflict, on those occasions the like of which have not previously occurred in the experience of the individual and in relation to which, therefore, there has been no possibility of organizing reactive mechanisms. To put it again in a little different form: Clear consciousness does not accompany reactions to stimuli when the issue in conduct can occur in only a single direction, when there are no alternatives. Consciousness is an expression, as it were, of conflict. It arises in response to stimuli under conditions that make it possible to react by a choice of a line of conduct in any one of several directions.

This is the state of affairs that led to my statement previously quoted that consciousness arises only under conditions of conflict, of increased resistance; and to the analogy of the rise of temperature when resistance is introduced to the passage of an electric current.

We may think then of full, clear consciousness as only accompanying those mental states of adjustment to new and unusual conditions: conditions permitting of various reactions and involving therefore selective judgment, critique, choice—in short, reason; and in proportion to the frequency of the repetition of the same adjustment the mental state accompanying such repetition tends to sink out of the field of clear consciousness. If we will consider the infinitude of adjustments the individual has to make to his environment we will see that this is a conservative process. As soon as a given adjustment is well formed it is pushed aside and the field of clear consciousness is left free for new problems.

If now we pursue this reasoning still further we can understand how, not only are originally clearly conscious activities relegated to the region of automatic forms of response but these, when they have been proved over long periods of time to have high survival value, are in turn relegated to still more deeply unconscious types of response, namely, the reflex type, and that when this has been accomplished the response has been definitely laid down in the structure of the nervous system—the response has become structuralized. An illustration will make this clearer.

The wink is a form of reflex that has been adequately proved, in an overwhelming preponderance of instances, to be protective of the eye. When the eye is suddenly approached by any object there is at once a reflex closing of the lids. This reflex wink occurs quite unconsciously hundreds, perhaps thousands of times each day. Now if for any reason it becomes necessary for the physician to introduce a drop of medicine into the eye it is not only almost if not quite impossible to control the wink reflex but the eyelids have usually to be forcibly kept apart. It is significant that this procedure throws the whole mechanism into clear consciousness and the patient becomes painfully aware of the whole procedure.

Looking at the whole situation from this point of view it would seem clear that when action flows simply and without obstacle from stimulus consciousness is at a minimum or altogether absent but that in proportion to the difficulties that have to be overcome before stimulus can result in appropriate action does consciousness become acute. It is in this sense that Harrison⁶ says:

“ Movement, then, action, is, as it were, the goal and the end of thought. Perception finds its natural outlet and completion in doing. But here comes in a curious consideration important for our purpose. In animals, in so far as they act by ‘instinct,’ as we say, perception, knowing, is usually followed immediately and inevitably by doing, by such doing as is calculated to conserve the animal and his species; but in some of the higher animals, and especially in man, where the nervous system is more complex, perception is not instantly transformed into action; there is an interval for choice between several possible actions. Perception is pent up and becomes, helped by emotion, conscious *representation*. Now it is, psychologists tell us, just in this interval, this space between perception and reaction, this momentary halt, that all our mental life, our images, our ideas, our consciousness, and assuredly our religion and our art is built up.”

In all these illustrations we see the same sort of phenomena; namely, the emergence of the phenomena of consciousness when there is existent any obstacle that tends to interfere with the orderly flow of stimulus into action, in other words, anything which tends to frustrate the adequate response of the individual to the presenting stimuli. We also see how naturally all these descriptions fall into ways of expression that are quite the same as those used to express energy changes and therefore to illustrate the proposition with which I set out; namely, the pragmatic advantages in attempting to visualize

⁶ J. E. Harrison. *Ancient Art and Ritual*.

mental mechanisms in terms of energy exchange. Let us proceed in this same way to further illustrate the advantages of this way of thinking in elucidating the subject in hand, namely, the frustration theory of consciousness.

If a bird finds itself imprisoned in a room it will start madly flying round and round, seeking at every turn to find an exit, beating itself against the window and walls in its mad endeavor but finally, if a window happens to be open, quite accidentally flying through it and thus escaping, when the ordinary quiet motions of flying are resumed. It will be noted that there is no methodical examination of the situation to determine and try out possible points of exit but a wild instinctive effort to escape as rapidly as possible which may or may not ultimately prove successful. This is the so-called violent-motor-reaction,⁶ which is more generally known as panic when we see it in our patients. Its general characteristic is that it is a relatively primitive method of response to external stimuli associated with a greatly restricted field of consciousness. The field of consciousness in conditions of great terror may be contracted, by analogy with the pupil, to pinpoint dimensions, occupied with the sole idea of escape. The more highly evolved type of response which includes examination, deliberation, judgment, choice, is associated with a much broader field of consciousness that permits the receipt of many more stimuli and therefore requires much more material to be worked through to reach a final decision. The instinctive violent-motor-reaction is stereotyped and while it may lead the animal to safety may as well lead it to its death because it cannot vary its response. The bird beats itself against the walls if it does not happen to get out. The higher type is much better adapted to the situation, more easily varied to suit different situations and has therefore, in general, greater survival value although both types of response may be successful. The choice type, however, is able to serve better because it permits a consideration of a greater number of stimuli from a broader field of consciousness which is equivalent to saying that there are here a wider range of possibilities than in the violent-motor-reaction type and because of a wider range of possibilities the reaction is less stereotyped, less like a reflex, and is more conscious. The flow from stimulus to action is not so direct but on the contrary is intercepted by numerous possibilities which tend to prevent, frustrate expression in immediate action.

⁶ See E. Kretschmer. *Hysteria. Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Mon. Se. No. 44.*

A similar exposition might be made of the sham-death-reflex,⁷ a passive form of defense from danger allied to the stupors, catalepsies and trance states, etc., in humans. As the structure of the psyche is built up, becomes progressively more complex, it is more and more difficult for a stimulus to find its way to immediate action. The trial and error method tends to become displaced from without to within as this resistance increases, with a corresponding growth of consciousness.

While this higher type of reaction which develops consciousness does so because so many more possibilities are presented that hesitation, deliberation, judgment, choice are introduced in the situation as expressions of the slowing down of the mechanism, it is evident that the goal in both types of reaction is the same, namely, adequate response. When this solution is reached there is satisfaction, or to express it in terms of energy, equilibrium has been reestablished by virtue of reducing the state of tension previously existent. The psychical apparatus has in fact been described as an apparatus for reducing states of tension.⁸ A stimulus creates a difference of potential, a state of tension: a wish is the expression of a state of tension. In both cases action that is adequately responsive or expressive restores the equilibrium, relieves the tension.

Let me still further illustrate the value of the energy concept by examples taken from the Gestalt psychology. Koffka⁹ shows how certain memory traces tend to change with time. Subjects are shown simple geometrical figures and then asked to draw them from memory at varying intervals of time. Each succeeding drawing differs from the preceding, but differs in a constant direction. The changes indicated that the traces not only grew weaker but underwent changes in shape, which must mean that they are not stable units but instead that stresses existed in them which gradually transformed them. In other words, these trace units are dynamic structures. Other experiments

⁷ See also Kretschmer.

⁸ Society has been similarly described. Its customs and institutions are devices for reducing tension. The sea coast native who fishes exchanges some of his fish for fruits and vegetables with the natives inland. Each exchanges something for something he has not but needs. Around these operations of trade all sorts of customs grow up which tend to stabilize certain practices so that in the end there is developed very effectively channeled avenues for draining off tensions of a certain kind in accordance with definite rules "arranged into well-balanced chains of reciprocal services." (See B. Malinowski: *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*.)

⁹ K. Koffka. *On the Structure of the Unconscious*.

were also significant. A person is set several problems. Some he is allowed to complete the solution of, some not. It is found that he remembers best his incompleted tasks. The inference is that the incomplete task left an unstable trace comparable to a non-closed figure. In such a figure then there is a tendency to closure. Such traces were more potent to influence consciousness than traces of completed acts in which such stresses did not exist. In another set of similar experiments the subjects, left to themselves, spontaneously returned to the interrupted problems. Again we see the operation of a stress system and the fact that the individual tends to do the things that will relieve the tension. Organisms are "energy phenomena" not "form phenomena."¹⁰

If we turn to psychoanalysis we shall find it shot through with expressions indicating that the psyche is conceived of as a complex energy system. We find such terms as defense mechanism, transference, fixation, cathexis, projection, repression, regression, etc. The terminology of psychoanalysis and the theory of its application as a therapy are distinctly mechanistic and deterministic.

Turn where we will we find mental activities expressed in the language of energy transformation. Thus Piéron says:¹¹

"Mental activity is a function of an expenditure of nervous energy."

Herrick says:¹²

"And in mankind this final katergic process, in turn, is adapted to step up lower energies to the plane of intelligent adjustment, setting them to work to invent and run machines, to maintain commerce and all of the other varied industries necessary to advance personal and social welfare, much as in a lower realm an electric transformer may take the energy supplied by the dynamo and step it up into a current of higher potential better adapted to do the work of some particular machine."

And again:

"And to the plain man of science unversed in the subtleties of traditional metaphysics mind seems to be a function of brain in much the same sense that contraction is a function of muscle.

"To an unprejudiced observer mind appears to be as truly a cause of certain bodily actions as muscular contraction is a cause of bodily movement."

¹⁰ Geo. W. Crile. *A Bipolar Theory of Living Processes*.

¹¹ *Thought and the Brain*.

¹² *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior*.

Warren¹³ assumes

"that consciousness and neural phenomena constitute one single series of events, and that their different appearance is merely due to different ways of observing them."

He says further:

"Consciousness 'belongs to' the activity of neurons as truly as the intensity or form of neural impulses belongs to this same activity They form part of the 'total description' of nerve activity."

The Gestalt psychologists, according to Koffka,¹⁴

"consider mind, or rather mental processes, not as something outside of nature, but as just such natural events as any other. They are links in the chains of reactions produced by an organism in an environment, and cannot legitimately be isolated from this context The total reaction of the organism of which mental processes are parts is surely a physiological event."

Herrick¹⁵ further says very significantly:

"We now believe that the action current is more than an indicator of internal change; it is an integral part of the process of nervous conduction. In an analogous way introspective evidence has value at least as an indicator of the presence of some cerebral process of great significance to the organism; and the evidence is to some of us quite as convincing that conscious processes play as real a part in shaping human conduct as does the action current in maintaining nervous transmission."

It seems to me peculiarly significant that although many deny our right to consider mental functions as examples of energy manifestations still it seems quite impossible to talk about them in language that does not imply that very thing. I have called attention heretofore to the fact that in defining psychology as the field of total reactions that it is impossible to speak in terms of total reactions, of the activities of the organism-as-a-whole, without using psychological language. The minute we ask, What is the man doing? we are committed to a psychological inquiry which can be answered only in psychological terms. It seems equally significant that we cannot speak of what lies behind a change without speaking in terms of energy. *Is it not for the reason that that is just what we mean by energy?*

¹³ Human Psychology.

¹⁴ Psyche, Vol. V.

¹⁵ Loc. cit.

Nevertheless we are confronted by able authorities who will not follow along this path. Johnstone¹⁶ in speaking of the phenomena of consciousness says:

"Something, then, is operative which is not merely physical sensation and physically actual or virtual response. This may be the exercise of pure memory, the disciplined deliberation that we call reasoning, 'mental' and 'physical' pain, pleasure, the unsustained and desultory efforts of reverie and 'day-dreaming' and so on. It would be as foolish to deny this as to attempt to characterize it all in terms of energy."

This despite the fact that on the previous page he has said very cogently:

"The greater the degree of indeterminism that follows upon a sensation, so much greater is the pitch of consciousness."

What are some of the explanations of this state of affairs? I have already suggested a language explanation. In addition to this Dewey¹⁷ says along similar lines:

"our language is so permeated with consequences of theories which have divided the body and mind from each other, making separate existential realms out of them, that we lack words to designate the actual existential fact . . . Body-mind simply designates what actually takes place when a living body is implicated in situations of discourse, communication, and participation."

Of the double language hypothesis advocated by Ogden¹⁸ he says:

"A peculiar effort of the imagination is required before this view becomes plausible. An experience and an agitation in the body seem so unlike one another that the suggestion that they are one and the same, and that the difference is merely one in our mode of access to them, is often treated as outrageous. Yet it is the very uniqueness of experience which suggests this view; and those who dismiss its advocates as unable to appreciate the obvious fact that experience is unique are frequently unaware of the weight of considered opinion in favor of the linguistic solution. We approach all other happenings from without; but our experience is a happening in ourselves. Thus it would naturally seem to us totally distinct from the happenings which we observe through signs; and if, as this view holds, an *experience* be observed from without, it must be unrecognizable as an experience. The unlikeness, therefore, would only be an argument

¹⁶ The Mechanism of Life.

¹⁷ Experience and Nature.

¹⁸ The Meaning of Psychology.

against treating the experience and the nervous disturbance as identical if the psychologist introspecting and the neurologist making his conjectures were using the same kind of observation."

I cannot refrain from further quotations which illustrate still more comprehensively how far we have come from the position which thought it enough to merely enunciate the absurdity of thinking of mind in terms of energy. Lotka¹⁹ says:

"It is frequently pointed out with critical emphasis that mechanistic attempts to *explain* consciousness are philosophically unsound.

"Such strictures are based upon a misconception of the function of science, mechanistic or other. Science does not *explain* anything, consciousness occupies in *this* respect a position in no wise peculiar. Science does not *explain* electricity, for example. Science is less pretentious. All that falls within its mission is to observe phenomena and to describe them and the *relations between them*. It is true that in loose parlance such statements are commonly made as: The inertia of matter is *explained* by the electron theory. But all this means is that certain *relations* have been *established* between the properties of an electric charge, and those of a mass of gross 'matter'; that the laws of motion of matter can be *comprehended* in the laws of motion of an electron. If *explanation* means the making *comprehensible* in this sense, then this is explanation. But who should say that the attempt to *establish relations* between consciousness and other phenomena is philosophically unsound? One would be disposed to retaliate by questioning the soundness of his philosophy.

"Quite on the contrary, the study of the relations between consciousness and other phenomena is not only legitimate, but altogether alluring and full of promise."

Professor Whitehead says²⁰ much more radically:

"The animal body constitutes a total organism which includes a mental state, which enters into its plan.

"The plans of the total organism modify the plans of successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms such as electrons are reached.

"An electron within a living body is different to an electron outside it by reason of the plan of the body.

"The electron 'blindly runs' either inside or outside the body but it runs within the body in accordance with its character within the body, *i.e.*, in accordance with the general plan of the body and this plan includes a mental state."

¹⁹ Elements of Physical Biology.

²⁰ Science and the Modern World.

So much for the present at least for the energetic conception of consciousness. Let us return to a further consideration of the violent-motor-reaction and the sham-death-reflex. Both of these forms of response are relatively ineffectual. The bird trapped in the room may find a way out in its wild flying to and fro: the insect, rolled up and quiescent, may be overlooked by its enemy. There is nothing like certainty in either one of these efforts and there must be a high percentage of failure.

In the violent-motor-reaction the response follows the pattern of primitive automatic types of response in general. The action flows directly and unimpeded from the perception. But in the sham-death-reflex there is a different principle involved, namely, the principle of *withdrawal* from reality. Of course a 100 per cent withdrawal from reality would spell complete failure but short of this withdrawal is an example of *frustration* of that even flow of stimulus into action that we see at the successive levels of tropism, reflex, and instinct, and is an example of how that momentary period of hesitation between perception and action comes about in which consciousness is born.

Frustration of reaction is carefully provided against at the vegetative level of response. The heart goes right on beating no matter what the circumstances. It is never plagued with doubt as to its next beat. At the psychological level, however, doubt enters for the first time as a normal component of the situation in which several alternative courses of action are open and a choice has to be effected. Doubt is the subjective state of what we may visualize as a state of tension resulting from the frustration of stimulus the energy from which is prevented, for the time being, from translating itself into action. When action takes place the tension is relieved and the feeling of doubt is replaced by one of satisfaction.

To amplify my analogy of consciousness to the heat produced when resistance is introduced in the course of an electric current we might think of that heat as intense enough to produce light and then we could visualize consciousness as the light that illuminated the field of possible actions and so guided choice.

This is the thought of Bergson when he says:²¹

"Consciousness is the light that plays around the zone of possible actions or potential activity which surrounds the action really performed by the living being. It signifies hesitation or choice. Where many equally possible actions are indicated with-

²¹ Creative Evolution.

out there being any real action (as in a deliberation that has not come to an end), consciousness is intense. When the action performed is the only action possible (as in activity of the somnambulistic or more generally automatic kind), consciousness is reduced to nothing."

And again,²²

"Throughout the whole extent of the animal kingdom, we have said, consciousness seems proportionate to the living being's power of choice. It lights up the zone of potentialities that surround the act. It fills the interval between what is done and what might be done. Looked at from without, we may regard it as a simple aid to action, a light that action kindles, a momentary spark flying up from the friction of real action against possible actions."

Speaking very generally the violent-motor-reaction seems to be dictated in the main by circumstances outside the individual. The sham-death-reflex and other degrees and types of withdrawal seem to be primarily dictated by conditions within. They are responses to an intrapsychic tension and withdrawal is the first step to finding a means for the relief of this tension. It is in this sense that G. Stanley Hall spoke of²³ consciousness as "always more or less remedial."

Here we are confronted with a consideration, already often referred to, that cannot be too much emphasized, namely, the time factor, or as I prefer to call it the temporal coördinate. It is only beginning dimly to dawn upon us that the organism cannot be understood in terms of three dimensions only. A fourth dimension at least must be added and that dimension is time—duration.

The secret of withdrawal is that it introduces a time factor between perception and action and in that moment there comes into being all the stupendous possibilities that grow out of the introduction of consciousness, with its qualities of deliberation, discrimination, judgment and choice, into the scheme of life. Man now becomes the first living being who

"is not under the immediate urge of a tendency to respond which does not wait, but fulfils itself; he has to begin to fabricate the situation, or features of it, to project something from himself upon them and endow them in fantasy and imagination with characteristics which will bring them within the scope of his active tendencies." ²⁴

²² *Ibid.*

²³ A Synthetic Genetic Study of Fear.

²⁴ J. C. Flower. The Psychology of Religion.

"And the manner in which we find a new orientation in the course of achievement is, . . . through the liberation of fantasies and images, and their projection upon the situation which led to the withdrawal."²⁵

It is worth while to note one of the mechanisms by which this delay and the resulting consciousness factor come into existence. In the first place let us recall the illustrations given in the early part of this article showing the formation of automatic responses and realize that the various instinctive and reflex responses that we now possess may once have been acutely conscious but have at least been so thoroughly laid down in structure that they discharge promptly and without the need of conscious direction. This of course must mean that the organism could afford to structuralize these responses because they had very great survival value and they possessed this high degree of survival value because the responses were, in the majority of instances, correct.

Now, as the organism becomes, in the process of evolution, more and more complex it is faced with the necessity of adapting itself to a correspondingly more complex environment, or, what amounts to the same thing, it touches the environment at more and more points at which adaptation is required of it. In the meantime numerous reflexes and instincts have been pretty well structuralized. It is therefore easily conceivable that two instinctive tendencies should at times be stirred to simultaneous activity. Flower²⁶ cites the instance of the stimulation of both curiosity and escape leading, in the instance cited, to their fusion in a response of cautious approach. With regard to this type of situation he says:

"The biological utility of this for a species which depends entirely on instinctive adaptation is obvious. But the psychological significance of an ability to discriminate two or more significant features in a situation, and to display tendencies to respond to both, cannot be overestimated: we may indeed trace to that the beginnings of the kind of conscious mental life which, as human, we know introspectively."

I take it that enough matter has been presented to indicate what is meant by the frustration theory of consciousness and also that enough material has been interpolated along the way to give a clear understanding of the general status of the energetic theory of consciousness.

²⁵ Flower, loc. cit.

²⁶ Loc. cit.

The two concepts appear to me to be at least closely related if not actually mutually dependent.

Whether mind is a form of energy or not we have not determined by this inquiry. A great deal depends on what is meant by the question. If it means what it says literally perhaps we never can know because the only mind we know at first hand is our own and we only know that by introspection and the results of introspection provide unique experiences for which we have no measuring rod.

Whether mind is a manifestation of energy is another question to which I believe we must give an affirmative answer. The developments of cerebral anatomy, histology, and physiology are constantly making it possible to more closely approximate an explanation of psychological happenings in terms of structure and function.

Whatever may be the answer to this particular one of the many riddles of the Sphinx it does not seem to me possible to gainsay the very practical advantages that accrue from describing mental occurrences in terms of energy. The frustration theory of consciousness that I have outlined has been set forth "as if" we were dealing with energy under varying degrees of tension and flowing in given directions. The advantages of this form of exposition are in the ease of visualization that results. The pragmatic advantages seem to me to be inescapable and until some serious reasons can be advanced against it there seems to be no good reason why it should be abandoned.

NEGATIVE TRANSFERENCE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS *

REPORT OF A CASE

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FOREWORD

Psychoanalytic treatment is a system of therapy specially designed to reveal to the patient his inadequate psychological equipment for adjustment in human relations, and to aid him in reconstruction. An analysis acts as a laboratory experiment in which the subject sees his plan of life in operation. The deeper lying features of his psychic organization become manifest in this special setting, in a way that would be impossible in the outside world, where social considerations of one sort or another are a determining factor. The subject brings to the analytical situations his patterns of emotional needs and response just as he does to all contacts with people elsewhere. In ordinary relationships, business, marital, friendship and so on, the neurotically handicapped individual is expected, and makes the attempt, to mould his inadequate emotional material into forms consistent with the attitudes and behavior of normal adulthood. In the analysis the immediate goal is reversed; all effort is directed toward revealing how the subject really does think and feel, and to bring to the surface his general reactions as they are, rather than as they appear to be or should be; in other words, the true self is brought out from behind the disguise of the surface personality. The reactions of this real self toward the person of the analyst make up the so-called transference phenomena. Made aware, through this experience, of the childish and undeveloped state of many of his demands from life, and realizing his inability to satisfy them in reality, the subject is in a position as never before to modify and reconstruct them, to achieve, so to speak, a tardy psychological growth along special emotional lines.

Some of the conscious transference manifestations present themselves as obvious states of mind. The patient approves or disapproves, is pleased or annoyed, hopeful or otherwise, and so on. The uncon-

* Paper given at a Clinical Conference, Department of Abnormal Psychology, Harvard University, November 23, 1928.

scious features of transference, to a major degree obscure in situations outside analysis, are disclosed by the analytical process and are its special consideration. Intellectual acceptance by the patient of the deeper significance attached to historical data and to the analytical situation is welcomed as a contribution to a forward movement, or at least a sign that such is taking place. As always, however, the analyst must be on guard that intellectual conviction does not act as a substitute for the deeper dynamic changes desired, and thus become employed in the service of resistance.

The case reported in this paper presented in an unusual degree, so far as consciousness was concerned, an unbroken negative transference throughout a six months' analysis (108 hours). At the same time it seemed apparent from dreams and other material that steady progress towards solution of intrapsychic difficulties was taking place. Any such change was denied or explained away by the subject and, to the last, analytic evidence was repudiated. Here is illustrated once more the fact well known in analysis, that failure to grasp problems or see developments on the intellectual plane does not necessarily preclude profound and significant changes at unconscious levels.

CASE PROBLEM

Miss A., aged twenty-two, came for analysis, referred by a psychiatrist in another city. From her reading and associations she was already interested in psychoanalytic doctrine and somewhat conversant with the subject. However, to seek aid for herself through this means was another matter. She felt resentful and humiliated at the necessity, and kept her analysis a closely guarded secret from her friends. The problem of her difficulties, as it unfolded, seemed more a personality disorder than a neurosis in the ordinary sense. There had gradually developed since puberty a deep and abiding discontent with life in all its phases. In addition, relationships with other people, both in and out of the family, were filled with complications. There had been more and more mental depression, evidently part of the general picture, and in no way "primary." The final trouble had been a homosexual friendship formed while living away from home with a group of girls after graduation from college. Miss A. had brought to this relationship extreme emotional intensity which ran the gamut and back again of love, jealousy, rivalry, and hostility. There were only minor physical intimacies, but increasing mental conflict over what she felt was a most unnatural love attitude led her to consult a psychiatrist.

FAMILY BACKGROUND

The father had been in earlier life a most successful business man, with physical presence and social qualities which made him a leading figure. As he grew older, handicaps in the way of ill health and financial reverses brought out the weaker side of his nature. There were several minor "nervous breakdowns" and his interests had grown more and more restricted to the family. In this sphere, an exaggerated fussiness, irritability and petty solicitude were outstanding. During Miss A.'s young childhood he had been an indulgent parent and companion, and she had adored and idealized him. The change in his character had been to her a source of bitter disappointment and disillusionment. She could "never forgive" certain temper outbreaks which had occurred with her as an object. Developments during the analysis showed that the disappointment and unforgiveness derived their main vitality from certain features of the early child-father relationship. These existed chiefly on unconscious levels, for some reason had failed of solution in the ordinary manner, and were brought over to the present as still active emotional problems.

The mother was an energetic, independent woman, with keen intellect and broad cultural interests. She represented discipline to the patient during childhood, and there was little confidential intimacy or close comradeship. One brother, two years older, completed the family circle. The usual discord and antipathy existed during childhood, but as an adult the patient showed a rather neutral attitude toward the brother, without strong attachment, but free in a striking manner from the antagonism and hostile trends manifest toward other people. The mother-daughter and brother-sister relationships were not revealed in their deeper aspects during the analysis other than by pattern and inference. The historical setting indicated that contact with the brother must have exerted an exceptionally important conditioning influence, and in particular have served to emphasize the social advantages of the masculine sex. The boy, as first-born and bearer of the family name, was the father's favorite and the object of his passionate devotion, especially in later years. As a child the son was delicate and sensitive, and there was frequent admonition against effeminacy. He was precocious intellectually, and great things were expected of him. In college and afterward he showed serious purpose and was given opportunity for independence, education and travel which the sister envied.

ADULT REACTIONS OF THE PATIENT

Toward both parents there was a continuous attitude of tension with frequent active discord. Miss A. was aloof, cold and critical. There were many outbursts of childish tantrum variety, for which she was secretly ashamed, although seldom admitting error or remorse. These scenes were precipitated by all sorts of minor incidents, in which the petty demands and frustrations of the father took important place.

The girl was personally attractive and had considerable attention from men. Her feelings toward them were motivated chiefly by the demand for power, with a strong competitive sense of desiring her share of masculine favor. She was critical at all times toward her admirers and openly furious at any slight or neglect, fancied or real. She wished for marriage, mainly it appeared, because it was the thing to do, rather than from any personal desire. In regard to the topic of sex, she was theoretically liberal in her views and without prudishness, but there was marked revulsion toward the whole topic when it affected herself. Any attempt at love-making was repulsed in no uncertain manner. There had been no physical sex problem whatever that was recalled, other than some stirrings incident to her homosexual friendship. Demonstrativeness with family or others was distasteful, with the exception of this other girl. She said that kissing was objected to for "something beside convention, there is an inner shrinking." She wondered later in the analysis "if the desire to have attention from men could be to prove to myself that there is nothing wrong with me."

Toward acquaintances and most friends, her attitudes and reactions were also outstandingly negative. She was critical, over-sensitive, jealous, and at times malicious in the sense of taking pleasure in giving hurt. She was self-conscious in any company, and at ease only when in some way gaining special favor or distinction which lifted her from the common level. Attempts to adjust in the economic field had been unsuccessful. An urge to financial independence and the example of others in her group led her to seek employment. She tried several positions and gave them up from boredom or dissatisfaction. Sick people were an especial aversion, and her mother's illnesses had been a trial. She had a feeling when near a sickbed as "though some unpleasant mutilation were present."

DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY

A few of the facts as they came out in the analysis will sketch in rough outline the developmental history. As a young child, Miss A.

was attractive, piquant, spoiled, and gained her way by tantrums. She recalled a curious reaction at eight years when her brother was present at the bath of a small cousin. It seemed a "personal affront" to the patient, that her brother should see this little girl,—a "betrayal of her sex." She always felt jealous that he would know more about girls than she of boys. She had the feeling that this cousin was being robbed of something, in the sense that the brother would not have let her see him unclothed. On the same occasion, the patient's father told her to hurry, which she resented: "It seemed there was a conspiracy on the part of my brother and father."

In one of the earlier grades in school she was thrown into a hysterical panic at the reading of a scene from "Huck Finn" in which the boy is in danger from a drunken father. At fourteen years she was sent home after a short sojourn at a vacation camp on account of severe nostalgia. She was depressed and listless for some weeks afterward, and lost weight. Puberty was stormy. She resented sex information and was disgusted by menstruation. During these years, as she put it, she was "soaking in an emotional bath." Her attitude earned from the family the title of "tragedy queen." Some of her behavior she recognized as a deliberate attempt to make an impression on the family. Illness was feigned or exaggerated, more it seemed in the nature of revenge than as appeal for sympathy. She revelled in morbid literature, Poe's "Pit and Pendulum" making special appeal. She was the author of much pessimistic free verse built on the theme of the failure and pathos of her own life. She constantly nursed a vague sense of grievance against the family and world. She was a bit slow in school, with respect to formal education, and her brother was held before her as an example by the ambitious parents. Later she was his accepted equal along intellectual lines.

She attended a girls' college near her home, and lived in a dormitory. She had a few friends with whom she was popular enough but made no wide acquaintance, and took no part in extra-scholastic activities. Here as elsewhere she showed a minimum of spontaneous interest. Motivation seemed largely on a competitive basis, and she was governed chiefly by a desire to have for herself what was deemed desirable by others.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

There were three main features of the psychopathology which stood out in the analysis, both historically and in the repetition shown by the transference reactions. These may be set down dogmatically at this point, with material for substantiation to be presented later on.

1. An unsolved father relationship was present. The patient's early attachment of the Oedipus-period had been retained, with failure to substitute a more abstract masculine ideal for the actual parental love-object. This had inevitably resulted in disappointment and disillusionment. The play of unconscious forces in this case were abetted by the actual family situation. She reacted to this deprivation in love, by hostility, hate, and the urge to revenge; sadistic attitudes, which covered a deep sense of injury and grievance.

2. There had resulted an intense masculine protest, envy of the male, and repudiation of the feminine rôle, in other words a "castration complex." Schematically outlined she had solved the Oedipus situation by the compromise of identifying with the father rather than by the constructive method of renunciation and ideal formation. If she could not have him, then she would be like him, and in that position was brought into rivalry and antagonism. Once again the actuality of her family life with the favoring of the brother, plus his intellectual superiority, supported this distorted intrapsychic organization.

3. An extreme degree of secondary narcissism followed. This girl had built up psychic obstacles which hampered all human contacts in her love life, and turned the libido current back to herself. The only exception was the outlet found in the recent homosexual friendship, which brought new conflict in its train. All these factors—wide deprivation in love, envy of the masculine rôle, and sense of inadequacy on the feminine side—resulted in an intolerable sense of inferiority, which motivated an aggressive defense attitude toward the world, and was only transitorily appeased by some concrete evidence of social supremacy.

CHARACTER APPRAISAL

The story so far makes this girl out a rather formidable person—and in truth she approached such category in her own home. However, personality qualities of a high order were clearly discernible. There was a strict intellectual honesty present which made impossible any evasion, in the analysis at least, when she could view her problems clearly. There was a genuineness of feeling, a native refinement and a latent charm which must impress the analytical observer. A frank and straightforward self-depreciation seemed only in part dependent on a morbid guilt sense. This young woman heartily disapproved of herself, as measured by life adjustments, and sincerely longed for the capacity of better things. There was no compromise

with standards of honor as she saw them. As one example, it never entered her head that she could be married without confessing to the prospective husband her emotional instability and her homosexual love experience.

In this patient the cleavage between the intellectual and emotional features of mind seemed unusually wide. Conscious direction appeared more helpless than with most, when set in opposition to unconscious trends. If, as Freud states, the goal of culture is the control of instincts by intelligence, she was in many respects relatively far removed. On the surface, she had a sound intellectual grasp of her own problems, while for those of her acquaintances she showed a keen analytical insight. However, any attempt on her own part, or with the aid of the analyst, to utilize these qualities for deeper personal self-understanding met immediate, overwhelming resistance.

COURSE OF ANALYSIS

Circumstances determined a poor start, even for preliminary smooth going. Miss A. was, in a way, forced into the analysis, viz.: the consultant psychiatrist had advised it, the family acquiesced, and there was no good reason to refuse. On her own part, she looked on analysis as a last resort in medical aid. If that was unable to help her, then she felt that nothing could. She was also, in a curious way, influenced by the fact that her friend of the homosexual episode was being analyzed in another city. She could not bear the thought that this girl should have opportunity or experience which she herself was denied. The money arrangement was not advantageous. The father consulted the analyst beforehand and worked out a fee program, which, in spite of its modesty, meant some sacrifice on his part. The parents were skeptical and discouraged when results were not soon forthcoming. There was talk at home of discontinuing for economy's sake, and after certain stormy scenes there was open comment that the daughter was being made worse rather than better.

For the first two months of the analysis, the patient, while reasonably courteous, in manner and speech, showed an underlying attitude toward the whole proceeding approaching scorn and contempt. She walked in and out of the office without a smile, and with an appearance of lofty detachment. A slight error in the monthly account she adjusted as though dealing with an erring tradesman. She repeatedly asked for explanations of material brought up, or of analytical theory in general, but when offered they were either summarily dismissed or forgotten with astonishing completeness. She was often depressed,

and frequently tears came to her eyes, but it was an isolated grief, without appeal toward the analyst or evident hope of aid.

She later softened somewhat, and developed some brief periods of responsiveness, but at most these manifestations were relative. To the last she was pessimistic of any help from analysis, and felt an oppressive obligation toward her parents for their financial support. At one of the late interviews she said they were paying "a terrific price for a blind package."

The transference relationship throughout was patterned on that with the father. The surface attitude was one of aggressive defense against any bonds of dependency. The analytical implication of course, was that there existed a strong childish longing for dependence and support, blocked by fear and guilt, and against which she overreacted. This pattern in the analysis was no different from that displayed in most of her relationships in real life, without regard to sex, special circumstance or family ties. It is possible, of course, that there would have been less transference difficulty with a woman analyst, though it is likely that any gain would have been offset by new complications.

It appeared clear enough from the material produced that, in the unconscious drama which the analysis set in motion, she projected onto the physician the rôle of brutal dominant male and fought out within herself a battle against both the childish and the feminine submission, which she at the same time longed for and vigorously rejected. Again, it should be emphasized that this transference drama only duplicated something which was aroused by all-important human contacts, except that the setting of the analysis, designed for the purpose of its encouragement rather than suppression, made it more active and more transparent.

After repeated unsuccessful attempts by the physician to guide the analysis, interference and interpretation were reduced to a minimum, and to a considerable degree the patient was allowed to direct her own course. Her comments on analytical procedure were ingenious and often amusing, and no weak points were overlooked. Interpretations of analytical significance dealing with dreams and other material she at first dismissed as fantastic, naïve, and absurd. When meeting in the development of things more convincing evidence, she dropped ridicule in order to minimize or explain away. She was sure that analysis if anything was only of value for diagnosis and not for treatment. She pointed out at one time that there are only a few themes in psychoanalysis, and the subject knew before starting out

that one or more of a half-dozen things were going to be found the matter. Also, she said, even if such were true, what was the difference. There was nothing to be done about it. Far better "let sleeping dogs lie." Analysis, she felt, was a lazy way to do what you ought to do for yourself. Free association she considered to be much easier than intelligent logical thinking, and so on and so on. At the end she said rather grudgingly that it might be possible the analysis had helped to make conscious what had before been vague, but implied that such service was as likely to do harm as good.

Toward the analyst she was consistently critical. His slowness of speech bothered her. She said she always got to the end before he did. She felt that her cultural background was superior. Everything that could signify the crude male came in for special emphasis. She saw the analyst expectorate on the street, happily in the gutter, and developed the point at length. The analyst's thumb, as he pressed the button of the elevator, implied a coarseness of fiber which shocked and disappointed her, and so on. She contrasted her analyst unfavorably with the one to whom the other girl was going. To the end she did not accept the analytical situation in the sense that a special, unconscious transference relationship was being lived through.

Positive points in her attitude were few. Her only commendation followed the analyst's refusal to advise, in spite of long insistence, whether she should write to the other girl. She commented on his shrewdness at declining to be drawn into the matter, and admitted that she probably would have rejected his advice. At one time she confessed to a "feeling of dependence," which was soon followed by a vigorous reaction. At the end there were flurries of agitation and panic over leaving the analysis, but mixed with aloofness and rationalizations. She explained these anxiety feelings by the realization that she was no better and her last hope was gone.

To formulate in summary once more what seemed to be going on in the analysis;—this girl in her emotional isolation longed unconsciously for positive transference, patterned most prominently on the child-father relationship. Against this tendency were operating powerful barriers which aroused a strong negative reaction. This reaction in the analysis, as in her life outside, filled consciousness and dominated the picture on the surface. The most important barriers were the ambivalent love-hate attitude with all its significance, the narcissistic fear of injury and sense of guilt, and, above all, the "castration complex" which stood guard against any dependence or submission.

There were unmistakable signs of improvement which developed during the course of the analysis. Some of this was evident enough to the patient to lead her to an occasional spontaneous admission, but always grudgingly, and with expressed conviction as to cause, which left it more in spite of the analysis than on account of it. Her depression decreased, which she laid to the effect of a new environment. She got on better with men, and was increasingly sought after, which again she accounted for by outside influences. She still resented any love-making, but was far more willing for her escorts to feel such inclination. At first she was anxiously concerned about the subject of a job; then the topic disappeared, until a month before the analysis ended, when she took a position and got on apparently without difficulty.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENTS, ILLUSTRATED BY SPECIAL ITEMS

The patient dreamed freely, and much of the analysis was taken up with consideration of this material. Most of her dreams were fairly simple in manifest content, though associations were more elaborate and involved. She had a number of crude sexual dreams, the first in her experience, and for which, like all contemporary unpleasantness, she blamed the analysis. These sex dreams were unaccompanied by erotic feelings, and seemed of more importance in their symbolic meaning than as simple wish fulfilment. Development from an uncompromising masculine protest to a receptive heterosexual attitude can be fairly clearly followed by a selection from these dreams. They were not written out by the patient, and as given here are based on the analyst's notes.

Two weeks after the beginning of analysis, this dream occurs:

July 29th. Dream. She is in bed with a man who is making uncomplimentary remarks about her physical appearance. She feels deeply humiliated.

The man is the fiance of one of her friends. The feeling of humiliation is familiar to many social situations where she is sensitive and self-conscious. The dream seems to indicate some deep-lying sense of inferiority, probably on a basis of incomplete femininity which is activated anew in the analytical situation.

August 14th. Dream. She is sexually assaulted by a coarse, middleaged man. She defends herself in a state of fear, but finally is acquiescent. Then, in a fury, she urinates on her assailant as an act of revenge.

The meaning appears obvious. The anger, and the aggressive masculine act of revenge, are equivalent to denial of castration, threatened by her tendency to accept the feminine rôle. The whole drama reveals once more the unconscious psychic situation of real life and, in particular, the analysis, where she both longs for and fights against passivity and dependence.

August 18th. Dream. There is sexual assault by a large older man. The whole thing is "obscene and unpleasant." She does not seem frightened enough to awaken.

In discussion she resents her lack of fear in the dream. The analytical significance of the dream implies a decreasing resistance to dependency. When this is mentioned as a possibility, she with momentary animation suddenly recalls that the figure of the analyst appeared in the background of the dream.

September 21st. Dream. The setting is that of a play of the melodrama order—a shabby farmhouse, many people present—air of mystery, and so forth. A daughter in the rôle of prodigal returns to the home. It appears the father had "taken advantage of her" before she left. Two versions of the same theme go on simultaneously. The father repeats his advances. In one case the daughter kills him; in the other the incestuous relation is acquiesced in by all. A dead baby is present, the only clear figure in the dream. "It seems substituted for somebody else who had been killed."

Once more the ambivalent child-father, patient-analyst relation reveals itself. The patient's comments were characteristic. When the analyst cautiously pointed out the former meaning, she said, with a manner of superior disdain, "How ridiculous, interesting and rather amusing—irrelevant—something like telling fortunes by tea leaves—even if it should be true, what could you do about it?" She adds that it takes no special acumen to read its meaning, as the main basis is unsupported analytical theory brought in to suit the occasion.

September 30th. Dream No. 1. Patient is looking after her mother, who is disabled by an injury, and has a wooden leg. They are travelling on a boat. She has a protective feeling towards the mother and is efficient in her nursing and management.

In association, she brings up again her horror and revulsion toward physical illness; "it always seems based on the idea of a bodily wound." Early memories of her mother's illness bring back feelings of fear and distaste.

Dream No. 2. A man resembling the analyst is teasing a little girl. He threatens to cut off her breasts with a knife. The little girl is smiling and does not seem to mind.

The castration theme seems clearly demonstrated in both these dreams. The unconscious attitude revealed is one of increasing tolerance toward castration, *i.e.*, femininity. In the second dream there is implied the acceptance of castration in the analysis, and is a sign of analytical growth from childhood toward maturity. That is, the reaction to the unconscious emotional dependence in the analysis, is changing from a masculine protest to a more feminine acceptance.

October 2d. Dream. In a room with a man of her acquaintance. They are playing with a cord like a telephone cord. It catches about her legs and she fears her skirts will be pulled up. In another room the same man appears, nude from the waist up; he has breasts like a woman, one of which is crude and deformed. This breast fascinates and horrifies her. The man is offended, and accuses her of looking at him. She feels fear of him along sexual lines, and takes an ingratiating and conciliatory attitude.

The man in the dream is in reality a friend who shows special interest in her. She feels in general repelled by him. He attempts to study her character and give advice, claims she has an inferiority complex, etc. She resents this as "prying into her mental life." Here, quite evidently, is represented the analytical situation,—the analyst also pries into her mental life. In the office a telephone cord is at times near the foot of the couch. No doubt the patient is concerned about the arrangement of her skirts when reclining.

This dream appears to give a glimpse deep into the patient's unconscious mind. As is expected in analysis, she is bringing into the special therapeutic relations her pattern of libido organization, which there can function and be studied, without the complication of social reality. There is signified in the dream a mixed fear and interest in heterosexual, *i.e.*, adult love life, occurring in the analytical setting, and complicated by man-woman, father-mother, pregenital, erotic, fixations and needs. The breast-penis connection seems obvious.

November 23d. Dream. Two birds the size of doves are mating in the position of humans. The female, strong and beautiful, has been blinded by accident. She is married to the other bird. Later the patient seems identified with the blind bird. There is no sense of sorrow, and all seemed "appropriate." Still later, the blind bird is walking behind the other, being led by a string.

Again are seen castration and acceptance without protest of the feminine part, presented in simple symbolism.

November 24th. Dream. Patient is identified with a young girl who is having sexual intercourse for the first time with a young man.

There is defloration. The dreamer is aware of the pain in intercourse, and the unpleasantness of the blood-flow. The girl's father and other people are in the room, but there still seems a sense of privacy, and everything is as it should be.

This dream, both for real life and the analytic situation, presents a striking contrast to those earlier in the series. There is represented complete attainment of heterosexuality. The dreamer functions in the passive and feminine rôle without fear or antagonism, all of which symbolizes psychological advance. For the first time some actual genital sensation accompanies the dream.

(Following the dream of November 24th the patient seemed really interested in the analysis for a few interviews and was more responsive and hopeful than before).

November 26th. Analytical evidence has somewhat impressed her, but she is still vigorously on the defensive. She says the analysis, whether or not it has accomplished any change in her, has not made her happier or more capable of meeting the world. She asserts she did not undertake the analysis for experiment, and questions what has been accomplished. "What difference does it make how much you know, if you can do nothing about it?" She wonders to what extent she will regret in future years having spent the time in analysis.

November 29th. She brought up a dream mentioned earlier, but not further discussed at the time. It had occurred in identical form five times in the last years of preparatory school. She had talked it over with some amateur analyst, who gave her a little of its meaning.

Dream. A fisher village on an island. A beautiful boy of four or five years is washed ashore, and is cared for by the natives. He warns them of some great calamity, but is not believed. Finally, when he is a grown youth, a tempest comes, the island is destroyed, but the boy rides triumphantly away on the waves.

In association she refers to the story of Cassandra. The patient still feels herself misunderstood by her parents, treated unjustly and not believed. She speaks with feelings of bitterness of the capacity that her brother had as a child to irritate her. Her mother once referred to her as a "jungle animal." She says, "Why are these wounds so real to me now? There is no occasion, but the emotion is as real as ever." She further spoke of having developed an armor against the world, but if anything like the analysis got underneath it, her reactions were the same as a child. She adds, "This armor may shut out pain, but it also shuts me in." She commented sadly on her feeling of loneliness, and said how much more "secure" she felt when

someone, man or woman, gave her special liking and attention. The similarity of this dream to the widespread myth of the birth of the hero, is of interest, and tells its own story of unresolved narcissism.

END PHENOMENA

A patient's reactions, when the date for termination of the analysis is set, are of great interest and importance. The final breaking of the transference must some time occur. If the analysis goes on somewhat indefinitely, end phenomena are more apt to be attenuated. If, on the other hand, the date is set for the end by the analyst, as soon as the patient shows sufficient evidence of capacity and desire for independence, then things are more stormy. Both methods have their advantages. The latter forces the patient to accomplish something which he would continually like to put off, and avoids the difficulty of a permanent transference bondage. The former makes more gradual the growing pains incident to the attainment of psychic adulthood, and carries perhaps less danger of a sudden regression into the old type of maladjustment. The person who has completed a successful analysis has in the experience worked through some of his old patterns of psychic organization to a more adequate form. He is now adjusted in the analysis, but the most important step is yet to be made. The analysis is to be taken away from him, and there are two roads open, one forward to an adjustment with the real world; the other backward, to neurosis or other compromise. (In this case, the end of the analysis had been set for the beginning of the holidays. The date was in part determined by circumstances, but was made definite by the analyst at this juncture.)

November 30th. The patient says her mind is now "flat" instead of depressed. Work or play seem equally pointless. She had a talk with her mother the night before, who thought there was no change in the daughter's condition. Although inclined to agree, she felt she must defend the analysis. There is a sense that she is being turned adrift.

December 1st. She expresses relief at the thought that the analysis will before long be over. She feels completely at sea whether anything has been accomplished or not, and wonders whether it is usual for patients to have that uncertainty. She has a strange feeling that there is little self-control over action while being analyzed, and is thankful that no serious question had arisen in her outside life. It seems nothing can be accomplished in the remaining hours, and she

will be forced back into personal responsibility, with nothing to lean on. She thinks she must have used the analysis as an "escape." Perhaps, she says, all the analysis can do is to make it more difficult to camouflage one's motives from himself. If so, is it justifiable? She cannot see any unconscious relationship (transference) in the analysis. She wonders if a year from now she will feel it was worth while—certainly being dependent on the analyst will not lead her to be independent.

December 5th. She reports that for the last few nights there have been peculiar excited feelings, confused but intense—a sense of anticipation "like a child before taking a trip." These are "not rational, but very definite." They seem to be concerned with her increased popularity with men, though nothing special has come up. She says, "It is incomprehensible I should have so much attention. There is a terrible come-down ahead of me. 'Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad.' I will soon get bored with social life, instead of finding it exciting."

It seems fair, with all the material available, to look on such manifestations as more than a passing mood, and really signifying some release from inhibitions which have stood in the way of emotional contacts in and out of the analysis.

December 6th. A complete change of mood has occurred. Once more the patient is listless and discouraged, although there is less animosity. In general, she thinks analysis at the best is but a palliative measure without permanent gain. It does no good simply to recognize things. The special things for which she wished help remained unchanged (she lists indecision, worry over trifles, and other minor symptoms). She speaks of her attitude to "petting" which she had always felt was superior. She wonders now if, after all, in "coarseness" there is an element of strength. Men consider her "wholesome," but she realizes that she is sailing under false colors.

December 7th. She is still discouraged. She would like to have confidence, but is skeptical. Analysis is like a hand to a child walking the dark,—almost like a "pacifier." It is palliative rather than corrective; hypochondriacs would seize upon it.

December 8th. Dream. In the analyst's office—a sunshiny day. She feels the analysis is over and is very panicky. The analyst assures her there are still several hours left, and also that she can come back again in a month. On leaving the office she forgets a book. The analyst follows and gives her a large volume of philosophy.

She feels the dream represents her actual feelings at the moment. She has an "awful fear" that after the end of the analysis she will settle into a worse rut than before. She admits "perhaps a little change since July, but certainly none in the last two months." She states that one constructive thing the analysis might do would be to help her believe that she could do better.

In the foregoing dream, in which unconscious transference is naïvely presented, one may believe that the anxiety is aroused at the coming repetition in the analytical relation of the thwarting and deprivation which had accompanied former childhood transference situations in real life, for which the analysis is now substituting.

Miss A. accepts none of this meaning. She asks, what is the use of bringing in mysterious and deep-lying significance? The obvious is sufficient. She realizes that a last hope is being taken away, with nothing accomplished, and maintains that she quite naturally dreams of the fact.

December 12th. She is in a puzzled and contemplative state of mind with reference to the analysis. She wonders if any change it may have wrought will ever be clear to her. She wants to do, and does just as many "unpleasant things" as before (harsh remarks, tempers, etc.) but her conscience does not bother her any more. She takes her parents' criticism less seriously, and in general is not as much concerned with other people's opinions. She has always been honest with her parents, and appears a bit alarmed that she may begin to deceive them. She wonders if she will be jealous of her brother when he comes home.

Following these comments, she asks, "Why has this whole process of analysis made so little impression on my mind?" She claims her attitude toward the homosexual girl friend is unchanged, but adds, "I would like to have her dependent on me, and yet be free from her." She desires both the protection of her home and the freedom of living away from it, and says this illustrates how she has always wanted to have her cake and eat it, too.

December 18th. A dream and associated material came up, which led the analyst to a more lengthy discussion than usual. He might have spared himself the pains. The patient remarked afterward, with the implication of being better occupied, that her mind had wandered and she heard little of what he said.

December 19th. (The day before final interview). She says all her symptoms have returned. She is depressed, and hates her work.

At night she is wakeful, and worries that she may overdo and become ill. She is jealous of everybody. All other people are better off than she. She narrates a thinly disguised homosexual dream, and feels like writing "all kinds of extravagance" to her girl intimate.

Such a flurry of regressive manifestations is usual enough at this critical period, just before the end of analysis. The explanation is not obscure. Deep in the subject's mind a new hope has arisen that somehow in the analysis will be found satisfactions always longed for and never achieved. Instead of that, one is faced once more with disappointment. Even the analysis is to be taken away.

December 20th. Her mood is in marked contrast to the depression of yesterday. She smiles and takes things lightly. She describes the phantasy of just getting out of an egg-shell and being stepped on. She is not aware of taking away anything "consciously" from the analysis. She cannot see that it is educational either on the emotional or intellectual levels. She had hoped for two things:—Relief of symptoms, and knowledge of herself and other people. Neither has resulted. She has a feeling of being completely fooled, and yet a tendency to argue that the analysis shall go on. She could not "in all justice" encourage anybody else to have an analysis, yet "in self-defense" she has to think it is worth while for herself. As she leaves she shakes hands and gives her first really cordial smile. She says, "I suppose this ought to be a very great moment indeed for me," but by implication leaves the impression that it is not.

CONCLUSION

There must always be incompleteness in the attempt to set forth the story of an analysis. The mass of material is so great that only a little can be selected for presentation. More importantly, much of the analyst's grasp of the case is based on "atmosphere," on shades of attitude and mood, in general on phenomena which are more sensed than accurately observed, and which defy clear articulation. Likewise, the analyst's own influence on the procedure is dependent in part on subtleties not easily translated into description.

The sum total of evidence seems to justify the opinion that the girl whose case is outlined went through a successful analysis, in the sense that in it she lived out her emotional life patterns and, in contrast to all her other experiences, was enabled to modify these patterns toward those more suitable for the normal world. The inhibitions toward satisfactory human relations, based on narcissistic fear of injury, and masculine protest, were in the analysis broken through,

in spite of her unwillingness and inability to grasp these things consciously. So to speak, in the purely psychic situation of the analysis she learned to live with the analyst on an adult rather than infantile level. By this accomplishment, an important step was taken toward making possible the same adjustments in the real world of ordinary living.

Miss A. has not been seen since the analysis. It would be most desirable to round out this history with an account of satisfactory post-analytic developments, thereby adding to the justification for the conclusions of the paper. Unfortunately, such information is not available. From some indirect sources, evidence of a better way of life has been obtained, but these are not detailed or conclusive enough to bring conviction. Therefore, one must rest content that the selected data of the analysis will itself prove that for this girl, satisfactory progress took place in the unconscious mental life, in spite of the conscious denial of change, which she maintained until the last.

TRAUMATIZATION OF THE LIBIDO, WITH THE REPORT OF THREE CASES

By L. S. LONDON, M.D.

For twenty years I have been interested in the etiology of dementia praecox. During all these years I have observed two characteristics in the schizophrenic: first, that their morals are very high and sensitive, and second, that their sexual life is subject to conflicts. It is the purpose of this paper to show that the libido in the praecox is traumatized; that is, when this creative energy tries to fixate itself on an oppositely sexed individual and it fails in its fixation, which is due to some faulty embryological development, it is traumatized, and that the degree of injury varies in individual cases. For example, in one case just a mere contact or social relation between a schizophrenic and an oppositely sexed member of society may cause an attack; in other cases attacks may occur either during courtship, after courtship, or even in marriage. For instance in case one, the libido was traumatized twelve years after marriage; in case two, the traumatization of the libido occurred during the infatuation of the individual for a young lady. In case three there was merely a contact between the girl and the man in dancing and this precipitated an attack which required hospitalization.

Let us assume the libido or creative energy shows a definite proportion in the normal individual, as diagram one: Here we see the components of heterosexuality in larger proportion than homosexuality, and the perversions and narcissism in like proportions as we know this occurs from the investigations of Freud. (See "Three Contributions to Sexual Theory," translated by Dr. A. A. Brill, N. Y.) In diagram two, there is a disproportion of the components. Homosexuality, narcissism, and the perversions are liberated.

My contention is that there must be something abnormal in the embryological development of the libido that makes certain individuals susceptible to traumatic attacks, but this phase of investigation will be discussed in a later paper in which I will try to show why it is that certain types of individuals are susceptible to attacks and the importance of the familial relationship or heredity.

Those who have had the opportunity to study schizophrenics in

state hospitals know that patients are often admitted with definite symptoms of dementia praecox and after a short period of hospitalization recover. This is especially true in the katatonic type. Why does this type recover and hebephrenic regress, can be accounted for only by the development of the libido and the degree of its traumatization; in other words, the libido is injured and in certain types of individuals adjusts itself. There may be a relationship between the degree of the injury of the libido and the degree of sensitiveness of the super-ego, but this question will also be discussed in another paper. It is my idea that although we have observed clinical psychiatry in

DIAGRAM 1. Mechanism of the normal libido.





DIAGRAM 2. Mechanism of the libido after traumatization.



the past thirty years, in the descriptive phase, or its pathology, the future researches must be conducted along the embryology and physiology of the development of the ego and libido. We do not know the psychic life of the embryo; the trauma may be partly intrauterine and partly embryological. With these factors in mind let us now proceed with the mechanism of the following cases:

Case 1. X. Y. Z., age thirty-eight, bank clerk, married. Family history negative for three generations. Personal history: attended school up to thirteen, later began work, but being industrious and ambitious, finished his studies in evening high school and attended business college, where he studied bookkeeping and banking. He did minor clerical work until he secured a position with a bank and remained with this institution for eleven years, when he thought that possibly he was being discriminated against and joined another bank, where he remained four years. During

this time he married and apparently led a happy conjugal union, without offspring, but his sexual life was entirely abnormal, as will be described later. Being of a religious make-up he sublimated in church work, and was active in his parish, being a devoted bible student. His trouble first began around December, 1924, when he commenced to complain of severe headaches and a sensation of heat over his entire cranium. Several months later, these symptoms were followed by ideas of a persecutory nature. He thought that the bank officials where he worked did not want him and were conspiring to get him out of the way. He also developed "auditory hallucinations." He said that he heard them say, "He is nutty." The bank officials advised the patient to take a vacation, as they thought he had been overworked. He went to the country for a five weeks' rest. He appeared improved on his return home, but after an interval of three weeks, his headaches returned and soon thereafter his auditory hallucinations. He would hear his wife crying while in the bank, although she lived many miles away. He also heard the bank officials say, 'He deserves what he gets.' The bank physician then advised that the patient take sick leave again and suggested electrotherapy, which the patient pursued for three months; this, however, only seemed to aggravate the patient's mental condition and he began to develop olfactory hallucinations based on persecutory ideas. He thought he smelled the odor of dead rats at home (anal component). He began to think that the superintendent of the co-operative apartment he owned wanted to get him out of the way and had concealed the dead rats in the walls of the apartment. On another occasion, he thought that possibly someone living in the apartment below him had concealed the body of an illegitimate foetus (woman beneath him is his female component), and that this was responsible for the odor. At other times he thought it was gas and that some of the officials of the bank had sent messengers to lower the pressure in the gas meter and then cause the gas to escape from the pilot light. This he also thought was the cause of his persistent headaches. These persecutory ideas which were based on hallucinations were not fixed but perfectly systematized. Soon after, he began to develop ideas of reference; he thought the bank officials were shadowing him, trying to get evidence against him for immorality and then expel him from his position (unconscious homosexuality). One of the bank officials gave him a magazine to read and in the magazine he noted an article which contained a story of immorality. He immediately thought that possibly this bank official was having him shadowed. As the symptoms continued to increase his wife became alarmed and consulted me as to a prognosis, the diagnosis being self-evident. She was considering sending him to a private sanitarium when I suggested psychoanalysis.

I was stimulated by the work of Jung of Zurich, who has treated cases of dementia praecox with obvious success. He states that the

effort is stupendous and one has to almost give his entire life to the treatment of a single case. If we can get the case of dementia praecox at the border line stage, much can be done for him. The disassociated psychic entities must be reintegrated and require creative effort, together with a vast knowledge of the unconscious mind; in other words, while I have not worked with Jung but have just corresponded with him, I believe he uses a different technique from some of the other psychoanalysts who have recently invaded the field of the treatment of the psychoses by psychoanalytical procedures. I believe that Jung analyzes to get at the root of the trouble and then molds the praecox back into shape by suggestion; for he has expressed the idea that one must get the praecox in a liquid condition before he has congealed. The transference of the psychotic is incomplete; he transfers himself on the analyst. Freud has given us a clue, that it remains for the psychiatrist to solve the enigma of the psychotic. He has shown us the theory of the neuroses and the mechanism of the libido.

The analysis of case 1 lasted about six months, the analytical periods being about five hours a week. Two dreams are recorded.

Dream one: Mr. X— presented me with a subpoena in which I am accused of raping a girl.

Interpretation: According to our knowledge subpoena represents super-ego, just like courts of justice, father, angels, etc. In reality he never raped a girl (except relation with prostitute); he did not even touch his wife. It is a wish to rape a girl.

Dream two: I am at a nice place where I can get a nice view of the landscape and on the side is a building which apparently obstructs the view. There is an excavation and I try to lower myself down. I saw a man who said it was some eight hundred feet deep. I saw a concrete and steel reinforcement wall. I went down the excavation and was about to go up when I saw my dad, who wanted me to carry him up, but I told him I could not, he being too heavy. He managed to get me in such a position that I would fall below if I did not carry him up. On the top I saw a colored girl whom I had apparently seen before. When somewhere near home I saw the same girl (colored, with blonde hair) dancing. I said, "Have you been waiting here all this time for me?" and she replied, "You bet I have."

Interpretation: In this dream we again see the super-ego as his father. Cavity represents mother's womb.

Heterosexual component: Mother, wife, girl raped in dream one; mother's womb and colored girl in dream two; prostitute in park, and wife.

Homosexual component: Subpoena: court, dream one; comrades in bank—father in dream two; analyst.

Perhaps the following information will clarify the interpretations of dreams one and two, and show the mechanism of case. In the analysis of the case it was ascertained that although the patient had been married twelve years, he had never had any real sexual relationship with his wife, who encouraged his homosexuality by being a woman of the masculine type. She was frigid, a school teacher, and without doubt a homosexual. Although he practiced coitus with her, in reality he went through a love act that was more or less homosexual. He would lie on her and not penetrate her vagina for fear that she might be injured by his penetration, as he rationalized that she had a floating kidney and feared that she could not bear childbirth; that she was too weak to undergo the strain of motherhood. His sexual life in his childhood showed the usual polymorphous perversions characteristic of neurotics and psychotics. He practiced bestiality and one homosexual experience stood out in his childhood life. He masturbated an employee of his father's bake shop and frequently while this employee was asleep he would go over and masturbate him for the purpose of watching the orgasm.

For years he sublimated in active church work and would spend his evenings going around and trying to reform prostitutes to lead moral lives. In his conscious life he satisfied his religious ideas but in his unconscious he had so-called homosexual relations with them. His trouble began when on one of these occasions he became indiscreet and had an actual sex relationship with one of these harlots. This experience occurred in Central Park. This was the first time that the patient experienced the penetration and contraction of the vagina. He believed that the girl had some contrivance or mechanism in her vagina which grasped the organ and he experienced a sensation he never had before. It was following this episode that his troubles began. Although he confessed his misconduct to his wife, nevertheless his symptoms increased until he was considered for sanitarium treatment. In this case we see that the libido had been ungratified and that when it definitely came in contact with an oppositely sexed member it was traumatized or injured. The mechanism of the machine that he believed the prostitute had in her vagina can be considered as the root of his trouble; if he penetrated the vagina he

could not come out again. Trying to reform the prostitutes can be regarded as the saving phantasies, according to Freud.

In all cases of dementia praecox that I have analyzed I have found that if the patient is analyzed long enough, we can always get polymorphous perversions at the root of the conflict. The libido, if traumatized, can either bear the shock that occurs even in normal individuals as a heterosexual adjustment, or if it fails in its adjustment due to trauma, the individual seeks refuge either in a neurosis or psychosis.

When the mechanism of this case was disclosed to the patient he one day returned smiling and said, "Do you know, doctor, I really believe I have taken the virginity of my wife last night." From that time on he began to improve and after six months' treatment returned to his work, which he has pursued to this day with more energy than before.

The question will be asked, why did this patient develop his psychotic attack so late in life? The answer to this justified query is quite obvious. His libido was not traumatized and in his marital relations he frequently practiced masturbation or coitus intrafemoris and was satisfied. It was only when his libido was traumatized that his conflict developed.

Case 2. A. R., age twenty-one, single, male, salesman. Family history negative for two generations. Personal history—attended school until fourteen; one term high school, then entered business of brother. Present illness—two years ago developed a state of anxiety, thought he had swallowed a piece of glass. Had a similar attack one year ago; at this time feared he had developed some disease of the heart and lungs. Of late he has developed the fear to go out of the house alone. He had to be taken to his place of business by either his sister or brother and had to be returned to his home. Recently while riding on the subway there was a blockade in the traffic and the patient heard a voice say: "You are going to die, but if you reach Ninety-sixth Street you will live to be one hundred years old." His sexual life is similar to that of other schizophrenics. He masturbated and at the age of eleven had an incestuous relation with his sister, three years older [sister takes him to work]. While she was asleep he put his penis to her body without awakening her [without doubt she awoke]. For several years he worried lest his mother find out and when he grew older he was ashamed to look at his sister. He has tried on several occasions to indulge in sexual intercourse, only while in the company of his male friends, but on each occasion he had a premature ejaculation. He has had periods of anxiety while attending theaters; once while in the theater with his mother he saw a vaudeville sketch on

the stage which depicted two men going through an act in which one of them masqueraded as the wife of the other. The man came in and fired a pistol shot at the disguised man who was acting as a woman. Immediately a cold sweat came over the patient's forehead; he felt faint and had to leave his seat and go out to get some air. [We can understand the hallucination of the subway; he feels divided into two parts, wishes to get rid of one part; if the female part dies he will live to be one hundred years old.]

The year before he attended a camp, where he took the part of a female, and it was following this episode that his fear to go out developed. This has continued for months, and it is for this purpose he is brought by his brother, and is accepted for psychoanalysis. The analysis of this case lasted seven months, and the following information was obtained through his dreams and free associations. In this case an effort will be made to demonstrate the conflict which developed as the result of the traumatization of his libido. The following are some of the dreams disclosed in the analysis:

Dream One. He is in college and is in front of a camp fire. There are many boys there. On the sides there are many high hats and coats. Many of these boys come to get their hats and coats. When he came to pick his hat, it was peculiar in shape, being neither high nor low.

Interpretation: He is neither man nor woman; the fire represents his instincts.

Dream Two. He is on the fifth or sixth floor of an apartment house. There are some girls there and P. and L. (boy friends). The boys said they were going downstairs, and he said "If you go I will follow you." They began to run down the stairs. L. is first and one floor ahead of him is P., the patient being behind. When he reached the bottom he found P. speaking to a fellow on — Street. He does not remember this boy's features, but believes he was dressed in a black suit.

Interpretation: There is a fear of death, the solution is death, his inner voice tells him he is homosexual.

Dream Three. He dreams of a big bottle; the mouth of the bottle is a little bent. He filled the bottle with water and when half through, J. (boy friend) says "S." (another boy friend) "uses it for his penis." S. denied it and J. said you had better see a doctor.

The association of this dream discloses the following: That while the patient was at a gymnasium he saw a young man with his penis exposed and the thought of taking the penis of that young man occurred to him, but he turned his head away. On another occasion he was with C. A., another boy friend, who had spent the night in his house, and while wrestling with him, the patient became passionate and wanted to rub his penis against C. A.'s body.

Dream Four. He was on F— Street dressed in a soldier's uniform—there is a whole line of soldiers marching and he stands in line with them. One of the officers takes him out of the line and escorts him to another officer, who pinched his cheek and kissed him and he retaliated by a blow on the jaw.

Interpretation: He fights against his impulses which are organized in a strong rank and file.

Dream Five. Patient is on a hill about eighty feet high and is standing on the edge with two girls. He then stands on the edge of a ledge, with his back to an excavation. One of the girls takes his hands and holds them. He is frightened, for it appears that if she lets him go he will fall. Then she holds him up and he turns around and sees soldiers going up the street trying to get into a barn.

The association in this dream discloses that when he was four years old, he went to a candy shop to purchase candy, and the proprietor took out his penis and put it into the patient's mouth. The patient became frightened and ran home, never telling anyone about it. On one occasion he had an attack of vertigo while purchasing a drink in a candy shop. On the counter he recognized the same kind of candy that the man who first subjected him to fellatio gave him.

Dream Six. His mother, father and sister are in the back seat of an automobile. The patient is in front. His mother is pregnant and tells his father that she did not want a child and she is going to die. Then the patient speaks to his mother and says, "I did not want a baby but it is all right."

The associations in this dream disclose that the patient has had ideas of having relations with his mother. His father and mother frequently quarreled. Once they nearly killed each other. When he went out, on his return he usually opened the door very slowly, for fear that he might see one of them stabbed, and he believes that this caused him to develop the idea that his mother might poison him, by mistake, in an attempt to get rid of his father. He also associates

that his father was contemplating going to Europe in a short time and he feared that if his father died in Europe and if his mother worried and died as the result of having induced him to go to Europe, then the patient might die of shock. In the same analytical period he discloses that while at a camp he had a love affair which consisted of a violent infatuation for a girl, L. F., and he believes that this precipitated his trouble. She appears to be the only girl he ever loved.

At the age of eight there was a girl thirteen who used to rub his penis against her vagina. When he was sixteen he saw this girl who was then twenty-one and he felt ashamed.

He always showed extreme jealousy for his friend "R." (boy friend) and when he heard a pistol shot or a cannon shot he became excited. While at the Follies he once heard a pistol shot and he became excited.

Dream Seven. He went to a lady psychologist who asked him questions. He came the next day, looked at her and became very passionate, thought of having sexual relations with her and then had a pollution. He associates that he had a homosexual experience with "R.", male friend (rectal coitus). He often feared that people would take him for a fairy because he was good looking.

Dream Eight. J. F. (male) is standing on a corner with his girl, the patient walked over, started speaking, and J. F. walked away because he could not get anything. The girl held the patient's hand and said he should put it between her legs. The patient said he wanted coitus with her. They looked for a hallway but could not find any. While walking he saw one or two couples enter a house, so they decided to go into the same house. As they walked in they found the apartment divided into six rooms. One room in the corner seemed elaborately furnished. One could observe what was going on in all the rooms. He saw H., a male friend, and H. said he was a girl. The patient said he wanted to have coitus with him. He took H. to a bed, and the patient awoke.

He associates a guilty conflict. He says if anyone looks at him, especially someone who has lost something, the patient fears that they will think he took it. He also worries about the thought that he will be taken for a fairy. The patient always had an idea that he was taken for a fairy, as he noticed that men frequently flirted with him. On one occasion he was in a pool room and he thought he was taken for a fairy. On another occasion he was in a Turkish bath and a fellow suggested fellatio. Two years ago he had the idea that fairies

stand and lean on one foot and he was afraid to do that lest he be taken for one. About a year ago he took a boy to his home to stop over night with him while his mother was away. The next day when his mother returned, he thought that his mother probably took the boy for a homosexual. During the same week, while his mother was away, he went and stopped for a night in a Turkish bath, fearing to stay at home alone. About six months before that a fellow tried to pick him up. When he had his two teeth pulled out, the fellows were kidding him and said he could make money. On another occasion while going down on the bus he noticed a fellow who was clean shaven and the patient thought this man was a homosexual because he got off at — Street and Fifth Avenue. On several occasions he has masturbated a friend of his in another friend's car.

We know from the study of analysis that there exist morbid fears in young girls and women. We have called this, rudely, the prostitution complex. They fear their unconscious desire to prostitute themselves and therefore fear to go out into open places (agoraphobia).

In case two we see this fear as a determining cause: he was afraid to go out into the street alone. The analyst will at once discern this fear as guilty of committing a crime. In this particular case there is enough evidence which shows that his struggle began after his libido was traumatized in its attempt to seek gratification, when he became infatuated with the girl while at the camp. When his libidinous fixation in his childhood reappeared after his libido was traumatized and he could not accept fellatio because his super-ego had already been formed, he chose to remain in the house lest he might prostitute himself. The symptoms of fear for going out were replaced by his unconscious guilt. The homosexual has no fears, for, in the first place, his homosexuality is manifest and his super-ego allows him to carry out his practices. He will therefore not develop nervous manifestations.

Case 3. F. S., age thirty, single, female. Family history negative for three generations. Father and mother are about seventy years of age and are living and in good health. The patient is thirty years old and has had a college education. She has the degrees of B.S. and M.S. Attended school until sixteen and graduated from Columbia at twenty. She did not like teaching and has pursued a business career. Present illness: She is very suspicious in her initial interview and does not disclose much of her life history. She comes mainly for advice as to what she should do. She does not like her position and admits that six years ago

she had a nervous breakdown. She gives no further details. Last year she had another attack of nervousness and took a vacation and went abroad for two months. She says she is very shy, and does not associate very much with either sex. She has never had any love experiences and was never courted by a man or even ever kissed by a man. She has indulged a great deal in athletics, is fond of swimming, tennis, etc. During the past few years she has even lost interest in these sports. She speaks of being very fat, and describes herself as hideous. (She, however, appears quite attractive and does not show any masculine characteristics, but on the other hand shows many feminine traits, of her features, well shaped body and hands and legs.) She speaks a great deal of her contempt of men and describes them as animals. She also expressed a paranoid idea about a Mr. X— in the place where she is employed, but is unable to give reasons why she entertains this idea against him. She is accepted for psychoanalysis, although the physician who referred her is advised that the patient is apparently psychotic and probably would not submit to an analysis.

During the first twenty hours she brought many lengthy dreams (negative transference) and after that time became so resistant that the analysis was almost terminated. At this time she brought me a large envelope describing her life history; this information was minutely detailed but rather incoherent and seemed to have been written under a great deal of psychomotor activity; she also confessed that she had censored a great deal of her dream material. For example:

Dream One. She dreams of lizards and salamanders. She describes the lizards as horny and she hears voices from the sky and they tell her to look out for the lizards, that they are poisonous and that she would die unless she took an antidote. Later she describes a dream in which a lizard is on her lap and it had a human form to its back. She also confessed later that this lizard was really a child who was gasping for breath.

During the first month she told other things about her life's history; that she once met a man, "R.", whom she liked very much. She describes him as polite and sociable but an extreme flirt. She met him at a friend's house and she cared so much for him that she went West to escape this man.

Whenever she broaches her sexual life, especially her habit of masturbation, she becomes emotional, wrings her hands and sobs and ends the analytic session abruptly. On one of her next visits she


expresses a great many fears of the unknown; fears dark rooms. She also says she is very fond of perfume bottles. She relates having had attachments for various women in her life. At the age of seven she loved her teacher. When she was nineteen she was very much in love with a teacher and whenever she saw her she would get excited. She describes her as being nice and dainty. Later she met a lady whom she was very fond of; she loved this woman as much as her mother. In this analytical period she speaks of the effort of her mother to induce her to play with dolls when she desired to play with locomotives. She says she was always considered a tomboy and always liked to watch her father at work in his workshop. The next day she comes and complains of insomnia, that she did not fall asleep until five in the morning and recalls no dreams. In this session she relates that her father is highly sexed, that he used to scratch her when he used to kiss her, and that she now hates her father, although when she was a child she loved him. She does not know why she changed. She speaks of her father not having any brains and that he came of a generation who made girls go out to work as servants, while her mother comes from a more educated family.

At the next analytical period she brings the following dream: *She is in the hallway of a house; there are a bunch of girls; one is a blond girl and one is a dark girl. The blond girl had been all over the world, the dark one expressed a desire to go to South America or Europe.* She associates and condemns herself for being a female, says she cannot understand why females menstruate, that there must be something wrong with her. She says she likes to do what men do and even wonders whether nature made a mistake, mixing the souls of boys and the bodies of girls. She thinks her mother would have been a good business man. On this occasion she describes her first contact with a man—when she was twenty-three she went to a dance and while dancing with a man she became greatly excited. It was following this episode that she first began practicing masturbation—that up to the age of twenty-three she did not even know how women gave birth to children and that her married sister, although she was about to give birth to a child, a few hours before the child came did not know where the child was coming from—that her mother would not tell her. The patient then states that when she first got her menses she was frightened, that her mother would not tell her. She also speaks of the inferiority of women, compares them to cripples or hunchbacks, and again speaks of men as strange animals. The

following day she brings a dream and draws a sketch of it, as diagram below.

At this stage of the analysis she again became very resistant, rushed away from the analytic period and said she would never come back. Nevertheless she comes on time on her next appointment, says she has thought it all over and will continue treatment.

DIAGRAM 3



During the next ten hours, although she is in good transference, she still brings lengthy dreams, but with occasional short ones. Here are two short dreams:

People are standing in line, H., a sister standing behind her. Patient stepped back and almost broke her sister's neck. She realized that her sister was injured and after the injury could not find her.

Interpretation: her sister is the feminine part of herself; there is also a death wish against her sister, of whom she is jealous of her feminine traits.


Another short dream: She is going up an elevator. She goes past her stop—she goes back and apparently everyone has a rose. The scene then changes and she is patching a green cloth. There is a long room and there are many youngsters. V. (her niece, a small child) is also there. The patient feels very lonely.

On her next visit the patient brings a diagram giving her impression of her case (see diagram 4). She then states that she became inquisitive concerning sex and studied zoölogy and somatology.

If one studies diagram 4 carefully, one will see what is lurking behind in the unconscious of this individual. It represents a section

of the vagina, fallopian tube and ovary, and also if we turn the diagram around it represents a penis, spermatic cord and testes.

DIAGRAM 4



The analysis continued for several months more, during which time the patient was bringing very prolific dreams. Sometimes it would take her as long as twenty minutes to relate a dream. I could not speak to her of her sexual life. Whenever she spoke of masturbation, she would become tremulous, cry and sob. I decided to wait and was rewarded when she brought me the following dream several weeks later:

Dream: She sees the form of a nude man, the back part. The man is very strong and herculean in type. Near the man stand a steer and a pig. Both of the animals are not in their own skin but in the same skin as the man. I gave her the following interpretation: That the steer represents virility and the pig her conception of sexuality. The following day she confesses that there were two other parts of the dream that she censored because they were too ghastly; one part was where the man and the two animals are riding down an elevator. She is an onlooker and sees a great pool of blood at the bottom of the elevator. Another part of the dream is where she sees the steer and the man in close embrace, so close that they cannot be separated from each other and after they are separated she notices that the entire front part of the man is torn away (castration).

Inasmuch as the analysis had lasted over one hundred hours, I deemed it proper to give her a further interpretation of this dream. I told her that the man represented three parts: first, her father, whom she first loved and later hated; second, the man "R." with whom she danced, whose genitals had traumatized her, and that the third part is myself, and I explained my position in the transference to her.

The following day she comes and makes another confession and gives the following information: that after she danced with the man and felt his genitals she became greatly excited. A few days later while taking a bath she was applying a hose to her body and there was a sensation of warmth that the hose gave to her entire body, and when she applied the hose to her vagina she got a similar sensation. This finally led her to insert the hose into her vagina; that following this experience she has masturbated continually from three to five times a week, using the hose as a substitute for the penis. This continued for years, when she found out after she had moved and had no accessible hose that the finger would answer the same purpose.

She then relates an experience that happened to her at the age of six. While playing with a doll she inserted the doll's hand into her

vagina, but that at that time she had no idea of sex, that she was perfectly innocent and that it was only before she began her analysis that she began to take an active interest in the knowledge of sex. She took a course in zoölogy and although at first she selected the course because it was the least expensive, she realizes now that the reason she selected it was her inquisitiveness in sexual matters. Several weeks later she came with the following information: a great light has dawned upon her, that she now understands sublimation, God, love and friendship—that she will now reform—that she realizes that her creative energy, which is distinctly feminine, has been trying to go in the channels of a male; that a woman's energy is creative and for the propagation of the species and for the training of children—that a man's energy is for the support of the female. She is now changed, is very happy she is a woman; she now sees the reason for existence and why she has had no basis for friendship, that her creative energy might turn to male friends, children or work. She now sees why during her life she was so attracted to women—that she realizes women have to menstruate—that she is not hideous and has distinctly feminine characteristics—that on one occasion she compared herself to an ape, thought that she had hair all over her body and expressed the fear that unless she shaved regularly she would lose her position.

In the same hour she tells of another experience with her sister "H." at an early period of her childhood. Her sister took her to the woods and inserted some long grass in her vagina. She recalls that the experience was of a pleasant nature. (H. is the sister in the dream formerly described where the patient wishes her death, and where her feminine component was fixated.)

For years, she now tells, she has resorted to phantasies or day dreams. She has formulated various personages or characters; for example, she has what she calls heroes number one and number two. Number one is lively, tall, dark, is a doctor, makes little children well, is full of fun and jokes and she describes him as having a thousand laugh wrinkles around his eyes. He is also a tease and musical. Hero number two she describes as being of a serious makeup, quiet, also tall, lanky, not good looking, but with a nice character. He is a lawyer, smiles a great deal and has a keen sense of humor. In her phantastic life she has carried on all kinds of activities. For instance, hero number one she has married to a female, a phantastic individual, and hero number two she has married to a cousin of his, also a phantastic individual. She has also phantasied in her day dreams

her desire to be a boy and has made violent love to girls. She went into such details concerning her phantasies that she even called her heroes by name. Hero number one is Peter and hero number two is Phillip. Peter has foster parents. Her phantastic females have been, one a girl whom she describes as her dream girl, called Cynthia; she is dainty, plump and full of fun. She has blue eyes and pink cheeks. Then there is a Spanish girl, Bonita, a dancer. Both of these girls she likes. Bonita wondered why the patient never made any love to her, so she married her off. Later she married off Cynthia. In her phantasies she has also been a man and has gone out on expeditions, especially geological.

One can thus see that this patient, in her effort to withdraw from reality, had to choose her social life among her life phantasies. She is still under observation, but it clearly shows that the precipitory factor in this case was her traumatization of the libido; the shock which it gave her precipitated a psychotic attack. On account of her extreme paranoid condition it is difficult to question her as to the details of her psychotic attack, but it is known that she was violent because she describes herself as once being in a straitjacket and that it required four men to put the straitjacket on her.

In the above three cases I have tried to show that the libido evidently goes through some morphological changes in various individuals and they may be phylogenetic. This will account for the prevalence of the psychosis in families. Perhaps in the development of the libido there is some "locus minoris resistentiae" and that the libido in its striving for its gratification and in its attempt to gratify itself, its sexual desire, if traumatized, changes its components in such a way that they change in proportion, liberating the perversions and homosexuality. Just as in the pathology of the neuron certain changes occur in its degeneration if injured, just so may it be that in an injury of the libido metamorphoses occur as in diagram 2.

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SPECIAL REVIEW

CHILD ANALYSIS *

By WINIFRED V. RICHMOND

This little book is the transcription of four lectures delivered at the School of Instruction of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (we are not told when). The lecturer is the daughter of Sigmund Freud; the content is presented in a clear and simple fashion and one suspects might have been a bit disappointing to her hearers, who were probably expecting an exposition much more profound and illuminating. The author herself recognizes this and regrets that she is unable to clarify many of the points at issue concerning child analysis. She modestly sets out to describe only what she herself has found and been able to accomplish in the children with whom she has had to deal. One must confess that after the brilliant speculations of Melanie Klein on infant analysis and the exciting forays of Frances Wickes into the inner life of the child, Anna Freud's lectures sound a bit tame. But on a closer reading they would seem to make up in common sense what they lack in other directions; they point out what one actually finds in dealing with children and take up the obvious matters that make child analysis so difficult in actual practice.

In the introductory lecture Anna Freud raises the questions of how far analysis is a method applicable to children and what modifications and alterations it should undergo when used. She puts aside their solution until she has described her actual procedure in cases in which analysis seemed advisable for reasons explained later. She first discusses the differences in the situation of the child and the adult, which arise from the fact of the child being an immature and dependent creature. If he comes for analysis he is brought by someone else; often, perhaps usually he feels no concern over his illness and therefore he has no will to be cured. Anna Freud, as the first step, devotes herself to making the young patient "analysable," to giving him an insight into his illness, arousing his confidence in the analyst and her methods and producing in him a desire to be cured.

* Introduction to the Technic of Child Analysis, by Anna Freud: Authorized translation supervised by L. Pierce Clark, M.D. New York and Washington, Nervous and Mental Disease Pub. Co., 1928. Pp. 59.

This entails a more or less lengthy period of preparation, during which there is no actual analysis. During this period the analyst has to combat different things in different children; in one, an environment calculated to frustrate her best efforts; in another, a mode of adjustment disturbing, it is true, to the environment but highly satisfactory to the young patient; in still another a hostility toward the analyst which successfully blocks any attempt to gain a transfer. And very often there is also a parent or nurse who consciously or unconsciously is jealous of the little patient's beginning attachment to the analyst and does her best to prevent it. The ways and means by which Anna Freud circumvents these obstacles, the methods direct and indirect, the long periods of no apparent progress, the "obtrusion of herself on human beings who are of the conviction that they can get along very well without her," may seem far-fetched to those accustomed to dealing only with the adult neurotic but they are very comparable to what one has to do in attempting analysis with institutional psychotics. Here, as in the child, the method has to be adapted to the peculiar situation of the patient.

The second lecture deals with the method after the child's confidence has been gained and the actual analysis begins. The history must be constructed from information furnished by the parents or guardians; the child is discovered to be a good dream interpreter and often can produce day dreams or spontaneous drawings as an aid to analysis; but there the trouble begins for the child cannot or will not associate and the chief instrument in the psychoanalytic therapy is rendered useless. Something must be devised to take its place and all who have worked with children have in fact devised some substitute. Hug-Helmuth played with the child in its own environment and attempted to learn by observation all its intimate relations in life. Melanie Klein has developed a play technic, placing at the little patient's disposal a miniature world and observing his actions in this world. The third lecture examines this play technic of Mrs. Klein's and discusses in this connection the rôle of transference in child analysis. This Anna Freud believes to be quite other than in adult cases. Instead of the analyst remaining "impersonal, shadowy, white paper upon which the patient can register all of his transference phantasies" she has to be to the child a person of importance, actively interfering with the conduct of his life. Now, if she is to obtain results at all she must have just what Anna Freud sets out to get in her very first sessions with the child, a strong positive transfer from him. This she considers the prerequisite for all subsequent

work. "For it (the child) has faith only in the person it loves and then accomplishes something only out of love for that person." The analyst cannot take the place of the parents as he does in his relations with his adult patients; for the child's original love objects are actually in existence as love objects, he is in an every day relationship with them and dependent upon them for all his real gratifications and satisfactions. The analyst must share with the parent the love or hate of the child.

From this situation arise difficulties that are well-nigh insuperable and that have made child analysis a thing to be avoided by the majority of analysts. For the child's abnormal reactions have originated in the home and they will continue to be shown there. To understand them we must know the home environment and the personality of the parent; and very often we discover that so long as these are what they are there is little we can do to help the child. And so we find it necessary to deal with the parents, to show them their errors and help them to a better understanding of their relations with the child. When this can be done the analysis is successful. When it cannot, it can only partially succeed.

Anna Freud then discusses the desirability of removing the child from the parental home for the period of analysis and finds that it has both advantages and disadvantages. For the period of analysis itself it may have many advantages but when the child returns to its home it finds itself in a more difficult position than ever. The old conditions of conflict are still there and there is nothing for it but a new neurosis or open rebellion. One gathers the impression that though she would like to try the experiment of a "school" in which might be created an ideal situation for the carrying out of analysis, she is not at all convinced that the results would be satisfactory. This leads logically to the subject discussed in the last lecture, the relation of child analysis to education. Again we find that the difference in the situation of the child and of the adult brings about an analytic situation that deviates in important respects from the classical one. In the first place, with the child the external world projects far into its inner relations, it has not yet assimilated the external reality and built up its ego out of its introjection and in the second place its super-ego is still in process of formation. It is indeed present and in many respects analogous to that of later mature life, but it is very unstable and of itself can oppose but a feeble resistance to the instinctual demands. In addition to this weakness and dependence of the child ego-ideal-demands, there is

the two-fold aspect of the child morality; he keeps one set of reactions for himself and his playmates, and another for his relations with adults. Thus, child analysis becomes in no way a private affair exclusively between the analyst and the patient. What is to become of the impulses freed from the unconscious if the super-ego is unable to handle them? Who is to bear the responsibility for their further direction? The first answer is the obvious one, the parents. But we have already seen how often the parents are responsible for the development of the child's neurosis and in very few cases are they sufficiently enlightened by his illness to be able to handle the situation wisely. Nor can we entrust the direction of the instinctual impulses to the child himself no matter how well analyzed he may be. There is nothing for it but to fall back upon the analyst, who becomes now not only the doctor but the teacher, whose authority is above that of the parents and to whom the child must look for guidance and direction at this crisis of his psychosexual development. But even under these circumstances child analysis is "no insurance against all the damage which the future can inflict upon the child."

All these considerations help in an answer to the questions which the lecturer raised in her preliminary discussion. Child analysis, says Anna Freud, belongs in the analytic milieu and must provisionally be limited to the children of analysts, of analyzed patients or of parents who have a faith in and respect for analysis. And we have already seen what great modifications and alterations the analytic technic is forced to undergo to make it suitable for application to a child.

But in spite of all its disabilities Anna Freud sees in child analysis great advantages over that of adult analysis. First the possibilities for character rehabilitation are greater; the child has a much shorter road to travel to get back to his proper path, much less to tear down in order to begin again. Second, the rigidity of the super-ego is absent and one has a chance not only to influence it but to assist in its development; and third, whereas in the adult we can do little toward modifying the environment to suit the needs of the patient and indeed consider such attempts to lie outside the sphere of the analyst, with the child we can do just that thing and under favorable circumstances procure for the child at every stage of his development just what he most requires.

On the whole, the book seems to this reviewer the most sensible discussion of child analysis she has yet read. It makes no extravagant claims and indulges in no fanciful speculations. It inspires confidence because of its moderation and because of the author's refusal to

draw conclusions which do not seem to her susceptible of proof. Anna Freud has been severely criticized by Melanie Klein (Symposium on Child Analysis. *Int. Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. VIII, 1927, p. 339-370), who takes issue with her fundamental assumptions; *i.e.*, that the child must be prepared for analysis, that only a few children can profit by it and that the rôle of the analyst is different in the case of a child than in that of an adult. Mrs. Klein finds children very similar to adults in their psychological processes and in their ability to profit from analysis. She claims to overcome the difficulties of which Anna Freud complains by the employment of an elaborate technic. But when one looks closely at this technic it seems that it accomplishes just what Anna Freud's does, builds up in the child a strong positive transfer and an attitude of faith in the analyst as a person of importance in his world. The other points of difference are not so easily disposed of. If an analyzed child of three or four can grow up normally in a neurotic home then certainly our theories of the effect of the parental milieu upon a child need to undergo revision. And Mrs. Klein's faith in the maturity and stability of the child's super-ego would seem to fly in the face of all experience with children, psychoanalytic or otherwise. Anna Freud's insistence that the child's relation to his parents is a fact of fundamental importance in a consideration of his suitability for analysis seems much more in accord with common sense.

Incidentally one wonders how the denatured infant of today is going to react when he reaches adulthood. The bottle-fed baby, whose toilet habits are "conditioned" to polite use of the bathroom before he is six months old, who is never allowed to feel or see or smell his bodily excreta, whose sexual development is treated as a matter of course and his sense of shame and disgust never appealed to; will he grow up in inner freedom and look upon the world from the beginning with the eyes of wisdom or will his super-ego fail completely of development and the resulting neurosis be a new thing under the sun? One wonders.

ABSTRACTS

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ABSTRACTED BY CLARA WILLARD

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1. SIGMUND FREUD. Neurosis and Psychosis.
2. S. FERENCZI. On Forced Phantasies.
3. H. NUNBERG. Depersonalization in the Light of the Libido Theory.
4. H. v. HATTINGBERG. Analysis of the Analytical Situation.
5. H. W. FRINK. Collective Review of the American Psychoanalytic Literature.
6. R. DE SAUSSURE. The French Psychoanalytic Literature for 1920-1922.

1. *Neurosis and Psychosis*.—Freud discusses the neuroses and psychoses in connection with the principles and mechanisms set forth in his recent work *Das Ich und das Es*. The neurosis implies a conflict between the I and the It ("Das Ich" and "das Es"), while the psychosis results from an alteration in the relations between the "I" and the external world. This formula taken absolutely does not always conform to the facts, as countless transitional types are possible, but broadly speaking it is in conformity with the conditions. The results of analysis show that the transference neuroses arise when the ego refuses to accept a powerful instinctive impulse belonging to the "It" and bring it to motor outlet, or withholds from this impulse the object toward which it is directed. The ego asserts itself through the mechanism of repression, the repressed material rebels against its fate, and taking a path over which the ego has no control, it finds a substitute which imposes itself on the ego in the form of a compromise. Finding its integrity menaced by this intruder, the ego enters on a conflict against the symptom, just as in the first instance against the instinctive impulse, and from this condition of things the neurosis arises. It is no valid objection to the formula proposed that the ego, when it undertakes the repression, obeys the command of the super-ego, which is really a representative of such influences of the outer world as have been able to find representation in it. The fact always remains that the ego has aligned itself with these powers, and that, in the ego, their claims are stronger than those of the "It"

and that the "I" is the force which sets the resistance to work against the "It" and endows the resistance with stability through the anti-cathexis. The ego has come into conflict with the "It" in the service of the super-ego and reality, and this is how the transference neuroses originate.

On the other hand the mechanism of the psychoses is equally clear. Meynert's *amentia*, acute hallucinatory confusion, may be taken as perhaps the most striking form. Not only does the external reality belonging to the actual present disappear, but those incidents and events of the past which have become memories, disappear as well. These patients cease to perceive actual facts and to preserve their traces. They create for themselves a new external world, following the inclinations of the "It." Reality is found unpleasant to the ego, and the effort is made to avoid it, to render it nonexistent. The relation of the psychosis to the dream is obvious. In a certain form of psychosis, schizophrenia, the patients show a tendency to render themselves impenetrable to the external world—to shut themselves off from it entirely. In respect to the genesis of the delusion, Freud says, that certain analyses have shown that the delusion is produced like a scar at the place where originally there was a gap in the relation of the ego to the external world. If this pathogenesis is obscure in some cases, it is without doubt, because there have been efforts in the direction of recovery and reconstruction which mask the real conditions.

The etiological factor common to the neurosis and the psychosis is abstinence, the nonsatisfaction of those infantile desires which are so deeply rooted in our phylogenetically conditioned organism. In a last analysis this nonsatisfaction is always due to external circumstances, in some cases to that inner agency (the super-ego) which has taken over the office of representing the requirements of reality. The pathogenic effect depends on whether, in the conflict, the ego remains true to its allegiance to the external world and places a restraint on the "It," or is conquered by the "It," which then breaks loose and attains to realization. A complication is introduced in this seemingly simple situation by the existence of the super-ego which unites within itself still somewhat obscure influences originating in both the ego and in the external world. It seems to be, as it were, an ideal model to which all the efforts of the ego are directed, a reconciliation of all the various dependencies of the ego. The behavior of the super-ego must be taken into consideration in all forms of mental disease, something which hitherto has not been done. It must be assumed, until more conclusive proof is set forth, that there are disturbances due to a conflict between the ego and the super-ego. Analysis gives us the right to believe that melancholia may be regarded as a paradigm of this group and then we might adopt the name "narcissistic psychoneurosis." It would not be in contradiction to his impressions,

says Freud, if we should find reasons for separating melancholia from the other psychoses. In this way three categories of conflicts are obtained: (1) between the "I" and the "It"; (2) between the "I" and external reality, and (3) between the ego and the super-ego. The outcome of all such situations will undoubtedly depend upon the economic relations of the factors involved, on the relative strength of the various forces in conflict.

2. *On Forced Phantasies.*—Continuing his work in the direction of "active therapy," Dr. Ferenczi has found that in certain cases the treatment can be accelerated by a still further extension of this method, namely, to the phantasy life. Where the symptoms of the patient consisted in habitual daydreams he sometimes interrupted the phantasies and requested the patient to bring to mind the psychic impression which he was endeavoring to avoid when he slipped into his pathological phantasy. Ferenczi believes that he is not here confusing the method of free association with that of suggestion; the command was merely in the form of inhibition, by which certain paths of association were shut off, while that which was produced was the spontaneous production of the person analyzed.

Since then Ferenczi has come to the conclusion that it would be pedantry to sacrifice real advantages to a mere distinction in method and with another type of patients, that is to say, patients who are little inclined to form phantasies he used active intervention with good results in producing "forced phantasies." He requests these patients to invent phantasies, being convinced that the lack is due to repression and that though the phantasies thus produced may seem artificial and unnatural to the patient, they nevertheless furnish the analyst with valuable information, showing, first, that the patients are capable of such psychic productions and giving clues to repressed unconscious material.

In certain cases where patients, though strongly urged, could produce nothing, Ferenczi did not hesitate to tell them about what they should feel and what phantasies they ought to have in given situations; when finally they complied with his request, he naturally placed more value on details spontaneously contributed than on the matter given in conformity with the outline.

The phantasies which Ferenczi usually requested of his patients could be placed under three heads: (1) positive and negative transference phantasies; (2) phantasies of infantile memories; (3) masturbation phantasies.

Ferenczi cites various instances from his own experience.

In recommending this procedure Ferenczi realizes the necessity for determining the conditions under which it is indicated. As with all other forms of active therapy this intervention would take place only in the later periods of the treatment. Only persons with extensive experience in analysis should undertake to "force" these phantasies as suggestion

in a false direction may greatly retard the cure instead of accelerating it, as often happens even with the most skilled analysts.

Through these experiments with the unconscious life of the patient Ferenczi gained not only insight into the origin of the content of the phantasy in individual cases, but also an understanding of the causes of the liveliness or torpidity of the phantasy life generally. Among other things he discovered that the vivacity of phantasy often stands in a direct relation to those infantile experiences which are called sexual traumata. A large number of the patients in whom he found it necessary to produce phantasies in the manner described, that is to say by awakening them artificially, came from families in which the children's conduct had been so carefully supervised that from the earliest years that which is called "naughtiness" had been impossible, and where, for this reason the children had had no opportunity to "anchor themselves in reality." This contact with reality, these early experiences, seem however to be necessary conditions for the later freedom of psychic phantasy and the psychic potency connected with it. In other words Ferenczi arrived at the conclusion that a certain amount of infantile sexual experience, therefore that "sexual traumata" of certain forms not only do not harm the later life, but, on the contrary conduce to a normal condition, especially in so far as the capacity for forming phantasies is concerned. These discoveries seem to modify the first judgments concerning the infantile trauma, which, it was asserted was the cause of hysteria. Later, however, Freud himself deprived this factor of a great part of its importance when he discovered that the pathogenic element resided not in the infantile experience but in the unconscious phantasies. Now further experience shows that a certain part of the so-called "traumata" really furnish protection against abnormal development in certain directions. However, these infantile experiences must never exceed a certain optimum; a too much, or too early, or too strong may also have repression as result and in this way condition an absence of phantasy.

From the standpoint of the development of the ego then Ferenczi states, we may trace the absence of phantasies in the too well brought up (with its trend toward psychic impotency) to the circumstance that children who have never had experiences fall victim to an ideal of good behavior (always asexual); while others never so overpowered by discipline, when at puberty the pressure is reduced, do not waver back to the abandoned objects and aims of the infantile sexuality, but make an adequate adjustment to the demands of heterosexual development.

3. *Depersonalization in the Light of the Libido.*—The writer confines himself to depersonalization as defined by Schilder, where the personality and the outer world take on an aspect of strangeness. Calling attention to the fact that in certain stages of ontogenetic development the boundaries between the ego and the external world are ill-defined, he shows that

pathological conditions of depersonalization may represent a more or less complete regression to these earlier stages.

This feeling of strangeness, Nunberg notes, is most frequent in schizophrenia; the whole world seems to assume an unreal form, it becomes a mere phantom. In other cases of schizophrenia the patients regard their ego and their own organs as things wholly apart from themselves.

This feeling that the world is fading into unreality Freud also has noted is due to the loss of libido, and he does not consider it as peculiar to schizophrenia. Nunberg cites various cases in his experience illustrating depersonalization and all contributing to the view that the sense of strangeness arises from a partial or complete withdrawal of libido, in some instances from the outside world, in others from the formations of the ego. He states that the changes connected with depersonalization progress in a definite manner which is significant, citing one of his cases in illustration: (1) with the reduction of the sexual desire a change took place in the ego in the sense that it seemed something wholly altered and strange; (2) following this depersonalization unconscious phantasies pressed through to consciousness; (3) following the phantasies neurotic symptoms set in. In nearly all the cases observed by the writer this sequence was more or less strictly preserved. There was one, however, where the feeling of strangeness vanished with the reappearance of strong sexual excitement. The third member of the series, the appearance of the pathological symptoms is not constant, but where this does occur the order in the series is preserved. It would seem accordingly that after the loss of the libido connected with the ego, unconscious phantasies invested with libido possess themselves of the ego. When later the resistances in the ego become effective in the combination, the phantasies are thrust back and this leads to the formation of the neurotic symptom. Nunberg explains these conditions on the principle of dreams, and adds that the conditions may be analogous to the hypnoid conditions described by Breuer.

Freud notes that the feeling of strangeness may be regarded as an essential and regular part of the mechanism of repression. Those persons in whom it attains even the intensity of a morbid phenomenon have not yet definitely entered upon either a transference or a narcissistic neurosis, but are only on the way to one of these disturbances.

The question arises why, after the detachment of the libido, there are sometimes no further observable results; sometimes a transference neurosis; sometimes a narcissistic neurosis. Nunberg believes the answer is simple: the whole difference is in the disposition, that is to say, when the unconscious fixations are not too strong the libido finds its way back spontaneously; where such fixations are present, however, the dissolution of the libido is progressive. Where as in the narcissistic

neuroses the disturbance extends to the unconscious object, the result is much more disastrous than where, as in the transference neuroses, the disturbance extends only to the conscious and objective world.

4. *Analysis of the Analytical Situation.*—Dr. Von Hattingberg endeavors here to analyze, not the analyst, but the analytic situation. The first two sections of the article were read in the form of a paper at the Seventh International Psychoanalytical Congress in 1922. In these he discusses the various phases of technique, for example the significance of the position which the patient is requested to assume during the analysis, whether lying down with the analyst seated out of sight (as Freud originally recommended), or facing the analyst. He notes that the former position tends to emphasize the need of the patient for help and authority, to facilitate complete relaxation, and to preserve the impersonality and objectivity of the analytic situation. Von Hattingberg believes, however, that with certain patients this position may lead to too great passivity and apathy. If the face-to-face position be assumed there is danger that the analysis may be regarded by the patient as merely a form of conversation.

Dr. Von Hattingberg also points out certain dangers to which the analyst himself is exposed. Just as the neurotic patient uses his symptom as a defense in his relations with others, so the analyst may fall back on abstractions to avoid difficulties due to deficiency of interest or skill. The analyst is always in danger of being misled by his ego-instincts, that is by the desire for self-assertion and power, or by his sexual instincts, for example, by the opportunity of indulging sadistic tendencies or of obtaining gratification from oversubtle thinking. Taking all these conditions into consideration Dr. Von Hattingberg says that he believes psychoanalysis to be only in the "scholastic phase" of development and urges the greatest possible simplicity in the interpretation and presentation of psychic material.

In the last section Von Hattingberg examines the difference between "suggestion" and psychoanalysis, showing that the former treatment makes use of "dissociation," while psychoanalysis seeks to bring the repressed elements into consciousness. He contrasts the "rapport" of suggestion with psychoanalytic transference, showing that in the latter the relation between physician and patient is brought into full consciousness and that both the positive and the negative manifestations are encouraged.

Von Hattingberg emphasizes the importance, in the interpretation, of regarding the material brought to light objectively and impersonally—as something which might belong neither to the analyst nor to the person analyzed, but to some third disinterested person, which is being dispassionately examined to find significant connections. He regards this as an extremely important procedure in the analysis and states that one of

Freud's greatest claims to recognition is that he had the courage for so high a degree of objectivity, the mistrust of his own consciousness being for the individual the beginning of true self-knowledge, and for humanity the dawn of the era of psychology.

The patient's resistances will doubtless be mobilized against this objectivity, especially in the form of the "erotic misunderstanding" of the transference situation, and it is necessary that the sex element should be fearlessly admitted into consciousness, with the understanding that the physical relations are not an essential mode of expressing love. In this connection Von Hattingberg raises the question whether sexuality should be understood as constituting the whole of the mental life, or whether the concept should be subjected to certain modifications—perhaps in Adler's sense of the "will to power." He refers to the possibility of including opposite tendencies in that which nevertheless preserves identity, to the concepts of the opposite sexes, polarity, power and love, activity and passivity, the I and the We and finally to Fichte's formula "A is not non-A."

With this Von Hattingberg does not wish to be regarded as opposing Freud's theory of sexuality in the sense of minimizing its importance either in the neuroses or in normal life. The libido theory is only one of various possible theories; which is preferable from the point of view to the therapist, depends on its therapeutic usefulness.

(Vol. X, No. 2)

1. SIGMUND FREUD. The Economic Problem of Masochism.
2. DOROTHY GARLEY. On the Shock of Birth.
3. WILHELM REICH. On "Genitality" from the Standpoint of Psychoanalytic Prognosis and Therapy.
4. H. W. FRINK. Collective Review of the American Psychoanalytic Literature for the Years 1920-22 (Continuation).

1. *The Economic Problem of Masochism.*—The masochistic trend in instinctive life, Freud notes, may well be regarded as enigmatical from an economic point of view. If pain ceases to be a warning of danger for the organism and becomes an aim to be sought for, it may seem that the guardian of our psychic life has been put to sleep, and thus we are forced to the necessity of determining the relation of the pleasure principle to the two instincts which are fundamental in human life, the death instinct and the libidinal or life instinct.

In considering this problem Freud says: as the principle which dominates all psychic processes, we have accepted a special form of Fechner's tendency toward stability, and have ascribed to the psychic apparatus the function of abolishing instreaming stimuli, or at least of

reducing them to a minimum, a process for which Barbara Low has proposed the name of Nirvana Principle. It soon became apparent that the pleasure principle was not always identical with the Nirvana principle and that there are undoubtedly increases of tension accompanied by pleasure and, on the other hand, pain where there is release of tension. The condition of sexual excitement is the most striking example of pleasurable increase of stimulation. It is clear then that pleasure and pain cannot depend on a quantity which we call tension; it would appear that they are dependent on some peculiar character of the tension, some qualitative element, in the form, perhaps, of a rhythm, of a certain temporal repetition of changes in the stimuli. However that may be, we must hold fast to the fact that the Nirvana principle belonging to the death instinct has undergone a modification through which it becomes a source of pleasure, and must henceforth avoid the mistake of regarding the two principles, the death instinct and the pleasure principle as one and the same. From what source this modification of the Nirvana principle arises is easy to discover. It can only be that the life instinct, the libido, has conquered a share in the regulation of the life processes. We thus arrive at a small but interesting series of relations: the Nirvana principle is the expression of the death instinct; the pleasure principle of the claims of the libido and their modifications; and the reality principle represents the interest of the outer world. No one of these principles is rendered entirely ineffective by the others and as a rule they arrive at satisfactory adjustments, though conflicts sometimes arise. Thus it appears that the function of pleasure as the guardian of life must be recognized.

Returning to masochism, Dr. Freud says that there are three sorts, erogenous, feminine, and moral. The erogenous is always at the root of the other two forms; they all rest on the primary erogenous pleasure in pain which cannot be explained without going back to fundamental considerations.

Referring to his "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex,"* Freud says that his discussion of the subject there is applicable to masochism. It was shown that perhaps no event of importance takes place in the organism, which has not a component tending to arouse the sexual instinct, so that pain and displeasure would also have this result. The libidinous excitement accompanying the tension of pain would then be a phenomenon belonging to the undifferentiated infantile physiological development, which would later disappear with the establishment of the genital primacy. As consequence of this derivation the degree of the sexual characteristic would vary in keeping with the different sexual constitutions, and some of these developmental forms would furnish the physiological conditions for the psychic construction of erogenous

* Translated in Monograph Series No. 7, Nervous and Mental Dis. Pub. Co.

masochism. The inadequacy of this explanation, however, becomes apparent from the fact that it throws no light on the relation of this pleasurable pain to sadism which is obviously its counterpart in the instinctive life. If we go back to the fundamental principles underlying the life processes, however, we come to a derivation of sadism which does not contradict our explanation of masochism. The libido, in every multicellular organism, encounters a force tending to bring all the separate elementary organisms into a condition of inorganic stability (even though only relative), *i.e.*, with the destructive instinct, or death principle. It is the task of the libido to render this destructive instinct harmless, and the libido fulfills its function when it conducts this destructive force without and directs it against the object, for the most part with the help of the muscular system. The schema stands then: Death Instinct (or destructive instinct); the Instinct of Conquest; the Will to Power. Part of this instinct of conquest is placed directly at the service of the sexual system, where it performs an important function. This is true sadism. Another part does not attain to this outlet; it remains in the organism, and with the help of the sexual component, the constant element participating in everything of importance that happens in the organism, this energy is bound libidinally; in this we recognize the original erogenous masochism.

Disregarding certain complicating obscurities, we may say that the death instinct at work in the organism, that is to say the sadism, is originally identical with masochism. After the greater part of this energy is carried outward to the object, there still remains within a residuum which is the real erogenous masochism; it there becomes a component of the libido and has the organism itself as object. Thus this masochism is a witness and residue of that phase of development in which existed that alloy of the death tendency and Eros which is so important for life.

The erogenous masochism accompanies the libido through all the developmental phases and assumes the different guises belonging to these phases, fear of the father, castration, femininity, and the like.

The third form of masochism, the moral, is remarkable from the fact that it seems to have become detached from what we call sexuality. But when instances are studied where the masochism has reached a pathological intensity it becomes apparent that the feeling of guilt, with its sexual implications, is at the foundation of this moral masochism, and that it is an expression of tension between the ego and the superego.

In accounting for the manner in which the superego comes to play a rôle in the situation Freud says: the superego is a representation of both the It and the outer world, originating from the circumstance that the first objects of libidinous activities of the It, *i.e.*, the two parents are introjected into the ego, whereby the relation to them is desexualized and deflected from the direct sexual path. The superego preserves the essential characteristics of the introjected parents, their force, severity, tendency to

exert surveillance, and to punish. The superego and the conscience which is active in it can be harsh, cruel, implacable toward the ego under its protection. Kant's categorical imperative is a direct heritage from the Oedipus complex, and thus the moral masochism of too conscientious persons arises.

In conclusion Freud says: Thus moral masochism is the most convincing evidence that there is a mingling of instincts. It contains dangers for the organism because it originates in the death instinct, being that part of the death instinct which has escaped being carried outward; it has received an erotic component from another source, so that even self-destruction cannot take place without a degree of pleasure.

2. *On the Shock of Birth.*—Believing that the feelings and emotions of infants during the experience of being born have not been sufficiently studied, Dorothy Garley describes in detail various observations made by her during her obstetrical experience. She discusses these observations in connection with Freud's view that the primal anxiety state is brought about by the separation from the mother and that the experience of birth is the source and prototype of the affect of anxiety.

The writer emphasizes the fact that for some ten weeks before birth the brain centers of the fetus have attained sufficient development to be capable of receiving mental impressions and she believes that the violent shock of birth must be accompanied by pain and terror for the child and that this must especially be the case in difficult and prolonged labor. Referring to Freud's opinion that prenatal impressions persist and that in sleep there is a tendency to reproduce the primal state of warmth and darkness and to withdraw from the outside world to the prenatal condition, the writer argues that all neurotic reactions may be unconscious reproductions of feelings of the intrauterine period or of those which are experienced by the infant at the time of birth.

Some of the experiences which would be especially likely to leave lasting impressions are mentioned: pressure on the head of the child in the normal presentation, the sudden exposure to a colder temperature, and to loud sounds and bright lights; the necessity for the rapid adjustment of the respiratory and circulatory systems with sudden changes of position and the feelings of insecurity and helplessness accompanying such changes. She believes that if more consideration were given to the mental impressions of the child, some obstetrical practices would be modified. She regards the performance of the Caesarian section as far less injurious to the child both physically and psychically than delivery by forceps, and finds that children who are brought into the world by the latter operation are likely to be sensitive and irritable.

3. *On "Genitality" from the Standpoint of Psychoanalytic Prognosis and Therapy.* This article directs attention rather to the biological and

psychological material with which the analyst has to deal in each particular case, rather than to the technic of the analysis.

From his experiences Dr. Reich is convinced that it is of the utmost importance for the psychoanalytic cure that the libidinal development of the patient should have reached the stage of genital organization. A great degree of repression or displacement does not exclude the hope of cure if it only be possible to set the libido free, but if development has ceased at some point before the establishment of the genital primacy, there is far less prospect of cure. Where development has ceased at a pregenital stage there seems to be a paralysis of the affective life and a lack of the instinctive energy which could be utilized in recovery, the genital libido being one of the most powerful agencies in overcoming the sense of guilt, which so often stands in the way of cure. The writer raises the question in this connection why, in some cases the neurotic symptoms disappear, though the unconscious material has only been incompletely brought into consciousness; while other cases prove refractory, where this material has been more fully revealed and explained. From his own experiences, various examples of which he cites, he believes the answer to the question is that in cases of the first sort the genital libido has been set free by the analysis and its energy has been sufficient to overcome the activities of those portions of the libido which were still repressed (for example, the anal or urethral forms). If the other libidinal components are set free first or have great strength, the symptoms will probably not disappear. Cure in the full sense implies a complete synthesis of all the libidinal components in such manner that there is no danger of relapse, so that the mere disappearance of the symptoms is not always cure.

Dr. Reich describes cases where, the genital libido being absent, there was no foundation upon which to rest the reconstruction.

Dr. Reich summarizes the relation of the genital development to the whole structure of the personality and to neurotic diseases. Conditions which may arise are:

1. In childhood the period of genital development with love-object may be successfully passed without any further ill-effects than a certain disposition to disease springing from the Oedipus relation. Later, for example, at puberty, the incest wish may be revived and the early disposition activated by some cause so that the genital tendencies become entirely repressed, or at least the incestuous object.

Here the task of the analysis is to discover the incestuous object and lead the libido to a natural transference in the outer world.

2. Fixation may occur in the genital Oedipus phase at the level of the genital narcissistic organization. The genital libido at this level is subjected to repression, whereupon

- (a) the genital libido is distorted (hysterical genitalization of erogenous zones described by Ferenzi); or,
- (b) after the repression of the genital factor, pregenital positions are reoccupied, for example, the anal-sadistic (compulsion neurosis through regression, described by Freud).

It will usually depend on the strength of the pregenital organization whether the result is merely a fixation in the genital Oedipus stage with distortion of the genital element, or a genitalization of other organs, *i.e.*, a revival of pregenital positions through regression. The analysis has here a more difficult task, especially if the conditions described in (b) arise, because it has then the pregenital libido to contend with. The prognosis is favorable, however.

3. The fixation may have taken place in the pregenital stage as result of a strong emphasis on pregenital erogenous zones; a part of the libido may have been applied in the genital zone however, constituting partial fixation. In such cases the prognosis is doubtful; for the analysis has not only the task of removing the repression, but also of bringing about the unfolding of the genital erotic, of conducting the development to completion, and of subordinating the pregenital libido to the genital, when this latter has been sufficiently reinforced. The possibility of strengthening the genital element often depends on the degree to which the pregenital libido can be concentrated on the genital. For the prognosis, the degree of feeling of guilt which accompanied the pregenital activities in childhood is important; this factor in turn is dependent on whether, during the pregenital period, there was a binding of the libido to an object, and in what degree.

4. The genital period may never have been reached, or not set in activity. In such cases genital masturbation, exhibitionism and the genital incest-wish are none of them experienced. All of the relations of the libido to the object, and even the infantile onanism are of pregenital character. The prognosis is bad, because, notwithstanding the removal of the repressions, there is no force at the disposal of the pregenital tendencies which can be turned in the direction of reality (with the exception of what may be used in a partial sublimation), and these circumstances leave the individual powerless to use the sexuality in adjustment to adult demands.

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1. *The Passing of the Œdipus Complex*.—An abstract of this article appears in the *PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW*, Vol. 000, No. 00, 0000, p. 000.

2. *Professor G. Jelgersma and the Leiden Psychiatric School*.—This number of the *Internationale Zeitschrift* is dedicated to Professor Jelgersma on the 25th anniversary of his Professorship at Leiden, and Dr. Holstijn has written this paper in acknowledgment of the service which Professor Jelgersma has rendered to psychoanalysis. In 1911 Professor Jelgersma openly declared himself an adherent of the psychoanalytic school and through his lectures, writings, and practical work he was instrumental in bringing many persons in all walks of life to the psychoanalytic point of view. Jelgersma's work in the Leiden school is of particular worth from the importance he gives to experiment; "Back to facts, to the clinic and to practice" is the motto of his school. Notwithstanding this attitude, however, he does not reject theories, a priori, merely insisting that speculative views shall not be adopted which have no other support than metaphysical considerations. In fact in the Leiden school many other theories are current side by side with Freud's, as, for instance, those of Jung, Kretschmer, and Hirschfeld; but "dissenters" are never permitted to go far astray because of Jelgersma's demand for exact thinking, the substantiation of theory by practice and of deduction by experiment.

For years Jelgersma has maintained that psychiatry and neurology should be separated, that they are essentially different disciplines, neurology being exclusively a natural science, psychiatry a mental science. The writer notes that no one is better fitted than Jelgersma to offer an opinion on this subject, as he began his work in the neurological field forty years ago and has had extensive experience in all the other fields.

The Leiden school, says Holstijn, maintains that a permanent contact between the clinical psychiatrist and the psychoanalyst is necessary for both sides. Notwithstanding the brilliant and fundamental work of Freud and his coworkers we are still only at the beginning of our knowledge of the unconscious. The comparative study of the neuroses and the psychoses, in which the unconscious and the repressed elements manifest themselves so differently, is the first condition to further scientific advance. It is due to exertions of Jelgersma that within the

last fifteen years such remarkable progress has been made in psychological knowledge in Holland. He was the pioneer, and it is only in the directions indicated by him that further advances are promised.

3. *The Rôle of the Pregenital Libido Fixation in the Perversions.*—Dr. Carp notes that in the perversions the phenomena of repression and construction of symptoms do not play so great a rôle as in the neuroses and that for this reason it is easier to study the infantile sexual life in the former disturbances. He cites a case where the analysis revealed the pathogenesis of a peculiar form of homosexuality which was doubtless due to a primitive fixation of the libido; an accompanying compulsion neurosis offered the writer opportunity to follow the libido fixation to a very early developmental period and to establish a connection with the perversion.

The patient, a well educated merchant, first sought medical advice because of a compulsion to stare at people in the street. He had always had a strong mother attachment and found protection from the severe father, in her. When about four years of age, induced by scopophilia, he lifted her chemise and was terrified at the sight of her nates. A strong oral erotic was evidence of a fixation on a component belonging to a primitive libidinal organization, manifested in perverse urges to suck. He preserved this cathexis throughout his phantasies and dreams. Another feature indicating the nature of the fixation was that in his phantasies the nates were compared with the mother's breasts. There were numerous other evidences of an anal-erotic emphasis, which, as is well known, leaves behind in the male a predisposition to homosexuality. From earliest youth the patient had had homosexual inclinations and had engaged in open homosexual practices.

The writer comments that it was certainly no mere coincidence that a compulsion neurosis developed on this favorable soil, prepared by the anal-sadistic libido fixation. The outbreak of the neurosis was conclusive evidence that there had been repression of a part, at least, of the anal sadistic libido, indicating the necessity of amending the view that perversions are the direct negative of repressions. The writer finds that the patient only found a partial satisfaction for his infantile oral libido in his perversions; a part had been repressed and in dream the patient still sought the mother's breast.

The writer cites another case of homosexual perversion in a woman in whom the oral libido fixation also played a prominent rôle. She assumed a masculine rôle and it was evident that her "desire for a penis" was the desire for the mother's breast.

Believing that cases of this sort may be more numerous than supposed the writer outlines the probable mechanism: the abnormal attachment to the nipple at a period before the Oedipus complex had made its appearance, that is in the lactation period, probably constituted

the nucleus of the strong oral component instinct. There was evidence in the dreams that at the time of weaning the Oedipus complex was beginning to manifest itself, in a certain sense as a censor, under the influence of which the strong component instinct was forced to change its object, but the erogenous zone remained the same. The part instinct aided in the solution of the Oedipus complex by introjection, the cathexis of the mother's breast being transferred to a part of the person's own body by means of identification. In the further progress of development when there was an object, this object was made use of to satisfy the original organ pleasure; the primary pleasure-toned acts were repeated. The writer notes in conclusion that not alone through the repression of the Oedipus complex, but also through the introjection of the beloved mother object or a part of this object the transformation of a very strong part-instinct into a perversion may be effected. The fact that in this process there is always a repression is shown by the outbreak of a neurosis in the writer's first case here described, a concurrence to which Sachs has already called attention.

4. *On Asceticism and Power.* Noting that various writers have described instances where, in splitting of the personality, one of the personalities is of ascetic form, Dr. Rombouts describes a case from his own experience, which showed that one of the components at work in producing asceticism is the desire for power and conquest. The case is one of a pastor, thirty-five years old, suffering from compulsion neurosis. His father was weak, but his mother, the patient's ideal, forceful. He resembled the father. He soon felt the weight of responsibility in his calling and waged a strenuous battle against his sexual inclinations, developing fears about the abnormality of his sexual organs, agoraphobia, and other phobias indicating anal trends. His asceticism took the form of penances for evil inclinations (there was evidence of incest tendencies). With this conduct was connected a strong effort to gain the mastery of his weakness, to demonstrate his strength and power, traits often met with in schizoid and schizophrenic patients. Normal persons with ascetic inclinations manifest this same trend; vegetarians use the argument that they are showing strength and attaining perfection when they give up eating meat; total abstainers use a similar argument for refraining from alcohol. Spielrein says: "We feel the enemy in ourselves: it is our own glow of living strength which forces us with iron necessity to do that which we do not wish to do."

Another important factor in asceticism, the writer notes, is fear, for example, in the sexual act, that a part of the force or strength will be wasted, or that if an object be invested with libido the personality will be weakened or impoverished. Asceticism, he says, may be very strongly manifested in those cases where there is a splitting into various part personalities, and where condemned tendencies are strongly re-

pressed or depersonalized and an ideal of absolute purity is formed that reaches out for full domination of the ego, for power over all the lower desires and urges, *i.e.* for holiness and resemblance to God. In proportion as the ego identifies itself with the ego-ideal there is a feeling of being elevated above the rest of mankind. This ideal has a very strong narcissistic coloring and works against all libidinous tendencies in the direction of an object. If there is a strong mother fixation the ascetic trend may lead to identification with her; she is then exalted to the greatest height of purity; with this there may be connected an incest fear of all that is sexual. In some instances there is an identification with the father ideal, exalted above every human weakness. In the ecstasy and in those cases of schizophrenia where the investment is entirely withdrawn from the object, a condition of absolute narcissistic omnipotence may be reached, the ego being entirely identified with the ideal, so that no libido is expended on the object and the splitting no longer exists; the ego has become god-like, or God himself.

5. *A Peculiar Custom on Marken Island, Holland.*—Jelgersma seeks explanation for a custom prevalent on the Island of Marken, which he considers interesting as an example of primitive usages in the midst of a highly civilized race. This island, now having about 1,300 inhabitants, was settled in the thirteenth century by Frieslanders. These islanders for the most part engaged in fishing, have led an isolated existence. The custom to which attention is called is that of making boys wear girls' dress until they reach the age of seven years, at which age they are dressed exactly like the men, in short wide trousers and tight jacket.

Rejecting more superficial explanations Jelgersma says: "Seeking the source of this humiliation, only two persons have the power of bringing it about, namely the father and the mother. Our knowledge of hidden human impulses in the light of psychoanalysis permits us to regard the father as the parent who humiliates the boys of the Island of Marken. It is the father who has reason to fear his son and who wishes to repress his potency. Remarkable is the fact that as soon as the boys reach the age of seven they are given the clothing of men—a circumstance which helps to solve the riddle. The men spend most of their time on the sea, while the women remain on the Island with the children. For this reason we are justified in assuming that at one time there were few schools on the Island and that the boys began to help the father when they were seven years old, and were thus withdrawn from the society of their mothers and sisters. The degradation is therefore explained as a protection against the incestuous inclinations of the sons. A similar usage, which is almost 'magic' we find in Freud's 'Totem and Taboo' where a similar explanation is given."

In the writer's opinion one ground for the custom may be sought in

the fact that the inhabitants of Marken Island have been shut off from the rest of the world for many centuries and have consequently intermarried. The incest which they so greatly fear is then no phantasy on the Island but in the course of the centuries must really have taken place repeatedly. It is noteworthy that on Marken a law against marrying strangers is effective, which in so small a group is really a command to incest. This is just the opposite of the excessive prohibition of incest in totemism, but both command and prohibition originate from the same source, namely, the incest awe. The remarkable device taken to avoid incest, namely of disguising boys in girls' dress shows us that the inhabitants of Marken are also not inclined to let it go unpunished.

6. *On Projection and Its Content*.—Van der Hoop calls attention to the difficulties which attend the solution of the problem of projection. Freud said that in seeking the cause of certain of our sensations, not in ourselves (as in other sensations), but in the outside world we are following a process which deserves the name of projection, but which is normal.

From a review of pathological and primitive material the writer seeks to set forth the mechanism of projection. He notes the relation to introversion and expresses the view that the tendency to the projection of the person's unconscious content may increase as introversion becomes stronger. In conclusion he says it becomes clear that the objective perception both of ourselves and of the outer world must evolve gradually from a condition in which there are no such differentiations as inner and outer. Projection is thus to be regarded as a normal process. Only the degree and content may become abnormal. The degree increases with increased introversion, the abnormal content is determined by regression.

Schizophrenia may be regarded as an extreme condition of introversion, in which constantly increasing regression in the direction of infantile-archaic phases takes place. This regression is characterized by a loss of boundaries between subject and object, by reason of which projection acquires a very great importance.

7. *On the Two Sorts of Narcissism*.—Dr. Muller finds that persons who manifest pathological narcissism fall into two groups which present noteworthy contrasts, and also that normal persons with narcissistic trends may be divided into two similar groups.

In some persons narcissism has the significance of a perversion; they take their own body as their sexual object, that is to say their body as it really exists or as they perceive it. Though they be indifferent to all else, they still hold to something objective, namely their own bodies, or so to speak, they have a sexual object. Even though the person we call narcissistic does not make his own body his sexual object, but cherishes some one of his qualities, his mental attainments

or some other, this still implies something objective, something psychically real upon which he fixes his interest. Often, too, such persons value the admiration of others, evidence of investment of objects beyond the person's body; without some degree of transference there could not be such unambiguous effort to please, manifested in the care for the personal appearance, and in the conduct generally.

These conditions are not altered if the narcissistic person, instead of his own body or his real mental attainments, loves some creation of his imagination—his own body as it appears in phantasy or his attainments as they appear there. When we love it is always difficult to decide what part of the qualities we love are real and what imaginary, and when the person's self is the sexual object it is easy to love a physical or psychical self which differs more or less from the original. That which the phantasy has constructed is later regarded as real and loses the quality of an arbitrary figment. But whether it be play, daydream or delusion, it is still always an apparent experience and as such something objective. Those who in their delusions of grandeur love a self which is not real have still invested an object with libido and such persons have therewith sacrificed a part of their liberty which they would have retained had there been entire withdrawal of the libido from the object, and, besides, the possibility always remains that the object may be still further separated from the ego—be supplanted in part by the ego-ideal or an ideal person.

Contrasted with this group are persons in whom every connection with the object is absent, and for whom therefore the object investment is insupportable. These constitute the second group. Here belong paraphrenic patients, in whom the indifference to the outer world is one of the most pronounced symptoms; the external world has no value whatever for them; they are indifferent alike to blame and praise; they neglect their appearance and are careless in their behavior. The less extreme instances constitute the group which Kretschmer calls schizoid personalities.

In normal persons the first mentioned form of narcissism is manifested in all possible degrees of self-esteem. The desire for freedom from every restraint is a characteristic distinguishing the second group. Death itself may seem desirable to these persons because it implies complete freedom—Nirvana—withdrawal from everything objective.

The writer notes that the complete loss of the object, even of the self as object, does not preclude the possibility of satisfaction, though under these conditions delusions of grandeur and every form of pleasure springing from the binding of the libido to the self is inconceivable. The satisfaction of the narcissism without object which the writer proposes to call anerotie narcissism must have no dependence on anything beyond itself. It arises from activity as such. Instances given are

thinking for thinking's sake, and movement for the sake of movement. Unimpeded activity is the source of anerotic satisfaction, as in the flight of ideas, in senseless rhyming, in repetitions and rhythms, and in the various plays of thought in which paraphrenics indulge.

The writer believes that anerotism points to a primitive developmental state and calls attention to the fact that the movements of lower animals are not always purposeful, *i.e.* in the direction of finding food or shelter or for procreation, but are often in the form of an objectless satisfaction. He believes also that this anerotism may throw light on some obscure phenomena in the psychological and psychopathological fields.

8. *On the Dreams of Schizophrenic Patients.*—The writer collected the dreams at the Oud-Rosenburg Asylum for a period of one month. He was more particularly interested in the dreams of schizophrenic patients, but found that these were the most difficult to obtain. The study was undertaken to determine by actual observation whether, as has been maintained, schizophrenics have an entirely different attitude to their dreams than have normal people. He discusses the attitude of this class of patients to their dreams in connection with the autistic or dereistic thinking of Bleuler and with prelogical thinking as described by Lévy Bruhl. He believes that from the dreams obtained he is justified in assuming a correspondence between the content of the dream life and the content of the delusions in some cases of schizophrenia, though he is convinced that this is certainly not the case in all instances; he found further that the events in the dreams are regarded by these patients as having really taken place.

9. *Retentio Urinae.*—Dr. Holstijn communicates the dreams of a patient, a woman forty-seven years of age who for eight years had suffered from retentio urinae, ischuria paradoxa and obstipation. Her wish was that her daughter should return to her womb as the child of the patient's own father. Under the analysis the recovery progressed without difficulties; for a time the patient's menses returned (she had reached the menopause) and the recovery was clearly reflected in the dreams. The patient was able to sublimate her libido in social work and her mental and physical nature were totally changed. At the end of the analysis the patient related that fifteen years before she passed through a pseudo gravidity. She had become so large that every one believed her pregnant and she had felt the child moving. Thus the existence of a pregnancy complex was objectively proved.

10. *On the Delusion of Persecution in Women.*—Dr. De Sauvage-Nolting reports the results of observations of a number of women patients undertaken in the hope of obtaining actual evidence of the relation of the delusions to the unconscious. He notes Freud's explanation of delusions of persecution as arising from the projection of unconscious wishes which are insupportable to consciousness and can therefore pass the

ensor only with the negative sign. Nearly all the patients observed belonged to the schizophrenic group, or more exactly to the dementia paranoid or paraphrenic sub-groups. Because a complete psychoanalysis was impossible the writer had to depend on spontaneous expressions in the various stages of the psychoses, but he believes that even material of this sort, in the form of hallucinations and delusions, furnishes reliable proof of Freud's view and that it may be considered as particularly reliable from the fact that psychotic patients freely express what neurotic and normal persons exert every effort to repress. That the content was condensed or the complexes symbolized, he considers no valid reason for rejecting the evidence offered. Discussing the relative reliability of delusions and hallucinations, he says that both are formations springing from the unconscious, only with the difference that the delusion as it is presented to us, has passed the censor (albeit a weakened censor) and has lost a part of its original characteristics and has been in part rationalized; while the hallucination may be looked upon as an unconscious thought projected outward by a short circuit, so that the original, primary, unconscious thought is expressed in a purer form. While in the delusion the psychotic patient uses speech to disguise thought, the hallucination may be regarded as a thought which has slipped by the censor and has been immediately translated into hallucinatory expression.

The number of patients examined was not sufficiently large to permit definite conclusions but the writer found (1) that the expected homosexual persecution by women was only now and then met with in these women's cases (though in men, on the contrary, it seems that the homosexual persecution is usually present); (2) instead of a definitely negative feeling tone in regard to the persecutor, an ambivalent attitude existed (a condition which has been emphasized by other writers); (3) the sexual character of the persecutor was so evident that there could be no doubt. There was a possibility that behind the male persecutor there might be one of the same sex as the patient, but indications of this condition were rarely present. There were, however, obvious homosexual and narcissistic components of the libido, but these seldom stood in connection with the persecution.

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1. SIGMUND FREUD. The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis.
2. FELIX DEUTCH. On the Construction of the Conversion Symptom.
3. R. WÄLDER. On the Mechanism of the Psychoses and the Possibility of Influencing them.
4. K. LANDAUER. The "Passive" Technique.
5. L. HOLLÓS. The Psychoneurosis of a Person Born Prematurely.

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8. V. E. FRANKL. On the Mimic of Assent and Dissent.
9. E. WEISS. On the Psychological Meaning of the *Arc de Cercle*.
10. DOUGLAS BRYAN and J. C. FLÜGEL. Report on the English Psycho-analytic Literature for the years 1920-1923.

1. *The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis*.—Freud, defining the difference between neurosis and psychosis said that in the neurosis the ego has repressed a part of the It in order to give greater scope to reality; while in the psychosis the ego, in order to permit freer play for the It, has repressed a part of reality. For the neurosis, therefore, the determining factor is the influx of Reality, for the psychosis it is the up-welling of the It. The loss of reality is then a foregone conclusion for the psychosis, but in the neurosis we should not expect to find this loss. Experience shows, however, that every neurosis disturbs the relation of the patient to reality. While this seems to contradict the view of the origin of the two affections, closer study shows the contradiction to be merely apparent. Fastening our attention on the beginning stages of the neurosis we find the ego serving reality by repressing the instinctive impulses at variance with it; but, following this there is a second stage—a stage of reaction against the repression in the direction of a compensation, that is to say the repression is partially unsuccessful. The breaking away from reality takes place in this second step and it is this process of compensation which constitutes the neurosis. As we should expect, the neurotic person loses his perception of just that part of reality in the interest of which he undertook the repression of the instinct.

This condition of things is particularly impressive where the cause of the neurosis is definitely known (the traumatic scene). The person turns from the incident and overcompensates for it by amnesia. A case is cited in illustration.

Something analogous takes place in the psychosis. There are two stages here also, of which the second has the characteristics of a reparation; but the process is carried on in a much more autocratic manner; it consists in the total reconstruction of reality with the intolerable elements left out. In both neurosis and psychosis the second step is the work of the same tendency—the resistance of the It to be dominated by reality, refusal to accept necessity, the 'Ανὰχρη.

It is therefore in the initial step that the neuroses and the psychoses differ most fundamentally; the neurosis does not deny the reality at variance with instinctive cravings, but it will have nothing to do with this reality; the psychosis denies the intolerable reality and sets up a

substitute. We call "sane" or normal, a reaction which unites features of both processes, which, like the neurosis, does not deny reality, but, like the psychosis, sets about to change it when it is not acceptable. This purposeful normal conduct leads naturally to performances in the objective world, not to the production of internal changes, as in the psychosis; the normal reaction is alloplastic, not autoplatic.

In the psychosis the reconstruction of reality consists in demolishing the former relations with it, that is in destroying the memory traces, ideas and judgments which had previously been gained. These relations to reality had never been completed; however, they were in a formative condition, undergoing constant enrichment and change by the addition of new perceptions. Thus the psychosis has the task of supplying perceptions in keeping with the newly constructed reality, and this it does by means of the hallucinations.

A further analogy between the neuroses and the psychoses is that in both the task undertaken in the second stage fails in part, the repressed instinct being unable to set up any full substitute (in the neurosis) and the psychosis being unable to remould reality in completely satisfactory form. But the accent is differently placed in the two instances. In the psychosis the accent is placed on the first step which is in itself pathological and can lead only to the disease; in the neurosis, on the contrary, the accent is on the second step, while the first step (the repression of the instinctive urges) may be and often is successful, so that there is an adjustment within the bounds of mental health. These differences in the two affections depend on topical differences in the initial situations, as in the one the ego has ceded its allegiance to the real world, and, in the other, its dependence on the It.

Both neurosis and psychosis then seek to replace the real world by one in keeping with the wishes, and, to do this, have recourse to the same mental agent—the phantasy world belonging to an earlier developmental phase, to which regression is made in the effort to avoid the intolerable reality. It is from this phantasy world as from a property room that, in the psychosis, the material is obtained for the construction of the new reality which then entirely replaces the old. In the neurosis, on the contrary, there is a tendency to support the phantasy, as in the play of children, on some element of reality to which a special hidden significance is given, called, not very appropriately, symbolic.

In conclusion Freud notes that in a comparison of the neuroses and the psychoses not only the loss of reality but the substitution made for it should be taken into consideration.

2. On the Construction of the Conversion Symptom.—We have become so well acquainted with the psychic mechanisms by which disturbances of affect are changed into symptoms, says Deutsch, and the symptom pictures of internal diseases present so much that is psychic,

and the participation of the repressed unconscious in these symptom pictures is so obvious, that it is now possible to explain in some degree the "riddle of the leap from the psychic to the organic."

Setting forth his theory of the conversion he says that in approaching this problem it is always necessary to begin with the most simple cells. Whenever there is a union of two cells an energetic influence of the nucleus and protoplasm of one cell on these elements of the other sets in, resulting in changes in the albumin element. At this very first step we encounter a hiatus in our knowledge as we are but imperfectly acquainted with the chemical construction of this albumin element, but we may proceed to a fact objectively proved, that the reciprocal influences exercised by the two cells is in the nature of stimulation and the most simple form of response may be regarded as motion. The motion and eo ipso the stimulation ceases when the chemical influence reciprocally exercised by the cells ceases. The cells, owing to cell memories, learn to respond in the same manner to the same stimulus and in this manner the mechanism of the reflexes and instincts are formed. The objective conversion into other forms of energy, especially into motion (always depending on chemical activities in the cell), constitutes the schematic model of all responses to stimulation. Whether there be simple reflexes, instinctive motions, or complex acts the transformation can always be reduced to these most simple cell processes. If the instinctive form of response to an incident stimulus or to one arising in the cell be blocked then the chemical reactions will seek release in some other form than motion. If there be no possibility of substitute outlet, injury will result, leading in extreme instances to the death of the cell. Before this takes place, however, there arises a condition which is revealed to us objectively as unrest, anxiety, or pain. Here we encounter the first traces of the conversion. We are unable to say exactly what qualities in the cell correspond to these psychic states and how the transformation of a definite biological process into a definite psychic state takes place but the writer believes we are justified in rejecting the view that the two processes run parallel, in the sense of a psychophysical parallelism, and that an identity of process must be assumed. The reciprocal reception and release of cell products, under the hormonal influences, in the various cell systems, provided for by the correlation of cells in a hierarchy, guarantees the feeling of well-being. The highest displeasure arises when the sex cells meet with impediment to the outflow of their cell product in the normal manner, as the products of the sex cells dominate the entire cell content of the body. Conversely the greatest feeling of pleasure arises when the sex cells expel their content for thereby the entire cell system constituting the body is disburdened as in no other process. If the outflow of endogenous energy is not completely and entirely possible the organism will seek to keep the

threshold for incident stimuli as low as possible in order to maintain the equilibrium. The organism will endeavor to overcome the disturbances in various compensatory ways; these failing, *disequilibrium* and pain will result, and the cells will remember the once experienced pain so long as the equilibrium in the entire cell hierarchy is not restored by the compensatory processes and the same sort of disturbance is repeated if it has once taken place. The writer seeks to explain his view by a comparison with a biological and chemical process. If a copper wire be kept in a bottle of water for some time, this bottle, after the removal of the wire, retains the quality of exerting a disinfecting influence, which it communicates, for a long period of time, to whatever may be placed in the bottle. No matter how often the bottle is washed this quality remains—the so-called oligodynamic telekinesis.

If effective conditions result from an energy in the cells, *i.e.* a chemical process, which take the character of pain, it is not difficult to understand that the proper cell activity will be established only when this condition is overcome. The way which a given organism will take to arrive at this result will be dependent on the resistances against which it has to struggle. If in the effort to overcome the pain, the organism takes a false path, it will continue to take this same path so long as no more purposeful one is offered. The knowledge which the cells constituting the organism have of a special possibility of response and defense against certain stimuli, whether this knowledge rests on inherited dispositions or was acquired through previous ontological experience, leads by established mechanisms to a discharge of choked libido through outlets in fields at a distance from the normal ones. If the individual has chosen this mode of defense against accumulation of stimuli and has held fast to it by habit, he will permanently renounce the total outflow and the complete reaction to the affect in the normal way and will continue to produce disturbances of function in abnormal fields which secure a degree of relief. It is in this way that the construction of the symptoms in hysteria takes place; this disease disposes of the residues of affects which have not found proper outlet, so that finally, through diathesis and habit the organism becomes incapable of complete and proper reaction.

3. *On the Mechanism of the Psychoses and the Possibility of Influencing them.*—Dr. Wälder raises the question whether the impossibility of overcoming the narcissistic fixation by means of the transference is an essential characteristic of the psychoses. He believes the judgment premature that the psychoses are inaccessible to psychoanalytic treatment because of the impossibility of establishing the transfer and examines the question from various angles, beginning his study with borderline cases where it was possible to observe transitional phenomena.

Psychotic pictures, he says, fall into two classes—the regression

psychoses, of which catatonia is the extreme example, and the restitution psychoses, of which paranoia is the extreme example. In the psychotic mechanism of regression it is generally not the whole ego but always some part or some attitude which is invested with libido, and analogously in the restitution psychoses the projection is of some part only, or some parts. These mechanisms are not exclusively pathological but in more or less transitory form are observable in normal persons; indeed, all our conscious thinking is rationalization and our creative thinking projection of libidinal processes, manifested not merely in the choice of subject and direction of thought, but in the content. The writer describes at length a case with schizoid tendencies to illustrate the inner conditions to which these mechanisms may lead, when a psychosis is avoided. In connection with the activities in which what he calls "sublimation of the narcissism" may take place Dr. Wälder discusses the characteristics of the sciences, making a distinction between narcissistic and object-libidinal sciences. The narcissist, he says, will be interested in epistemological values, the person with libidinal attachment to the object, in sciences of practical value. It is the method of thinking itself which determines the interest. The scientist with object-libidinal trend works with hypotheses, which, biding proof by experiment, remain undetermined; he does not hesitate to make use of complex ideas so long as the final and simplest are not attainable. For him the hypothesis is not the foundation but the mere superstructure of the edifice, which can be torn down, if need be, and reconstructed. Otherwise with the narcissistic scientist. He endeavors to establish every theory in a fixed and systematic structure, to reduce all conclusions from a few independent and well defined postulates, to elementary and indivisible ideas. It is not difficult to justify the designation narcissistic for this process. Just as it is the tendency of the narcissist to create his world, so it is his tendency to develop mental constructions for application to reality, with great freedom and arbitrariness. In keeping with the method of thought which prevails in them, it is possible to range the sciences in a series, at one end of which, the object libidinal, would stand history, and at the other, the narcissistic, mathematics.

Dr. Wälder expresses the belief that in the case he is taking as an example of schizoid mechanisms, the psychosis was avoided because of the vocation of the patient, namely mathematics. In this work a large part of the narcissistic libido was sublimated in a manner consonant with reality and thereby the construction of the psychotic symptoms was prevented, and he suggests that certain forms of sublimation which have particular affinity with the narcissism constitute an immunity against the psychosis. If it be true, then, he reasons, that the psychosis may be avoided by diverting the narcissism to sublimations in which the narcissistic libido can find expression not out of keeping with reality,

we may hope to use the same method in psychoses which have already begun.

The therapeutic task which we see before us will then be the sublimation of the narcissism; we must not forget, however, that this same word is used for another but not identical process. In the sublimation of the object libido, there is a change of goal; in the sublimation of the narcissism on the contrary there must be an exchange of one object for another, both of which are within the ego. The writer believes that transference as used in the neuroses would be unavailing in the psychoses, where the narcissistic bindings have much greater force, but he also believes that for the cure it is not necessary to overcome these narcissistic fixations, it being necessary only to change the object within the narcissistic range. Effort should be directed to bringing about such a change within the ego that the resulting formation will attract the narcissistic libido and establish connections with the narcissistic elements, or, if such an expression be permissible, offer free valences for the narcissistic libido.

We cannot, he says in conclusion, directly overcome the narcissistic investment, yet we may hope to do so in a circuitous way, taking the preserved parts of the personality as our "standing place of Archimedes." Whatever difficulties may be encountered in this method of therapy, and however limited its application, we are not confronted by an absolute impossibility. Of this those cases in psychiatry which have been cured or have recovered spontaneously are proof. For historical support of his view he refers to Bleuler, Freud, Abraham, and others.

4. *The "Passive" Technique.*—Dr. Landauer's recommendation of passive technique is in opposition to "wild analysis" rather than to the "active technique" of Ferenczi and Rank. His method is based mainly on the principle that cravings which are made conscious lose force, while those which remain unconscious acquire power; his procedure consists in an attitude of reserve toward the patient, in refraining from interpretations, the suggestion of associations and the imposition of wishes; his aim is to permit the negative conscious transference to gather force in the unconscious.

In schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations, in depressions, perversions, impotence and compulsion neuroses he found the method effective.

The writer cites four indications which led him to the adoption of the passive technique:

(1) The discovery that inhibitions are more easily overcome when the physician assumes a passive attitude and refrains from interpretations.

(2) A fortunate insight into the process of a spontaneous cure of catatonic stupor in which the importance of the object choice through identification was apparent, and the necessity that the physician should assume an attitude which would permit the formation of such narcis-

sistic identification (in the sense of passively entering into the narcissistic scheme instead of forcing a transference—"Eintragung" in place of "Uebertragung.")

(3) The discovery that, where the negative transfer developed first, it is advantageous to allow it to persist while the positive is gaining strength in the unconscious.

(4) The discovery of the advantages for the cure, of quietly observing the patient's behavior, shown in the case of an actress who had an inexhaustible supply of symptomatic acts. This patient demonstrated the whole evolution of the cure in the form of an intensely interesting pantomime; the associations were in the form of movements, the mere noting of these was more effective than interpretations.

In concluding Dr. Landauer confesses that, notwithstanding his assertion that his attitude is passive, it may still be regarded as active in the sense of Ferenczi and Rank; eloquent silences and a significant attitude of "laissez faire" are often more coercive than words and overofficiousness, memories, dreams, phantasies, and acts being really "forced" by this procedure. Self-restraint and conscious passiveness may then become the most extreme degree of activity.

5. *The Psychoneurosis of a Person Born Prematurely.*—Dr. Hollós gives the history of a patient who had been born a month before the normal time. This patient was subject to peculiar attacks which clearly represented repetitions of the period of gestation. In his phantasies and dreams he went through the experiences of being cut into small pieces or of losing all feeling and of then being restored to life and form, i.e. phantasies of rebirth. The fit itself was symbolic annihilation of the self and of the parents. The same attitude was discernible in his sexual life. In his whole behavior was manifested an insatiable craving for self-destruction and re-creation; he was never free from anxiety lest he should arrive too early at places where his pleasure or business called him, or that he would begin a thing too soon; and he could never arrive at a certainty that a thing was really finished, he always had new ideas to add just as he was completing a work. The analysis in its course showed typical phases, the first one continuing nine months when a stage was reached where the attacks ceased definitely. The patient, as it were, had passed through a full term in the mother's body, from February to October, and had attained a new birth—the missing month had been supplied. In the last phase, that of readaptation to reality, there were still evidences of repressed material in relation to the mother, the uterus and "hostile life."

6. *On the Psychology of the Effect of Morphine.*—As an indication of the manner in which internal medicine may approach the problem of the use of morphine, from a psychological viewpoint, Dr. Levy presents a summary of observations from his own experiences.

He found a parallelism between the continued use of morphine, on the one hand, and a splitting of the personality, on the other, and he considers it very probable the splitting was caused by the morphine. It has been proved, he says, in regard to various other hypnotics and sedatives which cause similar intoxications, that their habitual use produces brain anemia or other diffuse brain changes; he regards morphine, however, as the least injurious drug of this character.

He deems the splitting of the personality as of direct value to patients who are suffering from chronic diseases, as it permits them to pass through the painful crises up to the very end, in a condition of euphoria.

He gives a theoretical explanation of the splitting, following the clue offered by Freud in his recent article on Neurosis and Psychosis. In this article Freud maintains that the psyche has three apparatuses at its disposal: the It, the Ego, and the Super-ego. If we assume, Dr. Levy says, that the morphine paralyzes the ego so that the pain in the It apparatus, caused by the disease, cannot gain access to the Ego, while the connection of the Ego with the Super-ego is preserved, we have a working hypothesis to account for the splitting of the personality. That there really are elements of the Super-ego in the delusions and identifications formed under the influence of the drug, is well illustrated by one of the writer's cases; a patient in his most critical period was filled with solicitude, not for himself, but for his wife, thus assuming the altruistic attitude of the devoted husband.

This division of the psychic apparatus permits the formation of new questions in regard to the topography of the brain, particularly of the cerebrum, and promises explanation of the obscure euphoric effects of morphine.

7. *On the "Tendency to Regression."*—Dr. Moxon cites biological instances from Kammerer and others in support of Ferenczi's statement that the fetal existence in the amniotic fluid indicates a regression to an earlier evolutionary condition and only takes place in animals whose ancestors had lived in water and were forced to take up a land life.

Referring to the salamandra maculosa, he says that under normal conditions the larvae have gills at birth and attain a certain development in water before their lungs are formed and they begin their life on land. If these salamanders are kept in captivity, water being withheld, this condition is compensated for by a reduction in the number of young, and by a longer period in the mother's body, during which the gills attain peculiar development. If this second generation of salamanders have access to water they produce very large larvae, which leave the water after a few days, instead of after months as is the case under natural conditions. Another species, salamandra atra, in freedom

has only two fully developed young at birth, which are capable of living in a dry medium. If water is offered freely the young are brought forth prematurely, with the gills still developing, and by a shortening and broadening, the gills adapt themselves to water breathing.

8. *On the Mimic of Assent and Dissent.*—The writer says that the signs of assent and dissent are to be regarded as emotional expressions. The nodding of the head, he regards as a symbolic use of the motion of mastication and of the motions in the sexual act, which have become displaced to the head; while the shaking of the head in dissent he traces to the motion of shuddering in disgust. He suggests that the gesture of the hand expressive of dissent is secondary, the motion of the head having been transferred to the hand.

9. *On the Psychological Meaning of the Arc-de-cercle.*—Dr. Weiss describes the dreams and phantasies of a patient who consulted him because of compulsive fears. She had no knowledge of the arc-de-cercle, yet in a dream she went through this experience in connection with a phantasy of giving birth. Dr. Weiss believes that the dream throws light on the hysterical arc-de-cercle as connected with the phantasy of giving birth and notes the frequency with which hysterical patients in their attacks imitate the act of giving birth or its equivalents.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF YOUTH. By Edgar James Swift. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927. Pp. 338.

The author of "How to Influence Men" purposes in this new edition of "Youth and the Race" to help parents understand their children after they have passed the age of ten. This is a creditable purpose and the average parent appreciates the need of some assistance. However it is an insult to his intelligence to read about "the instinctive fear of wild animals" (p. 7) when there is a more or less easily observed ontogenetic basis. And, then, instead of some irresistible influence of racial heritage being seen in the play of his children one is more apt to have observed some reflection of his own adult striving. Be that as it may, if the parent-reader can survive such revelations about his ten-year-old as "Primitive impulses are still rampant" (p. 29), he may be able to gain something from the quotations about pupil-government in the subsequent chapters. The capability and insight of children should be instructive to those who have attempted to manage them, usually through fear. The factual material collated here from various sources is self-explanatory; but the rest of the book remains as a monumental evidence to the author's lack of knowledge about psychology.

HADLEY.

CHILDREN IN THE NURSERY SCHOOL. By Harriet M. Johnson, Director of The Nursery School associated with The Bureau of Educational Experiment. New York: The John Day Company, 1928. 352 pages; including bibliography and index.

This book presents a clear and practical plan of the workings of one of the first experimental nursery schools. The author records her eight years' experience in this work, and gives conclusions drawn from the study of children's activities, from fourteen to thirty-six months, one of the most significant periods of mental, physical and social development. In the four chapters she explains her methods from a psychological and sociological basis. In her discussion of the environment offered by the school, she considers the child's activities and materials, his relation to other children and to adults, and his introduction to language and rhythm.

To quote from the book, "My conclusion is that they are leading productive lives. They are learning to live happily away from intimate contact with the family whose concerns are most emotionally bound up with theirs; they are establishing control over their own bodies so that they approach the physical environment with readiness and confidence;

they are learning to route themselves through a day with the least possible amount of direction and dictation; they are establishing interests which they can explore independently and they are learning to share the life of a social group, to modify their demands upon the world in relation to their fellows, and to appreciate the compensations as well as the restrictions that social living implies with the result that their emotional lives are functioning on a normal level."

The writer is evidently well qualified to undertake this work and the records of her efforts are of historical and practical significance, as well as of vital interest to teachers, parents, and others interested along these lines.

MARY O'MALLEY.

MODERN PSYCHOLOGY, NORMAL AND ABNORMAL. By Daniel B. Leary, Ph.D. Published by J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1928. Pp. 441. Price \$4.

The theme of this decidedly readable volume is that human conduct is the dynamic and determined behavior of an integrated personality. The fact that the behavior of the individual is the determined result of native traits, of structure in action, and of previous and present experiences is not, Dr. Leary believes, an occasion for pessimism but rather for promise; if the factors are not incalculable the results can be understood and perchance controlled or modified.

The author evidently leans strongly toward the school of Behaviorism, a fact that the reviewer suspects he would not admit, although Dr. Leary is not timid in expressing his views which are commendably catholic and liberal. He stresses the biological basis of behavior but shows the futility of attempting to explain it in terms of atomistic physiology. If Dr. Leary would hesitate to be called a behaviorist in the full Watsonian sense he would hasten to deny the theory of psychoanalysis. Yet with one of those inconsistencies exhibited by virile thinkers, the author in one breath designates psychoanalysis as a figurative scheme, an anthropomorphic speculation, while in the next he describes it as a dynamic, integrated exposition of personality, and characterizes its technique as a practical and valuable therapeutic device for the reshaping of personality or for the forming of a good one. In seeking for the dynamics of the personality Leary is impatient with the libido of Freud, the purpose of Jung and the will-to-power of Adler, evidently having them in mind when he alludes to "a disincarnated power, an entity having independent existence, or a species of freely floating or circulating energy." Of the various psychoanalytic schools which, in spite of his indictments as to nomenclature and demonstrability, Leary asserts "have been among the very few really fruitful sources of psychological theory for some years," the author sees that of Kempf as most rational, as most nearly conforming to biological postulates because it

offers a structural approach. Kempf's theory that all behavior is conduct in the service of the autonomic segments is, Leary believes, but another way of stating his own hypothesis that all conduct is in terms of the conditioning of drives. It is here that Leary becomes vague. Dissatisfied with the nonstructural, "freely floating energy" of the psychoanalysts as the fundamental, initiating dynamics for behavior he seeks for something objective. This he finds in "inherited and preferential connections" between receptor and effector of various patterns and in reflex circuits. Those groups of patterns of connected neurons that initiate activity Leary calls "drives"; those that execute the activity he calls "mechanisms," although he adds that any distinction between drives and mechanisms is artificial as all are really mechanisms, the difference being one of an arbitrary stress on dynamics in the case of drives. To urges, needs and instincts he would give a similar structural basis. One wonders if this structural neuron-connection basis of drives is altogether clear to Leary for later he says that drives may be thought of as situations or activities which initiate more complex streams of behavior. The attempt to substitute objective structure for a figurative energy, by whatever name one wishes to designate the latter, hardly succeeds in rendering the situation any clearer. In other ways Leary quarrels with the terminology of psychoanalysis in his attempt to reduce symbolism to structure. The unconscious, for example, is reduced to the nonassociated and the dissociated; repressed material, too, is dissociated material, while complexes are "conditioned incompatibilities." One may not agree with his conclusions or the bases on which they are reached, but the attitude of mind that seeks to ascertain if the value of old concepts should not be reappraised or their form be reconstructed is to be encouraged. This constant aim of Leary to read structure into old concepts has led in one instance to desirable restatement if not to revaluation. After advising the analyst to be familiar with Freud and with all there is to be known of general and abnormal psychology, he adds,— "And a great deal else also, for in brief, the process of analysis is really the process of building up in an individual a whole new philosophy of life, a philosophy, incidentally, not merely or even primarily of words, but also of motor and visceral patterns, for philosophy can exist as much in terms of these two latter types of patterns as in the more conventional verbal sense."

While departing evidently from orthodox psychoanalysis Dr. Leary does not thereby lose anything in dynamics or synthesis. Many will not accept his conclusions but his methods are consistent with those of Science, *i.e.*, to seek to interpret the complex and general in terms of the simple and concrete, and to formulate hypotheses that explain events in terms of observed facts.

Dr. Leary's book is divided into four parts. Part I is entitled

"Fundamental Structures, Drives and Mechanisms" and deals with the biological bases of behavior, the psychological level of behavior and the dynamics of conduct. Part II discusses the nature of functioning of intelligence and includes a sound evaluation of the rôle of intelligence in behavior. Part III is devoted to the personality and its disturbances. In this part Dr. Leary suggests a new classification of the psychoses, psychoneuroses and psychopathic personalities expressed in terms of the cause and purpose of the personality disturbance and of the degree of disintegration resulting from the adjustive effort. While from the mere standpoint of category the psychiatrist will not find this classification practical, it possesses both analytic and synthetic values not found in the usual formal classifications. Part IV is entitled "Types and Systems of Personality Adjustment" but as a fact deals with miscellaneous subjects such as art, religion and philosophy. The discussion on these subjects contains nothing unfamiliar to the psychoanalyst but represents a welcome departure from the material usually presented in a volume dealing with general psychology. Dr. Leary's method of presenting these subjects suggests how far he has departed in his volume from the type of book on psychology appearing but a few years ago. There is none of that former mixture of physiology of the special senses, verbalisms and epistemology. It is not esoteric; it is human. NOYES.

LECTURES ON CONDITIONED REFLEXES: Twenty-Five Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity (Behavior) of Animals. By Prof. Ivan Petrovitch Pavlov, M.D., translated from the Russian by W. Horsley Gantt, M.D., B.Sc. Published by International Publishers, New York, pp. 414; including Biographical Sketch, Bibliography and Index.

Although the results of Pavlov's experiments with dogs in developing conditioned reflexes have been far from unknown in England and America, they have never received the attention in these countries that their significance has merited. This has doubtless been due to the fact that until recently there has been no English translation of Pavlov's writings that covered the field of his researches. This has been remedied by the appearance in English of the volume under consideration and by a somewhat more detailed record of his experiments in *Conditioned Reflexes*, also recently published. As the title of the present book indicates, its contents consist of lectures. There are forty-one of these lectures, given before different scientific organizations between 1903 and 1928, and they accordingly represent the development of Pavlov's ideas over a quarter of a century of painstaking and critical investigation. Without in the least depreciating the genius of Pavlov, one must admire the discernment of Setchenov, who nearly fifty years earlier presented the fundamental idea of conditioned reflexes in an article entitled "Re-

flexes of the Brain," a contribution which Pavlov generously acknowledges.

Pavlov's general theory of conditioned reflexes and his technique of establishing physiological ones are too well known to need description. It may not be amiss, however, to add that for him adjustment depends on two groups of antithetical processes: synthesis and analysis, and excitation and inhibition. Analysis is a function both of the organs of reception and of their neuronc extension and representation in the cortex, the cruder analyses of external forces (light, sound, etc.) occurring in the receptors while the most delicate and discriminative analyses are made in the cortical neurones. The impulses resulting from this resolution of energies are synthesized by the cortical synapses and transmitted to the effectors. Expressed in psychological rather than physiological terms, this synthesis would of course be association. From Pavlov's standpoint the cerebral hemispheres constitute a complex analyzing organ resolving the intricacy of both outer and inner worlds into their elements and then connecting these with the multiform activities of the organism. Both synthesis and analysis are founded on the basic processes of excitation and inhibition, the exact nature of which Pavlov considers still unknown. The continual and rapid readjustment of the temporary, acquired, individual, or conditioned reflexes by the formation or abolition of temporary neuronc connections in an attempt of the organism to maintain an equilibrium with its environment is secured by these processes of excitation and inhibition.

Pavlov was struck by the differences of temperament observed in his dogs used for experiment. Some were aggressive, others were timid. One group was quiet and sedate while another was lively and active. As he sought to establish conditioned reflexes in these animals he found characteristic and permanent differences in the nervous systems manifested by varying degrees of excitation and inhibition associated with these dissimilar temperamental groups. Accordingly Pavlov, who accepts the time-honored Hippocratic classification of temperaments, believes that choleric persons possess nervous systems in which the process of excitation predominates, in the melancholic inhibition outbalances, while in the sanguine and phlegmatic the nervous systems are respectively excitatory or inhibitory in tendency but the two processes remain in equilibrium. While admitting it is but speculation, Pavlov suggests that a disturbance in the normal relation of the two processes in the excitatory, choleric type leads to neurasthenia. In the same way disturbed relations in the inhibitory type of nervous system result in hysteria. Finally when these processes are so disturbed as to lead to psychoses, the former results in the cycloid and the latter in the schizophrenic forms of mental disease. Curiously enough, Pavlov looks upon both the neuroses and the psychoses as the results of conflict, not of course in any subjective

sense but purely as a physiological conflict between excitation and inhibition. This physiological conflict and the resulting illness may follow impulses which because of the circumstances of life must be suppressed. Phobias are explained by the theory that the excitatory substances in the cortex are either small in amount or unusually destructible, with the result that inhibition is the predominant nervous process.

Pavlov's explanation of consciousness is interesting from a psychological aspect but sheds no light on its subjective nature. Consciousness, he believes, is dependent upon a certain optimum degree of excitation of a part of the hemispheres. New conditioned reflexes are easily formed in these favorable areas, the contents of consciousness being determined by the area possessing the most suitable excitability. These areas shift from moment to moment, dependent upon external stimuli and upon the relation between different centers, hence the constant succession of the contents of consciousness. Parts of the hemispheres not in this most favorable state of excitation possess a more or less diminished excitability concerned largely with previously elaborated conditioned reflexes and subjectively described as unconscious.

Sleep, according to Pavlov, is but an extension of inhibition. The latter is a localized, closely limited sleep restricted to certain areas by the opposing action of excitation; sleep is a generalized inhibition that has extended throughout the hemispheres and often into the midbrain. The various phenomena transitional between the waking state and sleep are different degrees of extensiveness and intensiveness of inhibition. Hypnotism is a localized suppression by inhibition of certain areas of the hemispheres but not extending deeply below the cortex.

Pavlov has undertaken a bold venture—an attempt to render objective mechanisms heretofore considered susceptible of subjective investigation only, but he has undertaken it with the vision and imagination of the true scientist. Some have called him the Darwin of psychology and of physiology; it is as yet too early to assign his permanent place in the field of science but it will certainly be an eminent one. Until the seed that Pavlov has sown comes to fruition the psychiatrist must wonder if his emphasis on physiology has not tended to establish mechanization at the expense of dynamics. Nearly all of Pavlov's researches on conditioned responses have been limited to work with the salivary gland,—a single physiologically unimportant effector or organ having few communications with the rest of the organism. Its rôle in the drama of life is insignificant. To be sure, higher forms of behavior are undoubtedly the results of lower and therefore simpler types of activity. It is an axiom of science to seek to interpret the complex in terms of the simpler, but how far this process can be applied in the highest psychical processes of man with his capacities for appreciating spiritual values must for the present remain undetermined. One must not forget the law of emergent evolution, that new properties can not be reduced to an identity with the

parts from which they emerged. The "nothing but" attitude tends to be static. In any case there will always remain a difference between living subjectively and resolving the subjective world into its elements.

NOYES.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY INTERPRETED. By Jesse William Sprowls. Published by The Williams and Wilkins Co., Baltimore, 1927. Price \$4.00. Pp. 268.

This book is intended to orient the student beginning the study of social psychology. There seems to have been a definite field for such a work and it is believed that the author has supplied that need. Professor Sprowls has realized the indefiniteness in which the subject still finds itself as well as the tendency of a nascent science to produce a diversity of schools, so has been less dogmatic than have the authors of some more ambitious dissertations on the subject. Its evolution from the generality of a philosophy to the particularity of a science is briefly outlined and the theories of its founders from Hegel to Allport are concisely summarized. His own point of view is biological and Sprowls believes that the sciences that contribute to social psychology are so definitely based on biology that the former subject is rapidly being removed from the sphere of speculation. Nevertheless he does not believe that social psychology has yet reached the degree of structuralization that it can dispense with philosophical considerations. Because it leaves out life as the problem he cannot agree that the mechanistic hypothesis offers a complete interpretation of psychology. If the mechanist criticizes Bergson or Freud as metaphysical for postulating an *élan vital* or a *libido* Sprowls charges the mechanist with being equally metaphysical, since in the final analysis physiology must be reduced to terms of electrons which are known in data of time and space only. While regarding the assumption of a fundamental life principle or force as feasible in the case of the individual Sprowls is skeptical of the postulation of a social force as an explanation of social movements and progress; if the term force must be used it should be used in a sequential rather than a causal sense. Naturally if the author does not consider the hypothesis of a social force warranted he can find no excuse for that vanishing assumption, the group mind. For descriptive purposes he would speak of mind groups to which he would attribute the origin of social habits, attitudes, prejudices and fears. The theory of a mind group like the theory of a common will Sprowls does not consider free from dangerous results, the former tending to endow public opinion with an unwarranted sacredness and the latter tending to produce static or reactionary policies in government by stimulating an unjustified conviction in the infallibility of the status quo. From the standpoint of sociology this proposition seems worthy of remark. His definition of social psychology as "a science of the behavior

of individuals in the presence of those elements of their environment to which they have come to attach value" appears, too, to merit quotation.

The practice of the author in distinguishing clearly between subject-matter and method tends to promote clarity of thought and is an example that many a writer of scientific subjects could follow to advantage. One entire chapter is devoted to the methods of social psychology. Sprowls is undoubtedly correct in describing these as still confused because of the lack of definiteness existing both in the scope and subject-matter. To one specializing in the study of the abnormal in the individual the author does not seem to stress sufficiently the genetic method, a method the value of which the author recognizes and the credit for which he believes is largely due to the psychoanalytic school although he considers some of its conclusions faulty. One desiring a taste of social psychology together with just enough of its philosophy to whet his appetite for heavier wines will not be disappointed in this little volume.

NOYES.

SUICIDE. By Ruth Shonle Cavan. Published by the University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1928. Pp. 359.

An excellent book—probably the best work on the subject that we have had in English since the translation of Morselli. It is written essentially from a socio-statistical point of view and its criticism must be from that angle. One might conceivably have a great deal of difficulty in determining the psychology of an individual after he has committed suicide, and the records are notoriously scanty, sometimes nil, in which latter case the entire psychological reconstruction must be hypothetical, but at the descriptive level and from the statistical and social angles the authoress has given us an excellent study, and the case histories that she has quoted, particularly the two extended ones, are very illuminating, poignant human documents.

WHITE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ADOLESCENT. By Leta S. Hollingworth, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Education, Teachers College, Columbia University. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1928. 227 pages including bibliography and index.

A conservative, clear, concise, and easily readable exposition of what is at present known of the adolescent mind and its universal problems. While there is nothing new set forth on the subject, what is here given will be of deep interest and much value to students, teachers, and all others interested in the adolescent problem. An excellent feature in this author's presentation is that she gives examples from her own experience of the reactions of the normal boy and girl at this time of life rather than cases of psychopathic trends.

The volume is composed of eight chapters which trace logically a development through this period. The title of each chapter is self-explanatory, and each one deals with the subject in an inclusive and

adequate manner. What is Adolescence?—the age psychical and physical changes is first discussed. In Chapter II, The Pubic Ceremonies, some of the known pubertal practices among primitive people is presented. In Chapter III, Psychological Weaning, the period of emotional upheavals is considered under the following headings: importance of getting away from the family; learning to let go; technique of weaning; revision of habits; the possessive mother; homesickness; extreme instances of parental domination; nature of attachment to the family; general symptoms of an unweaned condition; why is it desirable to be weaned; new powers and urges.

Following this, Chapter IV takes up the subject of Seeking Self-Support, and Chapter V, Mating. Some of the most important subdivisions under the subject of mating are as follows: recognition of sexual maturation; sex attraction; normal growth of sex interests; courtships; aberrations; co-education; rational control; sex education. The last three chapters are devoted to such subjects as: Achieving a Point of View (this includes the need of a religion and a philosophy), Finding the Self, and the Meaning of Maturity.

After summing up the maladaptations of various kinds, the author states, "many failures could almost certainly be averted if all of the essential major adjustments which we have described could be carried out under an enlightened guidance rather than under conditions of blind struggle which at present so largely prevails."

Included is an excellent group of scientific references. The author calls attention in the preface that Dr. G. Stanley Hall's writings have not been taken into consideration, giving as her reasons for the omission of this valuable material that the methods of study and social conditions have been so changed that such references would be largely of merely historic value. One cannot agree with the author's views on this subject as no constructive work can be done without a substructure, and the learned head of Clark University laid a firm and durable foundation for all the work which has since been undertaken. MARY O'MALLEY.

PSCHO-ANALYSIS AND EDUCATION. By Barbara Low. Published by Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1928. Pp. 224.

A very excellent, readable, clearly stated, and easily understandable presentation of the relation of psychoanalysis to the problems of education. A book that should be read with profit, especially by teachers and those who are in important administrative relation to the educational system. WHITE.

NOTICE.—All business communications should be addressed to The Psychoanalytic Review, 3617 Tenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

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